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ABSTRACT 
This study is informed by Gramsci’s hegemony theory complemented by instrumentalism to 
analyse the constraints on multiparty democracy under the Zimbabwe African National Union 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government. Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 was led by 
President Robert Gabriel Mugabe for 37 years up to 2017 when the military edifice deposed him. 
Electoral contests between the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF and pro-democratic opposition parties, 
inclusive of those that were formed out of ZANU-PF, gave the opposition no chance of gaining 
power. The closest the opposition came to winning was the March 2008 harmonised elections 
when the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) broke ZANU-PF parliamentary hegemony, 
and when Morgan Tsvangirai beat Mugabe for president, only to be prevented from forming a 
government on grounds of electoral technicalities. This dissertation is premised on the constraints 
on the institutionalisation of multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe. It analyses the efficacy of the 
growing opposition to ZANU-PF rule and how the liberation narrative espoused by ZANU-PF 
critically hampered the development of democratic traditions. This dissertation contributes to our 
understanding of attendant challenges to effective multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe in view of 
the military takeover in 2017. It is a study that transcends the narrow confines of analysing ZANU-
PF alone and blaming it for mayhem in the country. Rather, the research posits that the governance 
crisis in Zimbabwe is a shared responsibility. The shortcomings in the objectives, strategies and 
modus operandi of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe and the strength of ZANU-PF are 
analysed. The extent to which opposition parties were sponsored by western countries to effect 
regime change, and the extent to which their political programmes were largely driven and shaped 
by internal considerations and reflected the ‘will of the people’, were evaluated. The thesis 
considers ethnic divisions and post-independence inheritances in making conflict inevitable. It 
argues that ZANU-PF built up strong liberation narratives designed to entrench its hegemony, with 
media portrayal of opposition parties and ZANU-PF to serve different ends. Finally, the role of 
the military in Zimbabwean politics, oftentimes characterised by unremitting violence, is 
considered as militating against peaceful democratic politics and a smooth political transition after 
the 2018 elections. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION   
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY  
Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia under colonial rule and subsequently Rhodesia under 
white minority rule, was colonised by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1890. Six 
years after colonial occupation, Africans rose in resistance against this foreign invasion. The 
common grievances that the Shona and the Ndebele people had against the new arrivals included 
their loss of independence, forced labour, general ill-treatment, loss of land, the prevalence of 
diseases such as rinderpest that attacked their cattle, and natural disasters that they associated with 
the coming of the white intruders.1 This resistance against colonial invasion became popularly 
known as the First Chimurenga, a Shona word that refers to an uprising or revolt.2  
Africans in Zimbabwe were subjugated in 1897. Influential religious leaders of the resistance such 
as Nehanda, a woman spirit medium operating in the Mazoe area of Mashonaland, and Kaguvi, 
were among several religious leaders who were arrested and executed. The country was named 
Southern Rhodesia in honour of Cecil John Rhodes who founded the BSAC that effectively 
occupied this territory as part of the settlement reached at the 1884-5 Berlin Conference that 
endorsed the principle of ‘effective occupation’3 to regularise and regulate colonial acquisitions 
on the continent of Africa by European countries. 
In 1923, the BSAC surrendered its authority to a substantial white settler community that was 
composed of people from Britain and other parts of the world who had heeded the call to come to 
the country to be rewarded with 3 000 acres of land and fifteen gold claims each.4 There was high 
speculation of large gold deposits across the Limpopo after the discovery of gold on the 
                                                 
1 S. Dawson, (2011). The First Chimurenga: 1896-1897 Uprising in Matabeleland and Mashonaland and the 
Continued Conflicts in Academia. Constellations, 2(2): 144-153. 
2 Murenga Sororenzou was the leading personality and religious leader who fearlessly challenged colonial occupation 
and organized resistance in both Matabeleland and Mashonaland. His name became important in future struggles with 
the colonial system, hence the First, Second and Third Chimurenga which all signaled the fight against colonial 
oppression and African marginalisation. 
3 The Berlin/Congo Conference held in Germany during 1884 and 1885 put the brakes on uncontrolled European 
expansion in Africa. It also sought to prevent imminent colonial conflicts among imperialist forces such as Germany, 
Britain, France, Italy and Belgium over what they claimed as their ‘spheres of influence.’ One of the resolutions of 
the conference was that a power’s claim to a specific territory had to be supported by the hoisting of the colonisers’ 
flag and the physical presence of colonialists in the hope that this would prevent conflicts between European powers 
over spheres of influence. 
4 A.S. Mlambo, (2010). This is our land: The racialisation of land in the context of the current Zimbabwe crisis. 
Journal of Developing Societies, 26(1), p. 52. 
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Witwatersrand in the Transvaal in the 1880s. It is important to highlight that the white settlers had 
come to the country to stay permanently; hence, it was a settler colony. The country was given 
Responsible Government status by the British government, which meant that white settlers were 
in control of the country. Huge investments in infrastructure, including roads and railways, 
industrial and other capital-generating national projects were made on the understanding that the 
settlers were developing their ‘home.’  
African nationalism developed as a response to white oppression and racial discrimination and was 
regarded as a continuation of the post-pacification struggle that characterised the mid-1890s. It 
was realised by some African leaders that the oppressive system could be dislodged only if 
Africans ignored their ethnic differences and united towards the achievement of political 
liberation. The initiative to lead in this liberation campaign came from educated Africans such as 
Ndabaningi Sithole, Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzei Mudzi, Herbert Chitepo and Robert Mugabe 
among others, most of whom had been privileged to attend mission schools. The colonial struggle 
for control of territory north of the Limpopo river was represented by the Boers, as the descendants 
of Dutch and other Europeans settlers to the Cape from the 17th century were known, and the 
British, both of whom had long established themselves in what was to be the future South Africa. 
To counter Boer manoeuvres, the British created a dominion in 1953 in the form of a federation 
that included Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.  
In Southern Rhodesia, the interests of the whites were paramount whereas in Northern Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, African interests were paramount. The issue of paramountcy eventually affected 
Southern Rhodesia in the sense that the white economic and political interests took precedence 
over African interests. This setup was conducive for the declaration of white independence in 
Southern Rhodesia after the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963. 
Precisely because of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where the African 
and white partnership gave paramountcy to African interests, the Rhodesian Front (RF) party 
elected Ian Smith who refused to compromise with African nationalists. He summarily imprisoned 
leading nationalist leaders such as Robert Mugabe, Edgar Tekere, Maurice Nyagumbo and 
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Ndabaningi Sithole in 1964 before passing the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 
1965, which declared the territory independent under white minority rule.5  
The country became known as Rhodesia. A brief analysis of the UDI and the consequent birth of 
a racist Rhodesia is significant in that it allows for a reinterpretation of the post-independence 
discourses with reference to the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. One may argue that the 
UDI era was, paradoxically, a “blessing” for the nationalist leaders who finally took the reins of 
power in 1980 because it taught them the art of suppressing civil liberties and abrogating the rights 
of citizens. The UDI administration under Ian Smith provided a governance model that the ZANU-
PF government appears to have replicated. The modus operandi of the Smith Government was 
analogous to the leadership style of the Mugabe regime when it sought to thwart political 
opposition to its rule.  
Anti-communism was the major Rhodesian ideology and African nationalist formations such as 
ZAPU and ZANU were alleged to have been sponsored by communist countries to undermine 
white capitalist privilege.6 The communist threat7 was blown out of proportion to gain the support 
of sympathetic right-wing elements in the USA and the Conservative Party in Britain for Smith’s 
regime. This culminated in the establishment of a ‘Friends of Rhodesia’ and the Candour League 
of Rhodesia both of which were organisations set up by white Rhodesian hardliners in 1966 as part 
of the world anti-communist league8 and whose aim was to come up with a government-controlled 
African newspaper, The African Times, to become the medium through which to disseminate 
propaganda against communism and nationalism, and to counter the Daily News that had a 
                                                 
5 J. Hlongwana, R.S. Maposa & T. Moyo, (2013). Sithole, Nkomo, Muzorewa, and the birth of Zimbabwe: A 
reconsideration of autobiography as a literary mode of national history. Matatu Journal for African Culture and 
Society, 41, p. 322. 
6 D. Lowry, (2007). The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian political culture, ca. 1920s-1980. Cold War 
History, 7(2), p. 170.  
7 Communism required political emancipation, elimination of the capitalist state, and a conscious emancipation of 
man from alienation induced by capitalism. Communism required the transcendence of private property so that wealth 
generated, and the means of production such as mines, land, factories, and industries, would be communally owned. 
That way, society would be classless. The propertied (white capitalists) and propertiless (African labourers) classes 
created by the western capitalist mode of production would lead to serious contradictions to be resolved by means of 
a struggle/conflict based on class. The Rhodesian stance on the threat posed by communism was in concert with 
international reactions towards Marxism especially during the Cold War after 1945 between the Soviet Union and the 
USA in their superpower rivalry, and over control of African countries undergoing decolonisation once the British 
and the French began gradually pulling out. 
8 Rhodesia and World Report, (1967). Salisbury: Candour League of Rhodesia. African Pamphlet Collection, 2 (2), 
http://www.indiana.edu/~afrcol/items/show/11467 Accessed 5 February 2018. 
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significant African readership.9 Control of the media was achieved when Smith appointed Piet van 
der Byl, a propagandist and an anti-communist Rhodesian hardliner from apartheid South Africa, 
to take charge of the new office of Parliamentary Secretary of Information.10  
Lowry makes a further interesting remark on the ascendancy of the RF to power in 1964. He argues 
that it was not based on popular support among the whites, but the party with greater white support 
internally and from the British government, the Rhodesian Party, failed to renew itself resulting in 
a leadership vacuum which left the electorate unsure as to what to do.11 The RF opportunistically 
exploited the political apathy of the confused electorate, and weakening the opposition became the 
major pre-occupation of the RF, involving underhand tactics such as shouting invectives against 
opposition leaders, blocking their campaigns, and organising mobs to heckle them, and labeling 
them sell-outs.12 The propaganda was so strong that the former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Edgar 
Whitehead, was labeled an arch-enemy trying to hand over Rhodesia to African nationalists for 
his proclivity towards supporting a constitutional dispensation that proffered concessions to 
nationalist parties.13 
Newspapers such as Newsfront and the Daily News, representing white and African readership 
respectively, competed against each other. Later, it was felt that a government-controlled 
newspaper for Africans, to be known as The African Times, could best be used to churn out state 
propaganda to beat the Daily News, which was owned by a white liberal named Thomson, and was 
attracting a significant readership among Africans because it criticised the government. As the 
opposition Member of Parliament (MP) Brelsford opined, ‘The African Times had to be made more 
attractive for Africans to absorb the propaganda to attack communism and nationalism.’14 Harvey 
Ward and Ivor Benson, among other right-wing journalists of the Candour League, were part of 
                                                 
9 E. Msindo, (2009). ‘Winning hearts and minds’: Crisis and propaganda in colonial Zimbabwe, 1962–1970. Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 35, p. 674. Africans and liberal whites relied for news on the Daily News with a 
readership of 20 000 of which 5000 were Europeans,  
10 D. Lowry, (2007). The impact of anti-communism on White Rhodesian political culture, , p. 179.  
11 F. Clements, (1969). Rhodesia: The course to collision, London, Pall Mall Press, p. 243. 
12 M. Hirsch, (1973). A decade of crisis: Ten years of Rhodesian front rule, 1962–1972. P. Dearlove, Salisbury, p. 
33. 
13 E. Msindo, (2009). ‘Winning hearts and minds’, p. 671. 
14 Rhodesia legislative assembly debates, (1964). 57, Col. 1,845, 4 September 1964. Cory Library, Rhodes 
University, Grahamstown. 
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the propaganda machine that worked to help transform Smith’s image into a resolute iron man and 
an indomitably cold warrior.15  
These traits in Smith and the Rhodesian regime were antithetical to democratic governance. 
African political parties such as the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) were outlawed in 1964 to pave the way for a one-party state, 
thereby creating white hegemony. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), formerly the 
Christian Council of Rhodesia (CCR), emerged because of a largely African-inspired movement 
to create a forum where Christian leaders from different denominations could tackle matters of 
mutual concern in an increasingly tense political atmosphere.16  The first president of the ZCC was 
Bishop Skelton of the Anglican Diocese of Matabeleland who later resigned from his post as 
Bishop in protest against the Rhodesian racism.17 These tensions within the church suggest that 
even the predominantly white Christian Council operating in the country at that time condemned 
the UDI as defying multiparty democracy. It is interesting to note that nationalist leaders like 
Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, Canaan Banana, and Robert Mugabe emerged from a 
Christian background18 to become serious threats to white dominance in the country. As they saw 
it, the UDI represented a travesty of justice, the “bastardisation” of civilization, and an irreversible 
erosion of Christian values and traditions19  as it gave legitimacy to the exploitation of Africans in 
a white-dominated political space. 
The decision to take up arms and fight the white regime by military means came because 
diplomatic efforts to convince the Smith government to follow peaceful constitutional processes 
to non-racial democracy that had been launched in Zambia and Malawi in 1964 had come to 
nothing. ZANU, largely composed of a youthful leadership in Edgar Tekere, Mugabe as Secretary-
                                                 
15 D. Lowry, (2007). The impact of anti-communism on white Rhodesian political culture, p.180. 
16 M. Ruzivo, (2008). A mapping of the church groups in Zimbabwe. The Role of the Church in the Struggle for 
Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, p. 4.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ndabaningi Sithole was a Black minister of the American Board in the Mission Congregational Church; Abel 
Muzorewa was a bishop in the American Methodist Church; Joshua Nkomo was a lay preacher in the British-based 
Methodist Church branch; Robert Mugabe was a member of the Roman Catholic Church; Canaan Banana was a 
reverend in the American Methodist Church.  
Matikiti, R. (2008). The church and the struggle for multi-party democracy in Zimbabwe. In The Role of the Church 
in the Struggle for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe Institute Publications, Harare, p. 27.  
19 C.S. Banana, (1996). The church in the struggle for Zimbabwe: from the programme to combat racism to combat 
theology: Swedish Institute of Missionary Research [Svenska institutet för missionsforskning] in conjunction with 
Zimbabwe Centre of Research and Peace Studies, Mutare, p. 115. 
6 
 
General, Ndabaningi Sithole as president, Henry Hamadziripi, Mukudzei Mudzi, Herbert Chitepo, 
Leopold Takawira and Enos Nkala20 sent out young men to neighbouring countries for guerrilla 
training and this culminated in the Second Chimurenga. This phase was the decisive one in the 
struggle for liberation that led to the Lancaster Constitutional Conference in 1979 and the holding 
of multiparty elections in 1980 that were won by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).21  
Since independence in 1980 until the time of the writing of this thesis in 2018, ZANU-PF has 
formed the government of Zimbabwe, as shown in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1: Voter turnout in post-independence elections: 1980-2000 
 
Year 
Potential 
voting 
population 
Registered 
voters 
Voter 
turnout 
As % of 
potential 
voters 
As % of 
registered 
voters 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1995 
2000 
2 900 000 
4 000 000 
5 300 000 
6 000 000 
5 500 000 
2 900 000 
3 500 000 
4 800 000 
2 600 000 
5 049 815 
2 702 275 
2 972 146 
2 237 524 
1 482 660 
2 552 844 
93 
74 
42 
25 
46 
93 
85 
47 
57 
50 
Presidential 
1995 
2002 
6 000 000 
7 110 403 
4 902 244 
5 611 335 
1 557 651 
3 046 891 
26 
43 
32 
54 
 
Source: UNDP/Poverty Reduction Forum/IDS, 2000: 65; SAPES Data Bank 
This dissertation examines why opposition movements have been unable to wrest political power 
from the ZANU-PF, despite the downward economic spiral under its government over the past 
two decades. This research acknowledges that there has been substantial work carried out on 
ZANU-PF and thus attempts a reconstruction of Zimbabwean history that transcends the narrow 
confines of analysing ZANU-PF alone. Investigating and analysing the activities of the opposition 
will help to minimise the historical gaps and provide an alternative and more comprehensive 
                                                 
20 P. Chigora, T. Guzura, & J. Ndimande, (2015). The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU 
PF) regime in power in the 21st Century: A question of popular support or preserving power by undemocratic 
means. International Journal of Politics and Good Governance, 6(3), p. 4.  
21 The words ‘Patriotic Front’ (PF) was added to the party’s name after the Lancaster Conference in 1979 as clear 
indication that it had broken links with ZAPU and that it was going to campaign in the 1980 elections as a separate 
party. PF also differentiated it from the original ZANU party formed in 1963 of which Ndabaningi Sithole was still 
president.  
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history as well as insights that can be applied in home-grown political transition processes relevant 
for Africa. One of the key issues that this dissertation examines is the extent to which foreign 
influence and a western “regime change” agenda have been determining factors in opposition party 
politics in post-independence Zimbabwe. The dissertation examines the extent to which political 
opposition can meaningfully participate in elections in the face of ZANU-PF’s relentless rhetoric 
on preserving the country’s political sovereignty amidst western-imposed economic sanctions 
since 2001. The centrality of “war veterans” in buttressing the ZANU-PF government against pro-
democratic civil organisations, creation of liberation history by ZANU-PF intellectuals, and the 
influence of spirit mediums in marshalling support for ZANU-PF are examined. What emerges is 
a new theory predicated on military power that undercuts opposition politics in Zimbabwe. 
Analysing the continuity in approach by ZANU-PF from the Smith government, even though it is 
for different reasons and in a different context, is useful in understanding the ruling party 
government’s behaviour and strategies, and refusal to change, even in the wake of widespread 
condemnation in western circles. 
Two phases in the development of opposition politics can be discerned in Zimbabwe: those 
opposition political parties that existed before the 1991 Land Acquisition Act, such as ZAPU, 
ZANU Ndonga and the UANC which contested the independence elections of 1980; and 
opposition formations in the post-1991 period, such as the MDC, which differed markedly from 
the earlier opposition parties in terms of ideological leanings, economic interests, and support base. 
Emphasis in the latter was on democracy, accountable governance, transparency and the rule of 
law, ideals which liberal western countries such as Britain, USA and France were ready to support 
because of extensive human rights abuses that accompanied the 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 elections 
and the Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) of 2005.22 
ZAPU won all 27 seats at stake in Matabeleland in the 1980 elections as evidence of the 
polarisation of the Zimbabwean society along ethnic categories broadly defined as Shona and 
Ndebele. ZAPU also had sufficient background knowledge of the ruling ZANU-PF party members 
who defected from it to form ZANU in 1963. For ZAPU, a struggle for existence had begun not 
only as a party, but also as an ethnic group that felt excluded by the reconciliation policy 
                                                 
22 S. Moyo, (2014). The manifestation of regime change in Zimbabwe in the 21st century. Journal of Advances in 
Political Science, 1(1), p.38. 
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pronounced by the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, just after independence. The study makes an 
evaluation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law and their applicability to a state 
riddled with political conflict and organisational barriers for the opposition with a view to 
proposing a genuine political transition for Zimbabwe. The link between the Land Acquisition Bill 
and Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) introduced in 199123 suggests how 
political events and economic policies shaped political opposition.   
ZANU-PF viewed sovereignty as the converse of colonialism and appeared determined to preserve 
it by resisting opposition attempts to unseat it. For ZANU-PF, regime change connoted the forced 
removal of a legitimate government with a view to substituting it with one more compliant with 
western influence. Furthermore, ZANU-PF viewed sanctions as part of this regime change 
strategy.24 Factional fights within the MDC after the disastrous MDC-T party primaries in 2013, 
which will be discussed later in the dissertation, suggest the existence of a linkage between the 
failure of sanctions to cause popular uprisings against the government and the discordant nature of 
opposition politics thereafter. Democracy and the rule of law are abstract concepts that were hardly 
understood by the less-educated in rural areas where most of the population resides. This made it 
difficult for the opposition to make inroads into rural constituencies during elections and the ruling 
party took advantage of incumbency to use patronage in allocating state resources in 
predominantly ZANU-PF rural strongholds.25 This thesis explores how the sanctions discourse 
hardened ZANU-PF’s resolve to stay in power and how it watered down the opposition’s argument 
for a democratic political dispensation  
1.2 PRELIMINARY LITERATURE STUDY, AND REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE 
TOPIC 
The underlying hypothesis in this research is that meaningful political competition among political 
parties in a country with a vindictive colonial legacy of violence and divide-and-rule, is hard to 
fathom. When groups compete for position and power, it is difficult to achieve free, fair and 
                                                 
23 This is discussed in chapter 4 to show how the Land Acquisition Bill and ESAP in 1991 provided a groundswell 
for strong anti-government opposition. 
24 D. Masaka, (2012). Paradoxes in the 'sanctions discourse' in Zimbabwe: A critical reflection. African Study 
Monographs, 33(1), p. 49.  
25 T. Marima and E. Essa, (2013). Qatar/Aljazeera, Zimbabwean opposition living in denial: Those opposed to 
Mugabe’s victory continue to reject the idea that his victory may have been legitimate, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth features/2013 Accessed 13 March 2013. 
9 
 
transparent election outcomes. This is particularly so in a postcolonial state where the ruling elite 
is preoccupied with safeguarding its vested interests, often by coercive means. This research work 
undertakes a reconstruction of Zimbabwean history since 1980. Existing literature on Zimbabwean 
politics tends to focus more on the history, policies and make-up of ZANU-PF than on opposition 
parties. This dissertation seeks to transcend the narrow confines of analysing ZANU-PF alone and 
blaming it for all the country’s political and economic challenges and posits that the crisis in 
Zimbabwe is a shared responsibility. The political transition dilemma that was fueled by bitter 
electoral competition, intimidation and disappearances of political activists hinged on ZANU-PF’s 
assumption that opposition in the country has always been created by western powers to undermine 
it. Rwodzi and Chigora26  in their analysis of the Lancaster House Talks held in London in 1979 
conclude that the agreement was a victory for those who stood for the status quo, and that meant 
that the inherited capitalist system operative in Rhodesia had to be maintained and adapted after 
independence. Tony Blair’s Labour government revoked the United Kingdom’s commitment to 
sponsor Zimbabwe’s land reform, making whites in Zimbabwe the number one enemy of the state 
as most of them joined the opposition MDC party in criticising ZANU-PF. Therefore, an empirical 
study of the opposition parties is key to an understanding of the ZANU-PF perceptions. Makumbe 
(2003), Martin, Johnson and Mugabe (1981), Masaka (2011), Mashiri (2011), Moyo (1992) and 
Raftopoulos and Sachikonye (2001) have documented the government’s behaviour negatively. 
Coltart27 also produced publications that were critical of ZANU-PF. This research attempts to 
situate itself within this community of writers of Zimbabwean political history, seeking both to 
examine what they say and fill in gaps where these exist. 
In an early study, Raftopoulos28 discusses how ZANU-PF drew Zimbabwe into the ambit of 
international capital by introducing ESAP. Government pursued inherited economic policies that 
sought to protect domestic industry and manufacture from foreign competition after independence 
despite its dilemma to reconcile growth with more equitable distribution, and initiate change 
without serious destabilisation. The welfare strategy to please supporters of the war of liberation 
                                                 
26 A. Rwodzi, & F. Chigora, (2016). Addressing socialism and capitalism in gender balance: economic effect to 
households and workplaces in Zimbabwe. International Journal of Advanced Research, Management and Social 
Sciences, p. 131. 
27 D. Coltart, (2008). A decade of suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic collapse and political repression under Robert 
Mugabe. www.cato.org/...tions/development-policy-analysis/... Accessed 30 October 2014. 
28 B. Raftopoulos, (1992). Beyond the house of hunger: Democratic struggle in Zimbabwe. Review of African 
Political Economy, 19(54), p. 64.  
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was dropped as government adopted the IMF and World Bank programme .This Economic reform  
strategy represented neo-liberal ideals such as transparency, accountability, trade liberalisation, 
elimination of government subsidies on basic commodities with a view to cushioning the poor, 
promoting private investment, privatisation of government parastatals such as the Grain Marketing 
Board (GMB) and the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), reduction in government spending 
and shedding of redundant employees to reduce the government deficit.29  
The effects of the implementation of these policies was disastrous. The resultant decline in social 
service delivery due to ESAP destroyed the welfarist strategy and that also eliminated ZANU-PF’s 
platform for support mobilisation as inflation skyrocketed at a time when many workers had been 
retrenched. The formulation of the programme marginalised the ordinary people and a wide range 
of party and ministry officials, it having been imposed by the state and the [white] business elite.30 
The adoption of ESAP was a death knell to socialism in Zimbabwe, which had ceased to be a 
viable economic philosophy throughout the world after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
1989. President Mugabe admitted: “We do not as a party have clear definition of socialism…the 
sheer weight of capitalism could very well set us off course, though our socialist commitment 
might in theory continue.”31 The ESAP era created social and economic conditions through which 
the ordinary people, workers who had been retrenched, women and civil society at large could vent 
their frustration at the declining standards of living, politically. The era also represents the loci of 
the Zimbabwean crisis when the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was embroiled in 
the protection of workers from unjustified job dismissals before it decided to become the political 
opposition, MDC, in 1999 under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai. Moyo links the political 
marginalisation that incensed whites after the constitutional withdrawal of the twenty seats 
originally reserved for them, with white pressure for economic reforms.32 These debates 
illuminated race relations when the government decided, in 2000 through an amended Act of 
Parliament, to pass legislation aimed at confiscating white farms without compensation.33  
                                                 
29 R. Chattopadhyay, R. (2000). Zimbabwe: structural adjustment, destitution & food insecurity. Review of African 
Political Economy, 27, p. 310. 
30 B. Raftopoulos, (1992). Beyond the house of hunger, p. 65. 
31 Ibid., p. 49. 
32 J. N. Moyo, (1992). State politics and social domination in Zimbabwe. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
30(02), 305-330.  
33 T. A. S. Bowyer-Bower, & C. Stoneman, (2000). Land reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and prospects. 
Routledge, New York, p. 12. 
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The land issue enabled Mugabe to use the liberation war rhetoric, colonialism and imperialism to 
brand the MDC as a ‘puppet’ party at the behest of white farmers according to Reeler.34 ZANU-
PF’s creation of ‘enemy concepts’ through the ideology of ‘patriotic history’ succeeded in stifling 
pro-democracy movements and sustaining ZANU-PF hegemony.35 Mugabe’s political skills and 
charisma need consideration in explaining the ruling party’s continued stay in power36  
 Ranger, like Shubin, supported ZAPU during the liberation struggle. His findings can proffer the 
democratic forces’ appropriate strategies in their fight for democracy, especially when dealing 
with the character of Mugabe as portrayed by Barclays.37 Tichaenzana Manyawu analyses ZANU-
PF’s promotional jingles on state media by the Mbare Chimurenga Choir and links this practice to 
ZANU-PF’s  appropriation of the national heritage while alienating rival parties from that 
heritage.38. ZANU-PF-backed nationalist narrative, or ‘patriotic history’, drew distinctions 
between those who could and could not legitimately lay claim to Zimbabwe's nationalist history.39 
This elevated and valorized the anti-colonial guerrilla war and the roles of ex-guerrillas, while at 
the same time marginalising other historical subjects in Zimbabwe's nationalist past. According to 
Meredith, 40 Mugabe treated Zimbabwe’s wealth and resources as spoils of war for his inner circle. 
Meredith was a British correspondent for The London Observer and Sunday Times, and became a 
research fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, before becoming an independent author and 
commentator.41 He spent many years as a writer of African history and some of his conclusions in 
his book about the political history of Zimbabwe might have been coloured by the historical 
                                                 
34 A. P. Reeler, (2003). The role of militia groups in maintaining Zanu PF’s political power. 
http://archive.niza.nl/docs/200303171414038719.pdf Accessed 9 February 2017. 
35 Tendi, B.-M. (2010). Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals, and the Media, Peter Lang., p. 40. 
ZANU-PF appropriated the history of Zimbabwe and re-organised it into a single narrow narrative. This kind of history 
became known as ‘patriotic history’, repeated endlessly in the state-controlled media and state-sanctioned political 
rallies throughout the country in order to gain monopoly. Any history that was not embedded in the liberation struggle, 
particularly at the height of the political crisis after the 2000 referendum, was discarded as irrelevant. 
36 P. Barclays (2010). Years of hope and despair, cited in S. Onslow, 2011. Zimbabwe and political transition. The 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, p. 3. 
37 Ibid.  
38 A. T. Manyawu, 2013. The promotional discourse of liberation movements in Zimbabwe: A textual analysis of 
political jingles. Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies, 31, p. 71. 
39 M. B. Munochiveyi, (2011). Becoming zimbabwe from below. Multiple narratives of Zimbabwean nationalism. 
Critical African Studies, 4(6), p.91. 
40 M. Meredith, (2007). Mugabe: power, plunder, and the struggle for Zimbabwe. Public Affairs, New York, n.p. 
41 Meredith’s book: Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe's Future chronicles Mugabe's 
transformation from political visionary to violent dictator. It was for that reason that Meredith was deported from 
Zimbabwe by the government. 
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struggle of the British against Mugabe which may have made him too pessimistic about ZANU-
PF and Mugabe. This study takes up this point.  
Autobiographical accounts by Ndabaningi Sithole, Joshua Nkomo and Abel Muzorewa, who were 
founder members of ZANU, ZAPU and UANC respectively, offer an alternative history to the 
narrow patriotic version provided by ZANU-PF.42 This research focuses on the knowledge gap 
about the broad constraints on multiparty democracy, foreign influence on opposition build-up, 
and the role of internal factors. This should provide insights into the philosophy of opposition 
formations and their relations with the white constituency and ZANU-PF. Zimbabwe had no 
experience in multiracial opposition politics as symbolised by the MDC at its inception in 1999. 
The land issue was engaged from two different paradigms. The first was that land reform or the 
redistribution exercise was, to ZANU-PF, democracy at work, as it strove to bring development 
by empowering the historically marginalised blacks in terms of land ownership.43The second 
perspective from the neo-liberal school was that the programme involved violent, racialised attacks 
on white farmers and the seizure of their property without compensation, which did not align well 
with western democratic norms. 
Disillusionment with the government’s economic mismanagement, and in particular, taxation 
levels and escalating prices, gave rise to the MDC.44 Raftopoulos and Sachikonye 45 focus on the 
exclusivity of ZANU-PF nationalism and sees the emergence of the MDC as an anti-Mugabe 
reaction without positive alternatives. The 1999 MDC strategy paper envisaged democracy and 
the rule of law as its weapons in the fight against ZANU-PF.46 Tendi (2010), Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2012) and Compagnon (2011) trace ZANU-PF’s claims of a western regime change agenda to the 
British comments on the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe which smacked of interference. Missing 
from all these works are official opposition narratives to counter ZANU-PF’s patriotic history. 
                                                 
42 W. Willems, (2013). ‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’: changing celebratory styles and meanings of 
independence. Anthropology Southern Africa, 36, p. 15. 
43 Interview with Chung. She argues that ZANU-PF used food as a democratic tool and that sharing land is 
democracy. 
44 B. Raftopoulos & L. Sachikonye, (2001). Striking back: The labour movement and the post-colonial state in 
Zimbabwe 1980-2000. Weaver Press, Harare, p. 272. 
45 B. Raftopoulos, (2006). Reflections on the opposition in Zimbabwe: The politics of the movement for democratic 
change (MDC), In S. Chan and R. Primorac (Eds.), Zimbabwe in Crisis. The International Response and the Space 
of Silence. Taylor and Francis, London, p. 6.  
46 Ibid., p. 10. 
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According to Shubin,47 the British government was responsible for the failure of decolonisation in 
Southern Rhodesia. His political involvement in supporting liberation movements in Southern 
Africa from the 1960s 48 suggests his sympathy with the liberation movements. Shubin articulates 
the position of ZANU-PF over land and arguably over-emphasises the Zimbabwean political crisis 
as having started when ZANU-PF embarked on a land reform programme after 2000,49 though it 
can be argued that the country’s economic crisis had its origins at independence in 1980, and 
progressively intensified under ESAP. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya analyse ZANU-PF’s version of repackaged history to relive the 
Second Chimurenga.50. They analyse the economic meltdown since 1990. However, they tend to 
peripheralise how opposition politics, strategies and philosophical underpinnings evolved and 
changed since 1980. They largely ignore opposition agency in the political violence in Zimbabwe, 
yet, in some cases, ZANU-PF and opposition perpetrators of violence were indistinguishable, 
particularly during the 2008 election violence throughout the country. Coltart, an opposition MDC 
politician, admits that by 2005 his party had split over the decision by the less-educated in the 
party to use violence to take over power in Zimbabwe. As founding secretary for legal affairs in 
the MDC, he revealed how the split in the original party came about because of Tsvangirai’s bent 
towards violence.51 This view is shared by Bracking, who writes about British spies training MDC 
youths in South Africa to form an advanced invasion party to unleash violence.52 This could 
quickly be dismissed as ZANU-PF propaganda as this appeared in a state-controlled newspaper, 
but Coltart insists, in his book, that Tsvangirai trained bandits in South Africa in 2006 in 
                                                 
47 V. Shubin, (2013). Zimbabwe's choice. Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society, 1(1), p. 42. 
48 V. Shubin (2009). The Hot “Cold War”: The USSR in Southern Africa, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal 
of Military Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, p. 135. 
49  Shubin, V. 2012. Zimbabwe: Myths and realities. Africa Review, 4(1), p. 75. 
50 T. Ranger, (2004). Nationalist historiography, patriotic history and the history of the nation: The struggle over the 
past in Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, p. 215. 
51 B. Zulu, (2015). VOA Special Report,Ominous signs Zimbabwe headed for violent 2018 election, n.p. 
https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/zimbabwe-politics-violence-mdc-tsvangirai-zanu-pf/3050524.html Accessed 25 
January 2017. 
52 S. Bracking, (2005). Development denied: autocratic militarism in post-election Zimbabwe. Review of African 
Political Economy, 32, p. 351.  
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preparation for a violent takeover of power in Zimbabwe and that what remains to be established 
was whether the trained bandits were to be used for offensive or defensive purposes.53 
From the 1985 elections when ‘strategic killings’ of ZAPU organisers, councillors and officials 
was primarily aimed at undermining and incapitating the opposition, to subsequent elections held 
in 1990, 2000, 2002 and 2008, retributive violence was unleashed by the ruling party to broadcast 
a wider lesson, namely, that its hegemony should not be challenged at all.54 Sachikonye further 
argues that any explanation of the recurrence of political violence in Zimbabwe over the past three 
decades should include state-conferred impunity which did not criminalise attacks by regime 
loyalists on institutions and individuals belonging to the opposition.55 This research was predicated 
on the struggle for multiparty democracy from an earlier period, roughly from 1980, highlighting 
the use of violence that became the trademark of the country’s elections up to 2015. 
The African Union (AU) secretary, Takirambudde, in 2002, argued that MDC insisted on people-
driven land reform, yet its operations were financed by whites who stood to lose, and that was the 
reason for ZANU-PF to ascribe a sense of victimhood to white identities.56 The paradox of a 
people-driven programme benefiting white land victims became crucial. This research analysed 
the MDC’s political ambivalence and its multiracial composition as major constraints on 
multiparty democracy in the country. It failed to justify convincingly the reasons for its existence 
as a political party and as an alternative to the ZANU-PF government because rural constituencies 
were sealed off and impenetrable for the opposition. Instead, MDC became a convenient scapegoat 
for all the malaise of the rural communities for supposedly fraternising with western countries, and 
for its lack of a clear official party policy position about equitable land redistribution and reform. 
The idea of sanctions when first mooted after World War II was based on the belief that if peace-
loving states agreed on certain restrictions as a mechanism of control, potential aggressor states 
would learn their lessons and thereby abide by the universally agreed political conduct in pursuit 
                                                 
53 The Herald, (2016). ‘Provide evidence of MDC-T banditry, Coltart told’, https://www.herald.co.zw/provide-
evidence-of-mdc-t-banditry-coltart-told/ Accessed 25 March 2016. 
54 L. Sachikonye, (2011). When a state turns on its citizens: Institutionalized violence and political culture. Jacana 
Media, Johannesburg, p. 31. 
55 Ibid. p. 42. 
56 B. Raftopoulos, (2009). ‘The crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008’, cited in B. Raftopoulos, & A. Mlambo, (Eds.), 
Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-colonial Period to 2008. Weaver Press, Harare, p. 216. 
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of peace. Emphasis was on conformity with human rights norms as opposed to regime change.57 
Western sanctions laid primacy on democracy and good governance as means to gain control of 
African politics and economics by linking aid to development.58 European Union sanctions, some 
argue, were responsible for political violence in Zimbabwe as a means to maintain political 
power.59 ZANU-PF, in response, promulgated the concept of ‘patriotic history’ epitomised by 
Inside the Third Chimurenga, now regarded as the official interpretation of patriotic history.60 It 
depicts human rights as a form of moral imperialism similar to historical justifications for the 
colonisation of Africa.61 
The purported economic sanctions against the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe met with very 
stiff resistance from the target, and coincidentally equipped it with an equal determination to 
sacrifice economic principles for political expediency. The panic of recolonisation 62 from and by 
the west predictably galvanised the regime, which opportunistically used it to strengthen its 
relevant pillars of power, such as the war veterans, state functionaries, and the military. Given the 
deep-seated hatred generated from the failure by either the British or the Mugabe government to 
address the finer and yet very crucial details of a comprehensive reconciliation plan soon after 
independence in 1980, this dissertation assumes that EU and USA sanctions on Zimbabwe, in spite 
                                                 
57 R. A. Murphy, (2011). The development of economic sanctions in the practice of the United Nations Security 
Council.University of Nottingham, Nottingham, p. 202. 
58 H. Chingono, (2010). Zimbabwe sanctions: An analysis of the “Lingo” guiding the perceptions of the sanctioners 
and the sanctionees. African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 4(2), p. 66.  
59 J. Grebe, (2010). And they are still targeting: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted sanctions against 
Zimbabwe/Und Sie Sanktionieren Weiter: Zur Wirksamkeit Zielgerichteter Sanktionen Gegen Simbabwe. Africa 
Spectrum, Hamburg, p. 8. 
60 D. Coltart, (2008). A decade of suffering in Zimbabwe: Economic collapse and political repression under Robert 
Mugabe. www.cato.org/...tions/development-policy-analysis/... Accessed 30 October 2014. 
61 B.-M. Tendi, (2010). How intellectuals made history in Zimbabwe. p. 3. http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/...  
Accessed 13 December 2016. 
62 Interviews with Fay Chung, Maziriri, David Coltart allude to the panic that ZANU-PF created at the height of 
political opposition after the 2000 referendum, when indications were that its support base, both in rural and urban 
areas, was diminishing and when its legitimacy was constantly being challenged by civil organisations and Human 
Rights groups. It was a carefully orchestrated strategy to win back its lost glory by appealing to the rural populace to 
remain resilient against renewed forces of imperialism masquerading under cover of the opposition MDC. The ruling 
party, by deploying the war veterans of the Second Chimurenga to revive liberation institutions such as ‘pungwes’ 
and ‘bases’, threatened to go back to fight another bush war should the opposition be voted into power in the elections 
set for 2002. ZANU-PF capitalised on the traumatic experiences. The rural populace, who would not want a repetition 
of such a phenomenon, committed themselves through coercion, to voting ‘correctly’ in future elections. The most 
popular advertisement in the National Television and state-controlled Radio Stations was ‘Zimbabwe will never be a 
colony again’ in D. Compagnon, (2000). Briefing Zimbabwe: Life after ZANU-PF. African Affairs, 99, 449-453.  
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of the different names given to them,63 were punishment-oriented and therefore negative in terms 
of finding a lasting solution to the Zimbabwean political conflict. From 1980 to 1991, the conflict 
was racialised, but when the enemy concept shifted after whites were no longer politically 
relevant64 and had become less of a threat to the political status quo, the growing black opposition 
in the country fitted the definition of ‘enemy’. 
Though relevant to the sanctions debate, much of the literature on sanctions is politically driven 
and empirical research is required to argue the case both for and against sanctions, including its 
motivation and impact. Opposition parties’ complicity in the imposition of sanctions and their role 
in focusing international attention on Zimbabwe required fresh interpretation. For example, media 
were awash with provocative statements such as ‘Go and tell Mugabe today that if he does not 
want to go peacefully, we will remove him violently. This country cannot afford Mugabe to rule a 
day longer than is necessary’,65 which the state viewed as treasonous. The state could pin 
Tsvangirai down using the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) that was passed before the 2002 
elections for ‘terrorism’ against a popularly-elected government. POSA contained a clause that 
related to insurgency and banditry. Tsvangirai was charged of treason on the grounds that he 
wanted to subvert  the  government.66 It affirmed for the government, the extent to which 
Tsvangirai and the MDC party were committed to using violent means to unseat ZANU-PF. 
ZANU-PF’s behaviour was analysed in the context of ‘defending’ a nation state under immense 
foreign siege, hence the popular axioms invoked by Jonathan Moyo, Minister of Information: 
‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again,’67 and ‘So Blair, keep your England and let me keep my 
                                                 
63 These sanctions have been known variously as ‘smart sanctions’ by Britain, USA and the EU in the sense that they 
‘targeted’ ZANU-PF leaders and organisations affiliated to it; or ‘restrictive measures’ in the sense that they were not 
comprehensive sanctions aimed at affecting the economic development of the whole country as trade was allowed to 
continue. Only the leaders were constrained in their dealings as individuals with the outside world and global 
institutions until the rule of law was restored. To ZANU-PF, these sanctions were ‘illegal sanctions because they were 
imposed on the ‘state’ and not on individuals, without United Nations Security Council approval. See D. Masaka, 
(2012). ‘Paradoxes in the ‘sanctions discourse’ in Zimbabwe’: A critical reflection. African Study Monographs, 33(1), 
p. 55. 
64 The twenty seats reserved for whites were removed in 1987 after the Unity Accord between PF-ZAPU and 
ZANU-PF to pave way for a one-party state in Zimbabwe. Whites were relegated to the fringes of Zimbabwean 
politics thereafter. 
65
Reuters, Police might charge Zimbabwean opposition leader,2 October 2000 
https://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/oct3pm.html Accessed 19 June 2017. 
66 CCJPZ. (2002). The Presidential elections; March 9, 10, 11 2002. 
67W. Willems, 2013. "‘Zimbabwe will never be a colony again’: changing celebratory styles and meanings of 
independence." Anthropology Southern Africa 36(1-2), p. 27.  
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Zimbabwe’.68 This dissertation considers how impracticable it was for a ZANU-PF government 
operating under sanctions to adhere to democratic principles and analyses the limitations in terms 
of practical modalities necessary for that to happen. 
ZANU-PF viewed itself as mandated to rule forever because of its liberation war credentials and 
by viewing all political activity outside the realm of ZANU-PF orthodoxy as illegitimate.69 Much 
of the current literature on political communication in Zimbabwe relies on western theories such 
as postcolonial essentialism70 and situational crisis communications theory71 to interpret ZANU-
PF discourses. The latter perspective seeks to protect the image of an organisation in times of 
crisis. Western media coverage of Zimbabwe after the land reform requires cross-examination. 
Ranger72 criticises what he terms ‘patriotic journalism’ practised by Jonathan Moyo’s Ministry of 
Information and Publicity from 2000 to 2005, because it was narrowly defined and adopted the 
same propagandist and ‘under siege’ approach that the white minority regime in Rhodesia had 
applied against the African nationalist struggle. Dombo’s comparative analysis of state control of 
The African Daily News (1956-1964) and The Daily News (1999-2003) focused on private print 
media, the state, and democratic governance.73 These works were useful in that they portrayed 
media, both private and public, as means of mental reproduction which could be deployed to 
generate and propagate specific political standpoints, beliefs, and value systems. The struggle for 
the control of information disseminated via the newspapers put serious constraints on multiparty 
practice in Zimbabwe because the party in power had monopoly over the media. 
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1.3 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND OBJECTIVES: KEY QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED  
ZANU-PF views all political opposition in Zimbabwe as a regime-changing, neo-colonial 
initiative with western sponsorship. One of the key objectives of this research was to establish the 
extent to which Zimbabwe is or is not a functioning multiparty democracy in practice. Key 
questions include the following: 
1.3.1 Opposition politics: 
Opposition politics by both blacks and whites started during the heydays of colonial rule.  The 
Unity Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979 was an attempt by the white minority 
government to placate black opposition. No opposition party, after the 1980 multiparty elections, 
succeeded to the helm of political power despite clear evidence that the ruling ZANU-PF did not 
formally declare a one-party state. Why has this been the case? Was this because of shortcomings 
in the objectives, strategies and modus operandi of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe since 
independence, or it was because of the strengths of ZANU-PF, or a combination of both? 
1.3.2 External and internal factors:  
Political opposition is officially tolerated in Zimbabwe and yet the opposition has failed to exploit 
ZANU-PF authoritarianism to make electoral gains. Opposition parties failed to shake off ZANU-
PF’s propaganda, which labeled them as puppets of western countries. This dissertation examines 
the extent to which opposition parties were sponsored by western countries to effect regime 
change, and the extent to which their political programmes were largely driven by internal 
considerations and reflected the ‘will of the people’.  
1.3.3 Political Transition:  
Zimbabwean politics has sometimes been characterised by a war-like atmosphere due to 
unremitting violence. What factors militated against peaceful democratic politics in the period 
since 1980 and what were the factors generating conflict? Was this conflict inevitable because of 
ethnic divisions or was it the outcome of specific post-independence factors? 
1.3.4 Party narratives:  
ZANU-PF built up strong liberation narratives designed to entrench its hegemony. Whenever 
observers and opposition parties felt that the ruling party would lose an election, ZANU-PF always 
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easily romped to victory. Why have the opposition parties ultimately been so ineffective and 
unable to influence voting trends in their favour? 
1.3.5 Propaganda: 
Some observers of Zimbabwean post-independence politics believe that media propaganda has 
ensured the survival of the ruling party. What role has media played in the portrayal of opposition 
parties and ZANU-PF? How has this affected them politically and organisationally? Why were the 
opposition’s counter-narratives unable to match ZANU-PF media propaganda? 
1.3.6 Post-GNU opposition: 
Opposition parties after the expiry of the GNU in 2013 were in disarray. Why was the opposition 
unable to maintain its upward trajectory after the expiry of the GNU? Was this due to weak 
leadership? Policy differences? Personality clashes? 
1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND OBJECTIVES: BROADER ISSUES TO BE 
INVESTIGATED 
Sovereignty is a concept widely used in historical and political contexts and has its origins in the 
ideas of the philosophers of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire.74 In this thesis, emphasis is on 
its meaning rather than its historical origins. It is important to show the variables of sovereignty 
and especially those that are pertinent to my area of study. Sovereignty can be absolute, de facto, 
de jure, external, internal, legal and popular. This study uses absolute sovereignty in the sense of 
unrestricted or unlimited sovereignty that is the source of all laws and is above them, 75 whereas 
legal sovereignty defines sovereignty in terms of the law and also in terms of equality of all nations; 
and political sovereignty means the supremacy of coercive power,76 in which case power refers to 
enforcing compliance by means ranging from influence to coercion.77   
The issue of political sovereignty in Zimbabwe, and the significance ZANU-PF attached to it, is 
important to explore. This is because of the country’s long history of the fifteen-year liberation 
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struggle (1964-1979), the independence of which was achieved at the expense of human losses 
unprecedented in the history of armed struggles in the southern region of Africa at the hands of 
the Smith military regime. This long history of armed struggle enabled the ZANU-PF leadership 
to claim exclusive ownership of the state.  Because of this reason, presidential elections from the 
time of independence were often characterised by political violence.78. After the 2002 presidential 
elections, violence was wanton, symbolic and punitive, signifying ZANU-PF’s determination to 
maintain power and social control in the face of a population in urban areas throughout the country 
that voted for the opposition MDC ahead of the 2005 elections.79 The lesson learned by African 
nationalists from the Rhodesian administration was that force and violence could be skillfully 
applied to achieve desired ends. What made the Zimbabwean case more intriguing was that the 
guerrilla armed struggle was waged not against the British, but against white “rebels” who had 
defied British orders not to declare the UDI as that would affect Britain’s decolonisation agenda 
for all its former colonies as well as destroy its eminence in the eyes of the former colonial world.  
The nationalists were nurtured in an environment that was replete with repression and violence 
against voices of dissension. From another perspective, the guerilla experience in the violent bush 
war from 1966 to 1979 affected the way the leadership behaved and shaped their perceptions about 
political opposition after independence. In areas where ZANLA forces, the military wing of 
ZANU, operated, people belonging to other parties were murdered in public during night meetings 
referred to as pungwes (rallies).80 It is important, therefore, to investigate the extent to which 
guerrillas who assumed the mandate to rule the country in 1980 were able to transform ZANU-PF 
from being a revolutionary party into a political party that was amenable to the politics of genuine 
reconciliation, nation-building and multipartyism. Rhodesia was conceived in violence and that 
could have been a logical response first, to international pressure and second, to the guerrilla 
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insurgence that was wreaking havoc in the countryside. Similarly, violent election campaigns since 
the defeat of ZANU-PF in the 2000 referendum are argued to have been caused by its declining 
popularity. There is need to either determine the extent to which a regime facing a legitimacy crisis 
at home can resort to violence and excessive authoritarianism to cover up its weaknesses, or 
whether state violence is a sign of strength.  
The usefulness of the 2000/ 2001 USA and EU targeted sanctions on the ZANU-PF leadership due 
to government’s slide into authoritarianism, lawlessness, misgovernance and human rights 
violations 81 needs to be problematised.  The sanctions debate generated considerable scholarly 
interest because, amidst the economic decline that these sanctions caused in the country, they 
worsened the situation by hardening the targeted ZANU-PF government.  Central to the debate is 
whether sanctions worked as originally planned by those who imposed them, and how they could 
be compatible with international globalisation efforts to create a single village that knows no trade 
boundaries.  This research took cognizance of the leadership and governance styles in Africa, 
which have a lot in common. State institutions have been systematically destroyed, politics have 
been militarised, and police states, where potential enemies of the state are arrested before they 
can commit ‘crimes’, have mushroomed on the continent. A concept like ‘state security’ resulted 
in the criminalisation of people’s exercise of their civil liberties as happened in Kenya in the 1969 
elections when the opposition was controlled through legalistic innovations which reflected a 
general cynicism about constitutionalism,82 and in Tanzania from 1965 to 1970 when MPs in the 
Bunge (Parliament) were expected to be factually correct and truthful in their parliamentary 
statements83 so that there was [imposed] political unanimity. It is also argued that some elderly 
national leaders found that colonial ways of doing things were admirably suited to the retention of 
political power and that was a legacy bequeathed to nationalists which provided the government 
with a monopoly of coercive sanctions and resources for purposes of maintaining law and order, 
repressing opponents and discouraging dissent or the practice of politics itself.84 
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Zimbabwe stands out distinctly from all African countries in that the only president the country 
has known since independence in 1980 up to November 2017 when a military coup deposed him 
is Mugabe who fearlessly made several bold statements in international fora that directly accused 
western powers of complicity in attempts to remove him from power. The Zimbabwean scenario 
captures how electoral manipulation allowed incumbent leaders to maintain power and how 
opposition parties have fared under strict surveillance from the state machinery.  
Most African states responded by means of force to the struggle for democracy and people have 
not been able to hold their governments to account. The struggles for democracy, in the cases of 
Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008, turned bloody and that negatively impacted on political stability 
and economic development. From Africa’s point of view, it remains to be evaluated whether the 
prevalence of many political parties in a country is synonymous with democracy, or whether a 
one-party system is an aspect of democracy. This case study of Zimbabwe points to the challenges 
of achieving multiparty democracy in situations of poverty, weak institutional structures and 
communal tensions that are rooted in history. Although the challenges are not confined to 
Zimbabwe on the African continent, the need to understand the uniqueness of the leadership of 
President Mugabe and why he continued to be supported by sections of society at his advanced 
age becomes intriguing. 
From the foregoing, Zimbabwe meets the standard for international recognition as a sovereign 
state in that it has a government with legitimate claim and exclusive jurisdiction over territory and 
people.  Because of globalisation efforts, every state is compelled to forego some of its sovereign 
rights when it enters bilateral and multinational treaties that must be honoured, or if it becomes a 
member of a supranational authority such as the United Nations Organisation (UN). In practical 
terms, no absolute state sovereignty is realisable in the world today given the factual inequalities 
between states. In Zimbabwe, the term has become synonymous with safeguarding Zimbabwe’s 
freedom from unwarranted outside interference in matters of domestic politics and economic 
development. It has been argued that the prison experiences of ZANU-PF seniors and their 
background as guerillas, it has been argued, explain why political power is so essential for its 
elite.85 This background helps in determining the centrality of war veterans in marshalling support 
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for the regime. The question is: were western sanctions compatible with state sovereignty, 
democracy and globalisation efforts? Or did they not produce the reverse results of hardening the 
target and preventing a smooth political transition? The main thrust of this dissertation is on how 
Zimbabwe could create peaceful political transition mechanisms which are crucial for economic 
development in a wider sense. 
1.5 PRINCIPAL THEORIES UPON WHICH THE RESEARCH PROJECT WAS 
CONSTRUCTED  
This study is informed by Gramsci’s hegemony theory complemented by instrumentalism. 
Antonio Gramsci was the General Secretary of the Communist Party in Italy during the era of the 
Italian movement for independence known as the Risorgimento.86 He secured his release from 
prison after serving twenty years and the notes he compiled while in prison formed the foundation 
of the theory of hegemony, a post-modernist construction by historians who identified hegemony 
as a unifying thread of his prison notes.87 The theory is predicated on the state and its interaction 
with the ruled civil and political societies, affirming the fact that man is not ruled by force alone, 
but also by ideas.88 Gramsci made a clear distinction between the two groups: civil society was 
composed of private organisms such as schools, churches, clubs and parties; political society was 
composed of public institutions such as governments, courts, police and the army, which indeed 
exercise direct control.89 Gramsci also saw the Risorgimento controlled by the Moderates in Italy 
doing everything in its power to prevent outbursts of excessive popular enthusiasm and concluded 
that hegemony and dictatorship were mutually dependent on each other and that dictatorship could 
be the only means to create hegemony.90  
Gramsci highlights the important role of intellectuals in extending the world view of the rulers to 
the ruled in order to secure the latter’s consent and posits that when they fail to create hegemony, 
the ruling class resorts to using the state coercive apparatuses to discipline people.91 Using the 
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institution of the Risorgimento as reference to his argument, Gramsci also intimates that it wanted 
to dominate, not to lead, and to put its interests above everything else.92 The theory, therefore, puts 
emphasis on ideological consensus within the confines of the state to achieve hegemonic control.  
In their Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels argued that the state is characteristically a form 
of organisation which the bourgeoisie adopt for internal and external purposes for the mutual 
benefit of their property and interests93 Gramsci reformulated the Marxist definition of the state to 
include institutions and practices that the ruling class uses to construct societal values, impose 
moral, cultural and political homogeneity, and to maintain its supremacy over its subordinates. 
Hay focuses on contemporary theorising on the state by exploring orthodox Marxism and its 
variants, pluralism, elitism, post-structuralism and institutionalism, among other theories, and 
suggests that state theories today cannot be viewed as completely divergent.94 In his other works, 
the state in Marxist terms is viewed as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class that exercises  
power either directly through the manipulation of state policies or indirectly through the exercise 
of pressure on the state.95 According to Hay and Lister, an ideologically endangered ‘common 
sense’96, which is the way a subordinate class endures its subordination by accepting it as natural,97 
is constructed. This is the approach, I argue, that the ruling ZANU-PF government has used for 
people to view it as indispensable, and for it to become commonplace and ‘natural’ for the 
electorate to vote for it. In extreme cases, where opposition candidates dared to stand, the tendency 
was that ZANU-PF candidates were officially elected unopposed as if no opposition existed. 
Miliband posits that hegemony requires that the subordinate class is compelled to acknowledge 
the futility of its desire to change the status quo in which it is politically and economically 
alienated, and that there is no alternative.98 Therefore, hegemony depends not so much on consent 
as on resignation.99 Put more simply, hegemony in Africa connotes the imposition of political and 
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ideological unanimity on different people with diverse histories and cultures by a black elite class 
that seeks to advance its own agenda. On the other hand, the state alone is not the object of this 
study, but should be understood together with the processes comprising it, which involves 
analysing state institutions such as the government, judiciary, parliaments, the executive, the 
military and other security services.100 However, globalisation has had the effect of limiting the 
power and authority of states, yet Zimbabwe, under ZANU-PF hegemonic control, conflicts with 
pro-democracy organisations for its ever-increasing grip on power. 
Instrumentalism views the state as a neutral instrument manipulated and steered in its interests by 
the dominant class.101 Put more precisely, it is a theory that focuses on how the state apparatus 
relates to the ruling or dominant class. This state-agency debate presents an interesting scenario in 
Zimbabwe because of lack of a clear distinction between the ZANU-PF party and institutions of 
the state. In fact, government derives its policies from those of the ruling party, and the government 
is subordinated to the interests of the party. Instrumentalism, therefore, allows one to test the 
assumed neutrality of identifiable structures that represent state power in Zimbabwe. It also 
enables the establishment of linkages and relationships between the apparatus of the state and the 
political heavyweights and illuminates how state institutions become the object of manipulation 
by the political actors wielding economic power. 
The theory of instrumentalism is premised on the argument that the modern state serves the 
interests of the bourgeoisie who dominate as an African capitalist class. Given the fact that 
socialism failed to work in the country, the new black elite put structures in place that would 
safeguard their own capitalist interests because they had become a class in itself and for itself, with 
some getting even more daunting and daring than the settler capitalists that they replaced. The two 
selected state theories – hegemony and instrumentalism – are complementary rather than divergent 
and are relevant in the bid to understanding the conscious actions of political bourgeoisies in 
Zimbabwe in mobilising the executive, parliament, judiciary, mass media, religion and education 
to subvert political transition processes. 
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Cheeseman102  posits that political scientists have identified certain requirements for achieving 
democracy, which include a strong civil society, a coherent political identity, independent and 
robust political institutions, rule of law and a vibrant economy. It can be argued that Zimbabwe 
and many other African countries for that matter do not meet these criteria. Throughout Africa, 
democracy’s challenges are the structural inequalities that are characteristic of all the states despite 
their claim to sovereign statehood based on the political independence attained through European 
decolonisation. Most African states assume their juridical statehood at the UNO when in real terms 
they continue to depend on development assistance from outside the continent. The Third World 
status accorded to the continent of Africa is based on the rate at which the countries on various 
continents are developing and Africa is last in the hierarchy by most objective measures. Ethnic 
heterogeneity and the absence of a clear sense of nationhood retard development as most parts of 
the continent have not known peace due to ethnically-organised political parties that fight each 
other relentlessly under the guise of democracy. Development and democracy, both of which are 
difficult to realise in a context of communal conflicts over power which challenge the legitimacy 
of incumbent regimes, are dependent on each other. These are the pitfalls that affect the process of 
achieving a robust multiparty democracy. 
Linked to the above debate on a robust multiparty democracy, Cheeseman103 employed a different 
paradigm that admits that government defeats are extremely rare in multiparty Africa. He analysed 
the conditions under which ruling parties lose power as was the case with Zambia in the 1992 
multiparty elections when Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP party lost to the opposition Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Fredrick Chiluba who belonged to the Labour Movement. 
According to Cheeseman,104 opposition parties throughout Africa are four times more likely to win 
elections when the sitting president does not stand. He referred to these elections as ‘open seat’ 
elections, and further argued that these elections are more likely to lead to political change than 
elections in which the sitting president participates.105 What makes the Zimbabwean case unique, 
even if it shares a lot in common with other states in Africa, is the manner in which President 
Mugabe indeed managed to use his eloquence and possibly anti-colonial credentials to divide the 
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world at UN sessions. Another uniqueness is how ZANU-PF made use of the liberation struggle 
as a pivot around which the history of Zimbabwe, and the sovereignty that it goes with, have been 
popularised to the extent that the drive towards people’s democratic participation in the affairs of 
the state was circumscribed oftentimes through electoral manipulation, intimidation and 
disenfranchisement. 
Consolidation of democracy, or building democratic institutions and traditions in any state, is 
related to the term limits of the incumbent president. Basing on African leadership experiences on 
the continent, the shorter the term of office, the greater the consolidation of democratic practices 
such as transparency, accountability, civil liberties, multipartyism, and free and fair elections that 
are devoid of intimidation, torture and electoral manipulation. Cheeseman’s theory of 
democratisation addresses the leadership crisis in Zimbabwe, because the country had known only 
one leader from 1987 until 2017 when former president Mugabe was ousted from power through 
a coup engineered by the army.  
The government led by ZANU-PF resisted popular demands for a change of government during 
the 1992 ESAP period and when the opposition MDC was formed in 1999 to pressurise it to 
acknowledge its responsibility for the economic downturn in the country. Mugabe, with army 
support, refused to give in to opposition and international demands, preferring instead to sacrifice 
the electorate on the altar of sovereignty. Rather than seeking to contribute to change the 
Zimbabwean situation, many African Commonwealth leaders sought effectively to support 
Mugabe.106 The discovery of huge diamond deposits at Chiadzwa in the south-eastern part of the 
country around 2005 brought a sigh of relief not only to the ordinary Zimbabwean who anticipated 
better lifestyles thereafter, but also to the government due to the revenue and the resultant 
economic stability that the mining operations would bring to the country. Diamond mining 
activities were tendered to the Mbada and Canadile companies on 50% partnership with the 
government.107 The State established two joint ventures, Mbada Mining which was in a Public-
Private Partnership with a Chinese company, Anhui, and Canadile Mining company also partnered 
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with Pure Diam company from Dubai.108 Mbada Mining was chaired by Mugabe’s former 
helicopter pilot, Robert Mhlanga, who emerged from Zimbabwe’s adventure in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) as a millionaire while Mugabe’s wife, Grace, was a shareholder.109 
More licenses were granted to a Chinese company, Anjin, and not transparently to other 
companies.110 The heavy military presence around Chiadzwa mining sites111, together with serious 
though unproven allegations of corruption, coincided with the 2008 elections in which the state 
exploited the diamonds unmonitored, to outdo its rival MDC.112 The fact that the state deployed 
soldiers in full military paraphernalia to represent the state in guarding and controlling the diamond 
mining area meant that any of their illegal dealings that amounted to ‘corruption and concealment’ 
had the full blessings of the state.113 
‘Regime’ and ‘state’ are distinctly conceptualised. Chazan intimates that while the state must do 
with the structural and organisational embodiment of power, regime is more concerned with how 
this power is actually exercised and legitimated.114 Krasner defines a regime as "implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations.115 This presupposes that a ruling political party 
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is an institution in itself, which, under circumstances of war, serious opposition or political 
disturbances in a country, can act unconstitutionally. Collier views regimes as approaches that a 
party uses to cushion itself from its political rivals and to gain legitimacy.116 Chazan identifies 
administrative hegemonial; pluralist; party-mobilising; party-centralist; personal-coercive; 
populist and ambiguous as regime typologies.117 These typologies are debated later on in the thesis 
since ZANU -PF employed all the above interactive models at different times. These are relevant 
frameworks within which to evaluate MDC’s response of using the Voice of America (VOA) 
broadcaster to propagate its counter-narrative.  
In the ‘introduction’ to Becoming Zimbabwe, the editors118 express an interest in following up 
Morgan Tsvangirai’s call for a “more open and critical process of writing history in Zimbabwe”, 
and more importantly, to “remind the victors [ZANU-PF] in the political arena that the struggle 
for independence was a broad, uneven process, with many unsung heroes….”  There were multiple 
sites of the Zimbabwean anti-colonial struggle, beyond the drama of the predominantly rural 
‘guerrilla war.’ Such sites of the struggle included the urban townships, Rhodesian prisons and 
detention centres and university campus.119 
1.6 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
This research was based on mixed methodology. As such, it relied on interviews and documentary 
sources. With a population of about 6,7 million120, Harare was chosen as the site of study, and the 
findings were extrapolated as representing the political views of the country of 15 million people. 
The researcher obtained permission obtained from the Clerk of Parliament of the Republic of 
Zimbabwe, MDC-T and the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC), which allowed the 
researcher to conduct interviews with members of parliament from the political divide. 
Admittedly, the sensitivity of the area of study in Zimbabwe, and the intra-party polarisation in 
the major parties themselves, posed problems in having respondents in official capacities speak on 
                                                 
116 R. B. Collier, (1982). Regimes in tropical Africa: Changing forms of supremacy, 1945-1975. University of 
California Press, Berkley, p. 9. 
117 N. Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhill & D. Rothchild, (1992). Politics and society in contemporary Africa. 
Macmillan, London, p.131. 
118 M. B. Munochiveyi, (2011). Becoming Zimbabwe from below: Multiple narratives of Zimbabwean Nationalism. 
Critical African Studies, 4(6), p.89.  
119 Ibid., p.89. 
120 Research & Advocacy Unit, (2013). An audit of Zimbabwe's 2013 voters' roll, p. 6 
http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/rau_audit_of_june_2013_voters_roll_130716.pdf Accessed 21 June 2018. 
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behalf of their parties, unless otherwise instructed to do so. For example, it took the researcher 
close to one month before he could get the right people in MDC Harvest House offices to interview 
as a matter of protocol.  
Purposive sampling was used to select informants in leadership positions. Snowballing, which is 
respondent-driven in very hard-to-reach populations, was used to identify politicians from smaller 
political parties and influential party members in positions of authority who wanted to remain 
anonymous out of fear of being victimised. I had a representative sample of 15 participants drawn 
from the following target population: ZANU-PF, ZAPU, MDC-T, MDC-M, Zimbabwe People 
First (ZPF), war veterans, war collaborators, church leaders, women’s organisations, and 
academics. Women in influential positions both in party and government were chosen to get their 
views on the role of the womenfolk in regime change initiatives.121 It was not easy to identify 
women in ZANU-PF to interview until a Catholic University of Zimbabwe student who also 
worked in the President’s office assisted  in linking me to Monica Mutsvangwa. Although 
interviews assisted a great deal in data collection, the respondents in most cases were hard to reach 
and agreed dates originally set for the interviews frequently shifted unpredictably. One other 
challenge the researcher experienced in the use of the interview schedule was the lack of 
preparedness on some of the interviewees who, despite having the questionnaire with them 
beforehand, did not have time to study the questions until the interview day. This somehow 
affected the quality of the responses that the researcher received. 
Archival material from the various political parties in the first decade after independence, such as 
UANC, ZAPU, and ZANU (Ndonga), was also examined. Although UANC is almost extinct, and 
ZAPU has since merged with ZANU to form the broader ZANU-PF, opposition historiographical 
records up to 1990 were accessed through their party archives. However, the Mafela Trust, the 
board that manages the ZAPU / ZIPRA archive, is sceptical of researchers seeking access to its 
files. Cognisant of the dearth of archival material on opposition parties, especially those that 
emerged in the 1990s, such as MDC and Mavambo, the researcher examined Hansard records, 
                                                 
121 F. Chung, (2007). Re-living the second chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Weaver Press, 
Harare, p. 89. Also J. Nhongo-Simbanegavi, (2000). For better or worse? Women and ZANLA in Zimbabwe's 
liberation struggle. Weaver Press, Harare. She is quoted in a Book Review by T. Mashingaidze (25 June 2003) arguing 
that the war perpetuated the peripheralisation and domestication of women who were never co-opted into the decision-
making process, www.accord.org.za/.../for-better-or-worse-women-and-zanla-in-zimbabwes-liberation Accessed 9 
July 2016. 
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which are regular compilations of parliamentary debates. Admittedly, archival material that spans 
the whole period under study was inadequate because of the contemporariness of some of the 
political developments, or because of the fear among competing political parties of releasing 
sensitive or classified information to the public.   
To make up for the knowledge gap created by the archival material, printed sources such as 
periodicals and contemporary newspapers such as The Herald, The Sunday Mail, The Chronicle, 
The Zimbabwean, Daily News and The Standard, as well as published and unpublished sources, 
local, regional and international newspapers, were examined. The researcher is aware that 
newspapers reflect partisan perspectives and cognisance was therefore taken of this. Contemporary 
writers of Zimbabwean history highlighted earlier on, together with media houses, have presented 
the political crisis in the country from divergent perspectives, depending on the interests they 
represent. The element of bias can therefore not be discounted in secondary sources, most of which 
articulate a specific political stance. 
This study took cognisance of the importance of a “history from below” approach to complement 
the data collected from secondary sources and purposive sampling. Oral traditions are verbal 
messages which are reported statements from the past beyond the present generation.122 Though 
sometimes unreliable due to lapse in memory, oral traditions have a place in reconstructing 
Zimbabwean history. Oral history included personal or group reminiscences and differs from oral 
tradition in that reported accounts are not transferrable from one generation to another because of 
their contemporariness. In using the oral history research material, some respondents were cited. 
However, it was also used even if it tended to be subjective due to heightened political emotionality 
by participants who partook the armed struggle or are directly affected by the political economy 
obtaining in the country.123 Political tension in the country meant that oral interviewees from 
diverse political parties were so emotionally charged that they did not hold back their feelings 
about matters of democracy and the perceived governance crisis in Zimbabwe. 
                                                 
122 J. M. Vansina, (1985). Oral tradition as history. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, p. 27. 
123 The interview with Monica Mutsvangwa, a ZANLA ex-combatant, is evidence to this. Her husband, also an ex-
combatant, reflects his heightened emotionality when he narrated how he alone, among other liberation fighters, 
survived experimental biological warfare by the Rhodesian forces when it used napalm and laced jeans destined for 
the freedom fighters with cyanide. National Assembly Debate, 42 (19). 
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Fieldwork involved direct contact with the subjects through personal observation and 
participation.124 The researcher attended political party rallies organised at different times in 
Harare. These included the one in Chitungwiza near Harare organised by Joice Mujuru in June 
2017 and another one organised by the ZANU-PF youths in the town of Marondera in June of the 
same year, with president Mugabe as guest speaker, as well as other low-key ones. The research 
would have wanted to attend one more political rally organised by the main opposition MDC but 
was unable to do so due to time constraints. That could have given me a more representative sample 
of meetings of main political parties in Zimbabwe. However, the Youtube platform was used to fill 
this void. Focus group discussions with three History staff members at Catholic University of 
Zimbabwe and two History lecturers from the University of Zimbabwe were helpful in exploring 
the relationships between the opposition and ZANU-PF over time. 
This research was conducted at a time when political polarisation, inter-party struggles and intra-
party factionalism reached unprecedented levels in Zimbabwe in the light of the anticipated 2018 
elections. On occasions, the researcher was asked to respond to a party slogan before he could be 
entertained. Although carrying out this research using interviews was very challenging, I found 
that parties were ready to welcome researchers to position themselves ahead of elections and to 
discredit their opposition. However, with the rare preponderance of political parties [they were 
over 100] registered to participate in the 2018 elections, it was difficult to identify party members 
and to conduct interviews with them. Therefore, parties that existed before 2018 were singled out 
for interviews. A separate questionnaire was distributed to five students and five lecturers at 
Catholic University of Zimbabwe who were old enough to provide reminiscences of the post-1980 
era. The response rate was 100%.  
Despite the challenges associated with this research, I am convinced that it was worth pursuing as 
it is a building block for Zimbabwe’s future multiparty democracy, post the presidency of Robert 
Mugabe.  
 
                                                 
124 M. Buchler, & C. Puttergill, (1997). Understanding social change and research: Theory and method. University 
of South Africa, Pretoria, p. 223. 
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1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The study of constraints on opposition politics in Zimbabwe required a chronological approach. 
This chapter, which is the introduction, captures the underlying hypothesis that meaningful 
political competition among political parties in a country with a long and painful colonial legacy 
of violence that was perpetuated in the postcolonial state is hard to fathom when the ruling elite is 
preoccupied with safeguarding its vested interests by coercive means. The chapter provides the 
aims, objectives, and justification for this dissertation, analyses relevant existing literature on the 
subject to identify knowledge gaps and shows what new knowledge to contribute, and discusses 
the theoretical framework, key questions, and research methodology. 
Chapter 2: Reconciliation: A false start? 1980-1990 
This chapter analyses the elusive post-war reconciliation which resulted in turbulence in 
Matabeleland. The emphasis is on racial reconciliation which excluded other black political rivals. 
ZANU-PF’s manoeuvres towards a one-party state after the 1987 Unity Accord and the 
enfeeblement of ZANU Ndonga and UANC is also discussed. The question of why the one-party 
strategy failed, forms a key aspect of the chapter which seeks to answer such questions as: Was 
reconciliation an ideal political transition strategy for the country’s take-off from Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia to Zimbabwe? How can the Gukurahundi, state-sponsored violence (1982-1987) in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands Provinces against the Ndebele be explained when the 
reconciliation policy was barely two years old? Could guerrillas acclimatised to violent support 
mobilisation tactics during the liberation struggle be trusted and could they transform into 
politicians amenable to the politics of genuine reconciliation and enduring compromise?  
Chapter 3: Urban power politics and the quest for regime change 
In this chapter, focus is on the philosophical basis of new opposition parties against the background 
of ZANU-PF’s revolutionary credentials. Urban politics during the colonial era are briefly 
analysed to establish changes and continuities which related to organisation, strategies, changing 
demands and the political spaces available for confronting government for change in people’s 
living standards. This chapter also focuses on how workers’ demands turned political, and the 
34 
 
implications that this had on the stability and legitimacy of the state. An assessment of objectives 
and modus operandi of opposition formations is made to determine their credibility as driving 
home-grown political agendas. 
Chapter 4: The sanctions discourse: Agenda setting and structural constraints 
This chapter examines ZANU-PF’s resilience against the combined pressures of western 
governments and ‘push politics’125 of the MDC at home within the broader framework of 
sanctions and relentless struggle with the West. It interrogates ZANU-PF’s version of history by 
engaging the sanctions discourse. The two parties, ZANU-PF and MDC, used sanctions 
differently as an excuse to advance their agendas of staying in power and assuming power 
respectively. 
Chapter 5: The Third Chimurenga (2000-2015) and political deadlock. 
Chapter 5 starts by first examining the seizure of white-owned land by the Svosve people in 
Marondera and how this pioneering act triggered the Third Chimurenga in 2000. The role of the 
state apparatus in politicising economic issues is discussed. The chapter also includes a discussion 
of the GNU (2008-2013) and how the GNU interregnum indeed neutralised the drive towards 
democracy as the opposition, in a spirit of self-denial, participated in the governance of the country 
and lost the plot.  
Chapter 6: Opposition forces within ZANU(PF) (1980-2015) 
Chapter 6 analyses how opposition within ZANU-PF itself evolved. It examines the salience of 
ethnicity that emerged after the Unity Accord and the concept of two vice presidents. The impact 
of the death of Joshua Nkomo and the revival of the old ZAPU was discussed. Simba Makoni, the 
former Minister of Finance, was dismissed from ZANU-PF in 2008 for proposing economic 
                                                 
125 The MDC in 2003 organised what was code-named ‘The Final Push.’ It was a campaign that involved people of 
all occupations-touts, vendors, workers, political activists and the broader anti-Mugabe movement. They felt that time 
had come for them to forcibly remove President Mugabe from power. Marches were organised from all corners of 
Harare’s high-density suburbs where they were supposed to gather in the Central Business District in readiness for the 
final march to the State House, the official residence of the president. The campaign was not well coordinated, and it 
degenerated into chaos because of participants who saw it as an opportunity to ransack shops thus destroying the 
original motive. The MDC under-estimated the strength of the regime and the campaign flopped as the army was 
engaged to disperse the crowds. People scurried in a confused retreat and the organisers from the MDC party were 
arrested. 
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policies that appeared eventually to discredit the ruling party. His newly formed Mavambo Party 
drew support from both ZANU-PF and MDC as political re-alignments emerged against the 
backdrop of the dwindling legitimacy of the government. Recent political purges in ZANU-PF 
and the subsequent dismissal of Vice President Joice Mujuru in 2014 and later, Emmerson 
Mnangagwa in 2017 before his political comeback through military support late in the same year, 
are also analysed in the context of regime change. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion and recommendations 
The conclusion summarises the research findings, results and recommendations. The chapter 
acknowledges the political changes in Zimbabwe that occurred at the time of writing this 
dissertation, the most notable being the ousting of former president Mugabe, and his replacement 
by his former vice president Emmerson Mnangagwa in what critics have described as a coup. 
Military involvement in the political dispensation following the November 2017 coup that 
terminated Mugabe’s uninterrupted 37 years as the country’s leader raised another question about 
the feasibility of free and fair elections under a quasi-military ZANU-PF government. Can the 
military be trusted to lead a democratic process? In trying to answer the question, the chapter also 
suggests theories constructed around the military edifice, to be tested against future elections in 
the country, before it finally making recommendations suitable for the development and 
sustenance of genuine multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RECONCILIATION: A FALSE START, 1980-2000 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the elusive search for post-war reconciliation between ZAPU and ZANU-
PF and the antagonistic relations of the pre-independence era that carried over into the post-
independence era, resulting in the dissident menace and the Gukurahundi phenomenon in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands regions. It addresses how the African parties narrowly defined 
reconciliation to mean mending strained relations between ZANU and the Rhodesia Front led by 
Ian Smith. It, indeed, excluded other African nationalist parties that rivalled ZANU-PF prior to 
1980, such as the UANC led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa and ZANU Ndonga, and trivialised their 
significance in postcolonial reconstruction endeavours.   ZAPU was also ignored, till 1987, thus 
giving rise to the agitations in Matabeleland in the pre-1987 period. 
This chapter therefore analyses how party rivalries in the 1980 general elections won by ZANU-
PF were illuminated in the post-independence discourses primarily because the reconciliation 
policy focused on black-white relations to the exclusion of other black political rivals. ZANU-PF 
manoeuvres towards a one-party state after co-opting ZAPU in the 1987 Unity Accord and the 
enfeeblement of ZANU Ndonga and UANC are also discussed. This chapter also considers the 
quest for a one-party state that seemed more likely after the co-option of ZAPU and the reasons 
for the failure of the accord. 
The term democracy operates at two levels: behavioural and structural. At a behavioural level it 
means meaningful competition, [popular] participation, and the existence of civil liberties, whereas 
at a structural level it entails a functional or credible electoral system, multiparty organs and an 
independent legislature.126 For purposes of this dissertation, the accepted description of a 
democratic state is one in which there is political pluralism, existence of multiple parties and trades 
unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections held at regular periods, and where the populace 
can choose their leaders freely.127 
                                                 
126 M. Bratton & E. Masunungure, (2008). Zimbabwe's long agony. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No 4,. 43.  
127  C. I. Obi, (2001). Reconstructing Africa’s development in the new millennium through NEPAD: Can African 
Leaders deliver the goods? African Journal of International Affairs, 4. p, 164. 
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Table 2.1: National assembly election results in Zimbabwe 1980 – 2000128  
Party Candidates Registered Votes  %Valid Votes Seats 
2000 ZANU (PF)  
MDC 
UP  
ZAPU  
ZUD  
ZANU  
LP  
LPZ  
ZIP  
NDU  
ZPP  
ZCP  
PDF  
ANP N 
PA 
Independents 
Spoilt? 
120 
120 
59 
21 
16 
12 
8 
14 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
89 
1 220 951 
1150 793 
29 677 
10 824 
6100 
16493 
753 
10 449 
473 
164 
62 
16 
90 
862 
617 
51 971 
48.83 
46.03 
1.19 
0.43 
0.24 
0.66 
0.03 
0.42 
0.02 
0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0.03 
0.02 
2.08 
62 
57 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
TOTAL 469 2 552844 99.99 120 
1995 ZANU (PF) 
ZANU-Ndonga  
FPZ 
Independents (Margaret 
Dongo) 
120 
? 
? 
? 
1126822 
93546 
88223 
62085 
76 
6 
6 
- 
117 
2 
- 
1 
TOTAL  1370676 88 120 
1990 ZANU (PF)  
ZUM 
ZANU-Ndonga 
LIANG 
120 
120 
120 
120 
1 690 071 
369 031 
19 448 
9667 
81 
18 
1 
1 
117 
2 
1 
- 
TOTAL  2 088 217 101 120 
1985 ZANU (PF)  
PF-ZAPU 
ZANU-Ndonga  
UANC 
80 
80 
? 
? 
2 233 320 
558 771 
36054 
64 764 
77 
19 
1 
2 
64 
15 
1 
- 
TOTAL  2892 909 99 80 
1980 ZANU (PF)  
PF-ZAPU  
UANC 
ZANU-Ndonga 
80 
80 
? 
? 
1668992 
638 879 
219 307 
53 343 
63 
24 
8 
2 
57 
20 
3 
- 
TOTAL  2 580 521 97 80 
 
                                                 
128 K. Matlosa, (2000). Election monitoring and observation in Zimbabwe: Hegemony versus sovereignty. African 
Journal of Political Science, 7(1), p. 142. 
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In Zimbabwe, multiparty elections have always been viewed as an instrument to effect political 
change. Bratton and Masunungure’s129 characterisation of democracy where ordinary citizens find 
it difficult to hold their leaders to account is employed to problematise the operation of democracy 
since independence in 1980. The definition of democracy from above by Obi,130 which gives 
people the right to vote but not to choose, hence ‘choiceless democracies, is useful in highlighting 
the African argument about African democracy which is often at variance, or conflictual, with the 
conception of democracy in western countries. According to Held,131 democracy is failing in 
Africa because it is essentially a Western project lacking in universal significance. Another 
difference is that in Africa, those in power do not govern-which means they are accountable to 
citizens-rather, they rule.132 Democracy in Africa is premised on elections, and if elections take 
place in a state, then that state is supposedly democratic. The colonially inspired historical 
background of Zimbabwe, the protracted liberation struggle, its colonial inheritance and the 
implementation of colonial institutions informed the postcolonial political practices and the 
degree of open political competition that ZANU-PF allowed in the country. 
2.2 BACKGROUND AND RECONCILIATION CHALLENGES 
The Patriotic Front (PF) alliance was formed by ZAPU and ZANU on 10 October 1976.133 The 
stakeholders believed that the alliance would work towards diffusing sources of tension arising 
from the different ideological orientation and wartime strategic considerations between the two 
parties and that the revolutionary wings of ZANLA and ZIPRA would be united so that they could 
join forces to fight for a common purpose. Joshua Nkomo, who had been the ZAPU president since 
its formation in 1961, was convinced that this was not going to be a marriage of convenience, but 
that it was a reality of people who once worked together and so had realised that working separately 
                                                 
129 M. Bratton and E. Masunungure, (2011). The anatomy of political predation: Leaders, elites and coalitions in 
Zimbabwe 1980 – 2010. UKZN Press, Durban, p. 46. 
130 C. I. Obi, (2001). Reconstructing Africa’s development …, p. 159.  
131 D. Held, (1987). Models of democracy. Stanford University Press, Stanford, p. 12. 
132 W. Gumede, (2015). Africa style democracy? www.publicseminar.org2015/02/african-style-democracy Accessed 
17 February 2018. 
133 P. Preston, (2004). Stalemate and the termination of civil war. Rhodesia reassessed. Journal of Peace Research, 
41(1), p. 67.  
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to fight British colonialism could not produce sufficient TNT to crack this rock134135 . ZANLA and 
ZIPRA were placed under a single military command known as Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). 
However, the union of the two parties was short-lived as cooperation during 1975 to 1976 ceased 
when ZANLA fighters massacred ZIPRA fighters at Mhorogoro and Mgagao in Tanzania.136 
Official statistics of ZIPRA guerrillas killed are not available since records at that time were either 
difficult to maintain due to high mobility between training camps, or the ZANLA forces may have 
hidden them from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that wanted to see a single liberation 
movement, as opposed to the two in existence. These unhealthy developments were an expression 
of the ZAPU/ZANU conflicts in the 1960s that exhibited the tribal or ethnic character of mass 
political parties in the country. Between 1975 and 1976, ZIPRA and ZANLA guerillas also fought 
and killed each other when they were placed in the same training camps in Libya and in Mhorogoro 
and Mgagao in Tanzania.137  
It must be remembered that ZANU had split from ZAPU in 1963 when the ZAPU youths that 
included Ndabaningi Sithole, Enos Nkala, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira and Edgar Tekere 
were all high-ranking personalities of the Shona ethnic group except Enos Nkala.138  They  
protested against Joshua Nkomo’s leadership, and in particular, his persistent inclination towards 
constitutional talks with the white settler regime led by Edgar Whitehead that did not yield 
substantial and positive results. Possible reasons for the split had much to do with leadership 
wrangles, the best ideology and strategy to pursue against a recalcitrant white minority 
                                                 
134 J. K. Spiker, D. Crawford & R. L. Crawford, (1992). Influence of 2, 4, 6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) concentration on 
the degradation of TNT in explosive-contaminated soils by the white rot fungus Phanerochaete chrysosporium. 
Applied and Environmental Microbiology, 58(9), p. 3199. TNT is an acronym for ‘trinitrotoluene,’ a term used to 
describe rock mass damage induced by underground explosions.  
135 G. Ma, H. Hao & Y. Zhou, (1998). Modeling of wave propagation induced by underground explosion. Computers 
and Geotechnics, 22(3), p. 283.  
136 F. Chung, (2007). Re-living the second chimurenga. Memories from Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, p. 147. ZIPRA 
and ZANLA guerillas were placed into two locations by the Tanzanian authorities to destroy the potential rift between 
ZAPU and ZANU, but ZANLA guerillas undertook to exterminate ZIPRA fighters on the pretext that their leader, 
Joshua Nkomo, was collaborating with Ian Smith in endless negotiations. Key figures from both parties at Morogoro 
and Mgagao were  from the ZANU side,Constantino Chiwenga, Perence Shiri and Augustine Chihuri (Stephen 
Chocha). From the ZIPRA side were Eddie Mlotshwa, Phillip Valerio Sibanda (Annanias Gwenzi) and Sam Fakazi. 
T. Ntungakwa, (2016). Chronicles of Chimurenga II: How ZIPA was buried in Tanzania. 
http://www.sundaymail.co.zw/chronicles-of-chimurenga-ii-how-zipa-was-buried-in-tanzania/ Accessed 23 March 
2017. 
137  F. Chung, (2015). Zimbabwe looking east. Directory Publishers, Bulawayo, pp. 83-94. 
138 M. Sithole, (1987). State power consolidation in Zimbabwe: Party and ideological development. In E. J. Keller and 
D. Rothchild (Eds.). Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p. 86.  
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government, and possibly ethnic cleavages within the party.139 Maurice Nyagumbo remarked that 
Enos Chikowore and Nyamupingidza as youth members of the breakaway ZANU party, made 
conditions impossible for Joshua Nkomo and his deputy, James Chikerema, to remain in Salisbury 
(Harare) even for a hour.140  The reason  that Salisbury was in Mashonaland compelled Nkomo to 
establish ZAPU headquarters in Matabeleland. Therefore, after 1963, ZAPU and ZANU operated 
as two separate liberation movements, each with its own liberation army. Right from its inception, 
ZANU comprising youths, resolved to engage the settler regime by military means because of 
failed negotiation processes that had happened in the past, whereas ZAPU believed in 
constitutional negotiations to bring majority rule to Zimbabwe, and that the armed struggle would 
be the last resort.  
This was the position of the two parties before the hardline Ian Smith, representing the Rhodesia 
Front that was racist and exclusivist, came to power in 1964. The ZAPU vice president, James 
Chikerema, in response to observations on the struggle, intimated that the decision to undertake 
the armed struggle did not start in 1964 following the detention of nationalist leaders, but rather 
after the collapse of the 1963 Constitutional Conference. To weaken and silence African 
nationalism, all key members of ZAPU and ZANU were put into detention camps in 
Gonakudzingwa and Sikombela. The move did not deter meaningful correspondence between and 
among people in detention and those who remained outside to coordinate clandestine nationalist 
activities. Chikerema stated that the objectives of the party in sending cadres to neighbouring and 
sympathetic socialist countries for military training was not for waging a guerilla warfare, but for 
carrying out acts of sabotage considered relevant to engender fear and despondency among the 
white minority regime in Rhodesia. Information could reach Nkomo in Gonakudzingwa restriction 
area through the agency of white liberals141 who regarded him and his party as less hardline and 
African nationalist (“racist” as interpreted by whites), than ZANU.142  
The split between ZAPU and ZANU resulted in sporadic factional fights particularly in Salisbury, 
renamed Harare after independence. A distinguished journalist, Stanlake Samkange, who was also 
                                                 
139 Masipula Sithole, “State Power Consolidation in Zimbabwe: Party and Ideological Development”, p. 87.   
140 M. Nyagumbo, (1980). With the people: An autobiography from the Zimbabwe struggle. Allison & Busby, 
London, p. 184. 
141 T. Ranger, (2005). The rise of patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe and its possible implications. Westminster Papers 
in Communication and Culture, 2, p. 11. 
142 F. Chung, (2015). Zimbabwe: Looking east. Directory Publishers, Bulawayo, p. 94. 
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chairman of the Highfields high-density suburb ZANU branch in 1964, expressed dismay at the 
absence of love of one’s fellow countrymen demonstrated by the youths which he regarded as the 
number one principle of his party because Africans were murdering Africans and boasting about 
it.143 Each of the two parties sought to portray itself as truly representing African nationalism by 
outbidding the other. The support base for the nationalist cause was found mainly in urban areas 
like Salisbury where the contest for support took on ruthless forms. This was also because ZAPU 
was strongest in Matabeleland and Salisbury.144  
A distinctive depiction of ZANU’s aggressive nationalism was its attempt to obliterate all political 
rivals and to position itself as the sole guarantor of national goals by labeling ZAPU a party of 
traitors seeking to betray the attainment of the so-called national goals. Nkomo was caricatured as 
recanting, revisionist and recoiling whereas Sithole, the ZANU leader, was hailed as the leader of 
all patriots before he, too, became a “traitor” in the eyes of many after renouncing the use of 
violence as a precondition for his release from detention.145 This kind of patriotic journalism of 
the 1960s and 1970s had a direct bearing on ZANU-PF’s media influence, control, and 
manipulation in Zimbabwean modern politics after 1980. In the above periods, ZANU arrogated 
to itself the role of a true defender of African nationalism and there was always fierce contestation 
with ZAPU for that role. 
ZANU attacks on ZAPU supporters in 1965 provided a good example of what it called  patriotism, 
where ZAPU was demonised and ZANU was exalted for its love of the country.146  In ZANU’s 
booklet, Traitors do much damage to National Goals, ZAPU was portrayed as a club of traitors 
and ZANU, as the true representative of African black people in the country.147 The decision by 
ZAPU to fight a guerilla war could have been necessitated by the realisation that ZANU’s use of 
demonising propaganda stifled its organisational capacity in terms of recruitment, visibility and 
legitimacy. It was suicidal for Nkomo’s ZAPU to harp on the language of negotiation and peaceful 
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transition at a time when its rival, ZANU, had already embraced the idea of guerilla war as a 
practical necessity, and when its members in urban areas especially, were being killed, physically 
attacked and assaulted by the ZANU urban youths for belonging to ZAPU. ZANU as a liberation 
movement stated that it was engaged in a Manichean struggle which ought to end in an absolute 
victory, freedom or death, and proclaimed the certainty of military victory.148 The need for ZAPU’s 
military engagement was further reinforced by the failure of the Geneva Constitutional Conference 
in 1976 during which time it was brought to the attention of detained nationalists that their fellow 
comrades were being hanged by Smith’s regime of at the rate of five people every Monday.149 The 
futility of negotiating made Nkomo consider negotiating with the British in the context of war 
“…as the only way to eject a thief that had broken into the house”.150  
On the other hand, the release of Mugabe from prison in 1974 as a result of the détente initiative 
led by John Vorster, the South African president, and Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian president, 
coincided with a leadership struggle within ZANU. Ndabaningi Sithole, as president of ZANU and 
under compelling prison conditions, renounced the use of violence in order to obtain his release 
from prison and this translated to ZANU abandoning its military strategy altogether. The 
renunciation of violence by the ZANU president, Ndabaningi Sithole in 1970, and his subsequent 
release from prison, met with such mixed feelings that made him him unpopular within the party 
that he had presided over since its formative years.151 
The election of Robert Mugabe to replace Sithole as president of ZANU has been debated in 
political circles. Some members were not convinced that Sithole had sold out by renouncing the 
use of violence and so continued to regard him as their legitimate leader. The military leadership, 
not the ordinary guerillas, on the other hand, discarded Sithole as a sell-out and elected Mugabe 
instead. As Chung postulates, the importance of the military in fulfilling the role of ‘kingmaker’ 
was associated with Solomon Mujuru, whose war name was Rex Nhongo, who threw his weight 
behind Mugabe rather than Sithole during the 1974-75 power struggle.152 The controversies 
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surrounding Mugabe’s election as ZANU president in Mozambique informed military influence 
on decisions relating to democracy and power after ZANU-PF’s election victory in 1980. 
According to Laakso, thousands of guerrillas in ZANU camps in Mozambique were detained for 
allegedly plotting to overthrow Mugabe in 1977.153 This suggests that a substantial number in 
ZANU and its military wing, ZANLA, did not support Mugabe’s leadership from the start and 
continued to view his leadership as an imposition from the party revolutionary leadership. The 
leadership wrangles in ZANU around 1978 have been linked to the mysterious death of the 
ZANLA High Commander, Josiah Tongogara, in a car crash on Boxing Day in 1979. Although no 
documented sources exist to shed light on the circumstances that led to his sudden death, he is 
understood to have mobilised ZANLA guerillas against the idea muted by ZANU to break away 
from PF and to campaign in the 1980 elections as a separate party from ZAPU. It is suspected that 
psychological warfare and manipulation of views and perceptions became part of ZANU-PF’s 
political culture and the inclusion of the military in the voting for leadership led to the dominance 
of militarists within ZANU during the war.154 A precedent was set that the army in future would 
determine who should lead the country and who should not. From the support that Mugabe got 
from a war general who was only second-in-command to Josiah Tongogara, it is not surprising 
that the revolutionary solidarity between Mugabe and Mujuru continued in government until the 
latter’s retirement from the army. It is therefore imperative to analyse the role of the military in 
sustaining ZANU-PF’s hegemonic powers in post-independence Zimbabwe and in creating 
conditions that were not conducive to democratic participation of all citizens regardless of political 
affiliation. 
The British government did not take Smith’s UDI lightly and the regime was under pressure from 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to make him conform with British decolonisation 
policy at the time. It was for that reason that the UNSC imposed its first ever economic sanctions 
on Rhodesia in 1965.155 In a bid to establish what blacks felt about the political dispensation that 
was ushered in by the UDI declared by the white minority, Britain later set up a commission known 
as the Pearce Commission in 1970-1.  The Commission’s task was to investigate, through 
                                                 
153 L. Laakso, (2003). Opposition politics in independent Zimbabwe, p. 2.  
154 F. Chung, F. (2015). Zimbabwe: Looking east. Directory Publishers, Bulawayo, p. 88. 
155 M. Hove, & H. Chingono, (2013). National interests and the sanctions strategy 1959-2013. Review of History and 
Political Science, 1, p. 6. 
44 
 
conducting a referendum, whether Africans in Rhodesia consented to the constitutional proposals 
that were calculated to legitimise Smith’s UDI and entrench white economic and political 
superiority. The ZANU president at the time, Ndabaningi Sithole, and other incarcerated 
nationalists, denounced the commission from prison as another fraudulent constitutional proposal 
requiring African decision.156 To voice their condemnation of the commission, ZAPU and ZANU, 
both of which were almost paralysed and politically obscure, temporarily re-emerged as the 
African National Congress (ANC) under Bishop Abel Muzorewa. The ANC successfully 
mobilised Africans in urban townships throughout the country to condemn the Pearce 
Commission, a name given to the team selected by the British and led by Lord Pearce to conduct 
a plebiscite on the proposed constitution. Ndabaningi Sithole wrote two letters while in prison, one 
to the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, in 1971, and another to British Foreign Secretary, 
Sir Alec in 1972, condemning the Pearce Commission as fraudulent. Sithole indicated that the two 
letters would serve as reference material for the Zimbabwean people if they were in future 
presented with another fraudulent constitutional proposal requiring their decision.157   
This last point above serves as background to the 1976 Geneva Conference and more importantly, 
to the Lancaster Constitutional Conference of 1979, the latter of which exhibited the fraudulence 
that Sithole alluded to in as far back as 1972. The nationalists in Zimbabwe, through experiences 
in negotiated processes involving the British lost trust in them for their negotiating in bad faith and 
for flouting agreed positions with impunity. The Lancaster Conference produced a constitution 
that was not only typically flawed right from the start, but also fundamentally lacking in moral 
validity. Negotiations revolved around designing an undemocratic constitution – to protect white 
privilege and maintain the economic status quo. Any attempts at reconciliation, in this case, 
between blacks and whites after independence, had to reckon with a long history of chicanery by 
the whites that impoverished the Africans and robbed them of their dignity as proper human beings. 
A few cases need mentioning to emphasise the point above. The Rudd Concession of 1888 signed 
between king Lobengula, and Cecil, John Rhodes’ men Charles Rudd, Rotchford Maguire and 
Francis Thompson, became the legal document that the BSAC used to march into Zimbabwe on a 
colonising mission after cheating on the Ndebele king, Lobengula, to sign on a document written 
                                                 
156 NAZ, No. 39874, Zimbabwe must be free now, Zimbabwe African National Union, Salisbury, Letter by ZANU 
President Ndabaningi Sithole to the British Prime Minister, Douglas Home, December 1972. 
157 Ibid. 
45 
 
in very strong legal language about which he knew nothing. Lobengula later realised that he had 
been cheated and sought to annul the Concession when it was already too late to amend. It must 
be noted that it was this document that the BSAC, on behalf of the British government, effectively 
used to justify its colonisation of the country in 1890.  
Another case of what Africans consider to be white treachery involved constitutional proposals in 
the early 1970s. The Pearce Commission in 1971/72 was rejected upon the realisation that the 
Rhodesians wanted to cheat the Africans and hoodwink them into uncritically endorsing 
constitutional proposals that were meant to deprive them of their rights. A third case leading to the 
deepening of black distrust of whites was the Internal Settlement of 1978. The government of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under the premiership of Bishop Muzorewa after his election victory, was no 
less compromised than the Smith Administration that it replaced in that Smith retained all the 
powers, thus rendering Muzorewa a ceremonial Prime Minister. The Lancaster Agreement 
preserved white political and economic interests by giving them 20 uncontested seats in parliament 
so that they remained relevant in the new dispensation. It bore the seeds of its own destruction and 
became pivotal in the long-drawn out political and economic crises in Zimbabwe thereafter.  
Carrying out aerial bombardments on ZANLA and ZIPRA bases when negotiations were 
underway at Lancaster in 1979 showed to Africans the extent to which whites in the country could 
not be trusted. Memories of the developments highlighted above were transposed into the new era 
of compromise politics and inter-racial conciliation and reconciliation after the multiparty 
elections of 1980. It means that comprehensive reconciliation was not going to be easy unless past 
injustices, instead of being wished away and forgotten, were addressed holistically to pave the way 
for unity of purpose, progress, development and common identification with Zimbabwe to which 
everybody belonged regardless of creed, race, ethnic origin or any other criteria. 
With regard to the Pearce Commission, it can be inferred that the letters that Sithole wrote to the 
Imperial Crown in England were delivered by white liberals. The letters attacked the unfairness of 
using a commission to test the collective opinion of the Zimbabwean people. Such sentiments from 
the president of ZANU came in the wake of massive intimidation by the white Rhodesian 
establishment aimed at coercing Africans into voting ‘yes.’ Sithole warned Sir Alec Douglas 
Home: “… before the ink in which the proposals are written is dry, the Anglo-Rhodesian 
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Agreement has already been dishonoured”.158 The Smith regime, contrary to the anticipated 
peaceful conditions under which the plebiscite was to be held, violated the standards proposed by 
the Anglo-British Agreement so that it could rig the process and register a constitutional victory. 
The campaign by Africans produced a resounding ‘no’ to the Anglo-Rhodesian proposals because 
they failed to pass the test of acceptability unless the one-person one-vote principle was used.159  
From the foregoing, Muzorewa had his part to play during the struggle in the sense that he united 
traditionally hostile groups under the name ANC which later became UANC when both the ZANU 
and ZAPU leadership could not do so from inside detention camps. Muzorewa was responsible for 
the recruitment of military cadres, particularly in Manicaland, around 1975 who would be trained 
for guerilla warfare in Mozambique, Tanzania and eastern socialist countries such as Yugoslavia 
and Romania. He became an asset not to be dispensed with in the objective reinterpretation of the 
anti-colonial struggle and post-independence discourses in Zimbabwe. Chung160 intimates that 
Muzorewa was included in the first ANC that was formed in 1957. When ZAPU and ZANU were 
banned, they chose Muzorewa to lead an internal wing called the ANC comprising ZAPU and 
ZANU leadership. She also indicates that they chose Muzorewa to lead the ANC as an internal 
representation of nationalism not because they admired him for being a religious person, but 
because he had no understanding of politics and that he was in a way, another Tsvangirai. This 
sounds like an unfair assessment of Tsvangirai given by Chung. This is because Muzorewa was a 
man of the cloth and politically a moderate, whereas Tsvangirai had comprehensive reading of the 
economic crisis that not only gave rise to the MDC. Tsvangirai’s party also eroded ZANU-PF 
legitimacy, except that he operated in a militarised environment which political opposition was a 
risky area to tread. 
The armed liberation struggle intensified in the late 1970s and forced Smith to launch air raids into 
Mozambique and Zambia where freedom fighters were being trained. The Rhodesian forces 
launched air raids against ZAPU’s Westland Farm headquarters in Zambia and against Patriotic 
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Front arms dumps in Mozambique in 1978.161 The raids into ZANLA guerrilla training and refugee 
camps continued even when the Lancaster Conference of 1979 was underway in London, arguably 
as a strategy to pressurise the PF leadership into conceding to the demands by the Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia delegation. The loss of a Bell Huey helicopter to a surface-to-air missile inside 
Mozambique at Chimoio in September 1979 was the single greatest disaster in terms of casualties 
suffered by the Rhodesians during the war.162 Under the circumstances, Smith elected to cooperate 
with moderate African leaders such as Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa who were within 
the country. He hoped by this to have the sanctions imposed on Rhodesia removed and recognition 
internationally granted to Rhodesia through an internal settlement in which black parties inside the 
country would be participants in the 1979 elections, to the exclusion of ZAPU and ZANU.  
The Internal Settlement by its very nature excluded the PF alliance because it was external in the 
sense that the two parties, ZAPU and ZANU, had established governments in exile. Elections were 
conducted in urban areas only because rural areas, especially those in Mashonaland and 
Manicaland provinces, had been sealed off to Rhodesian forces and had become semi-liberated 
zones. This 1979 “internal settlement” introduced a new constitution for “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” 
and a complicated system of commissions ensured white control over important appointments in 
the administration, the judiciary, police and army.163  Muzorewa did not therefore exercise full 
executive powers as Prime Minister of the country. The results of the Internal Settlement elections 
gave UANC 51 seats, ZANU Ndonga 12 seats, and Ndiweni’s UNFP 9 seats.164 The government 
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had two chambers: the Senate comprising forty members with fourteen 
Africans, ten whites and six presidential appointees and the House of Assembly made up of 100 
members - 72 Africans and 28 whites. The PF, conspicuous by its absence from the internal 
arrangement, did not recognise Muzorewa’s government and so continued the armed guerilla 
struggle.  
                                                 
161 P. Preston, (2004). Stalemate and the termination of civil war. Rhodesia reassessed. Journal of Peace Research, 
41(1), p. 68.  
162 I. E. Beckett, (1985). The Rhodesian army: counter-insurgency, 1972-1979. Armed Forces & Modern Counter 
Insurgency, p. 163.  
163 L.. Laakso, (2003). Opposition politics in independent Zimbabwe, p. 2. 
164 M. Sithole, & J. Makumbe, (1997). Elections in Zimbabwe: The ZANU (PF) hegemony and its incipient decline. 
African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique, p. 126.  
48 
 
The international community as represented by the UNSC and the OAU did not give legitimacy to 
the new creation either, but instead piled pressure on both Smith and Muzorewa, compelling them 
to accept the inclusion, in the all-party elections, of the fighting parties of the PF as a precondition 
for finality on the constitutional crisis in Rhodesia. The two organisations appealed for the 
annulment of the elections and that meant that sanctions would remain in force unless there was 
international recognition of the new government. The Boyd Report on the 1979 elections, which 
was biased in favour of the elections, attempted to justify the claim to legitimacy by the Smith-
Muzorewa government by utilising statistics based on official Rhodesian figures which stood at 
62% voter turnout.165 Mick Delap, a member of the British Broadcasting Corporation (African 
Service), claimed that the reports were fictitious and that the election was neither free nor fair by 
any electoral standards used by western democracies because of violence and intimidation which 
left the Africans without any choice.166  The sixty-two percent voter turnout could have been based 
on the urban voters’ rolls that also disenfranchised potential voters because of property 
qualification and other requirements for eligibility as voters. The Conservative Government that 
took office in 1979 in Britain had sent a team of observers to witness these elections with a view 
to reaching a lasting solution to the Rhodesian crisis based on a majority decision of the people in 
the country.167  
The Lusaka Talks organised by the British government and the Frontline States culminated in the 
Lusaka Agreement signed by the PF led jointly by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo and 
Muzorewa representing Zimbabwe- Rhodesia in August 1979.168 The Lusaka Agreement fully 
accepted not only Britain’s constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe, 
but also that free and fair elections should be ‘properly supervised’ under British authority.169 
These talks were a precursor to the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979 in which all the warring 
parties in the Rhodesian conflict met to discuss the ongoing political and constitutional crisis. Lord 
Carrington brokered in two very powerful capacities: as British secretary of the Commonwealth 
leading the British delegation, and as advisor to the PF delegation of ZAPU and ZANU. The Smith-
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Muzorewa delegation represented the government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia that was constituted 
after the 1978 Internal Settlement, and that Ian Smith held with moderate African nationalist 
leaders such as Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, Chief Jeremiah Chirau and Chief Ndiweni. 
The historiography of violence in Zimbabwe began to be seriously documented when the ruling 
ZANU-PF unleashed a violent and conflictual nation-building campaign between 1982 and 1987 
as part of its efforts to make politics the preserve of war participants on its side during the liberation 
struggle.170 As Matikiti argues, provided an opportunity for ZANU-PF to destroy PF-ZAPU and 
establish a one-party state and that obscured the philosophy of multiparty democracy as effective 
opposition disappeared.171 Ironically, and based on the preceding discussion, the perpetrators of 
violence then were once victims of the orgies of violence carried out by the Rhodesian army when 
they captured and killed guerrillas to discourage Africans from joining the war on the side of 
nationalists.  
The government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was founded on violence and lawlessness caused by the 
militia groups that each of the coalition parties had assembled in 1978.172 Muzorewa had a militia 
force called ‘Pfumo Revanhu’ (Spear of the Nation), Ndabaningi Sithole had Masikuzu Apo, a 
derogatory term for an undisciplined army band, Chief Jeremiah Chirau had an auxiliary force and 
the coalition government had Operation Favour. These militias combined with Smith’s army to 
become the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia army. The violence inherent in the army of the coalition of 1978, 
when drafted into the Zimbabwe National Army at independence together with the equally violent 
ZANLA and ZIPRA force, was refined to make it more effective. This background violence, from 
the perspective of the researcher, militated against free political activity and the state’s appeal for 
reconciliation could very well have been anchored on an unstable political, linguistic, and ethnic 
terrain that produced unity at a superficial level.  
The decisions reached at the Lancaster House Conference must serve as a reference point in any 
analysis of postcolonial crises in Zimbabwe because they were flawed in several respects. White 
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settlers in Rhodesia were cushioned from the wrath of a vengeful African nationalist government 
that was likely to take over political power after the elections set for 1980. The PF delegation was 
negotiating from a position of weakness because several factors militated against it. Lancaster 
House was not a neutral venue and having been in socialist guerrilla combat and spending so many 
years in the bush, they possibly lacked negotiation skills and may have been forced into 
submission. Nkrumah's often quoted dictum: “Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will 
be added unto you”173 aptly explains the decision by the PF to surrender to conciliation at Lancaster 
immediately after signing the Lusaka Agreement. The PF’s optimal strategy was to gain political 
independence first, to be followed by a more comprehensive and thorough liberation struggle when 
they held state power. That was the best option they could settle for under the prevailing and 
compelling environment characterised by diplomatic initiatives to bring finality to the Rhodesian 
constitutional crisis. President Samora Machel of Mozambique also exerted pressure on Mugabe’s 
ZANU to agree to some settlement with the other political players at the Lancaster House talks 
because he claimed that Mozambique had borne the brunt of military attacks from the Smith 
regime in its pursuit of guerrillas, and that this situation could not continue indefinitely. Once in 
power, they could do as they pleased over time. To argue that the PF did not think they could 
defeat the government militarily at that stage would be to belittle the military successes that 
ZANLA guerrillas had scored throughout Manicaland and Mashonaland Provinces which sealed 
off these areas to Rhodesian forces before the Lancaster Conference.174 
The Smith-Muzorewa delegation participated in the negotiations from a position of strength 
because they were representing a government. Muzorewa was still enjoying the euphoria of his 
electoral victory of 1979 under the Internal Settlement agreement that created Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia. He was the Prime Minister representing his country and challenged the British 
government to find out why the PF insisted on fighting even when the country had long since 
attained majority rule under his stewardship. He argued that the conference should centre around 
considering lifting economic sanctions that he felt were inconsistent with the new dispensation, 
and that it should acknowledge his legitimacy as a democratically-elected Prime Minister of the 
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coalition government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia on the basis of the multiparty elections of 1979.175 
It was easy for Lord Carrington to threaten the PF delegation, but difficult for him to negotiate 
with a guerrilla delegation. Except for Nkomo and Mugabe who had gained considerable 
experience in the art of negotiation at the 1976 Geneva Talks, the rest of the PF delegation lacked 
these negotiation skills. It is significant to note that the proceedings of the three months’ conference 
that lasted from September to November 1979 were in accordance with Lord Carrington’s 
constitutional proposals which he successfully defended to secure white settler political and 
economic interests in a black-ruled Zimbabwe after 1980. 
It can be argued that the Lancaster House Agreement victimised the PF into submission as Mugabe 
admitted that he was forced by Carrington’s arm-twisting and Frontline States’ pressure and that 
he would have preferred an outright military victory over the Rhodesian forces on the ground in 
order to dictate his terms without interference.176 Based on the knock-out military strategy 
envisaged by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in Mozambique in the 
struggle against Portuguese imperialism, it was anticipated that ZANLA had the military capacity 
to induce surrender on the Rhodesian military force. Indeed, the greater parts of Mashonaland, 
which form the bulk of the country, had been declared semi-liberated or liberated zones by the 
time the Lancaster Conference convened in 1979. These areas were firmly under ZANLA control 
and were also no-go areas for the Rhodesian military.177  
ZIPRA military operations were confined to Wankie and their campaigns proved disastrous178 after 
failing to match the Rhodesian military might. Internationally, ZAPU was the only party 
recognised as truly revolutionary and its members such as Rex Nhongo and others got their military 
training in the Soviet Union in 1968.179 The Wankie debacle, which saw the annihilation of ZIPRA 
forces in the late 1960s, led to Rex Nhongo’s defection from ZAPU to ZANU.180 It is very 
important to note that ZAPU, after the Wankie fiasco, realised the futility of escalating an armed 
struggle against a visibly invincible Rhodesian force. It was not equipped with guerilla tactics but 
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its cadres had mastered the art of conventional warfare, a situation that made it to husband Soviet-
made  military ware for future use against ZANU in 1979 in what was to be code-named 
‘Operation Zero Hour.181 According to this plan, ZAPU was to wait for ZANU to defeat the 
Rhodesian army through guerilla warfare, because of its own inability to execute that kind of 
warfare, and then march to take over the country with a strong Soviet-backed conventional army.182  
The following observations must be made at this stage. Electoral politics in Zimbabwe, inclusive 
of the majority population, can be said to have begun in 1979 when blacks for the first time were 
accorded the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice in the internal settlement elections 
that brought about Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under Bishop Muzorewa. Even if the PF of ZAPU and 
ZANU lambasted the elections, at least the ordinary urban citizenry who participated exercised 
their democratic right to vote which had been denied them since colonisation in 1890. The 
Lancaster Conference resolved that ZAPU and ZANU would campaign as a single party under the 
banner of the Patriotic Front, but ZANU decided to dishonour the arrangement and proceeded to 
do so as ZANU-PF.  
The most plausible reason for ZANU’s decision to flout the agreement was that it was clearly 
visible on the ground in the greater part of the country, and its freedom fighters, ZANLA, had 
scored many military successes using Maoist fighting tactics. ZANU had succeeded in making the 
struggle ‘a people’s war’ as the support it garnered throughout the country far outstripped that of 
ZAPU. ZANU-PF’s superior support base over all other parties, coupled with a massive guerilla 
recruitment drive, influenced the decision not to want to partner with ZAPU because it was 
confident of an electoral victory. The idea for separation, in defiance of the agreed position at 
Lancaster, signaled to ZAPU that ZANU-PF could not be trusted as it continued to exhibit its traits 
of the 1960s which made cooperation between the two parties to hang precariously in the balance. 
Nkomo’s party became known as PF-ZAPU. This development confirmed earlier fears played 
down by Nkomo in 1976 that the PF would degenerate into a marriage of inconvenience.  
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The multiparty elections of 1980 quickly succeeded the 1979 Internal Settlement elections and PF-
ZAPU and ZANU-PF undertook extensive campaigns before the election date. Other registered 
parties in the electoral contest included The National Democratic Union (NDU) under Chiota. 
United National Federal Party (UNFP) under Chief Ndiweni, Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) 
under James Chikerema, National Front of Zimbabwe (NFZ) under Mandaza and UANC under 
Muzorewa. PF-ZAPU was not permitted by ZANU-PF during the time to freely campaign in 
Mashonaland for the reason that it did not operate in the area during the liberation struggle.183 The 
results of the 1980 general multiparty elections were as follows:  
Table 2.2: Results of the 1980 general multiparty elections184 
Party Leader Seats  Party Leader Seats 
ZANU-PF Mugabe 57  ZANU Sithole 0 
PF-ZAPU Nkomo 20  ZDP Chikerema 0 
UANC Muzorewa 3  NFZ Mandaza 0 
    UNFP Ndiweni 0 
 
Elite cohesion within ZANU-PF came mechanically in a desperate bid to win the 1980 elections 
but cloaked the deep-seated ethnic and other latent philosophical considerations that had the 
potential to expose the inherent cleavages of its party leadership. ZANU-PF was also able to 
sustain its cohesion in the first few years after independence because of its deep distrust of the 
white political elite and African participants in the internal settlement of 1979.185  
In terms of the British decolonisation tradition, Rhodesia had to be placed in the hands of Britain 
in order for it to facilitate a peaceful political transition from white minority rule to black majority 
rule and Lord Soames was sent as the last British Governor of the country to oversee the process. 
This move was an acknowledgement that Smith had erred in declaring white independence just at 
a time when African nationalists in neighbouring Zambia and Malawi had attained majority rule 
after the dissolution of the Central African Federation in 1963, thus plunging the whole country 
into a protracted 15-year war that could have been avoided. The United Nations (UN) also sent its 
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troops to ensure that the electoral campaign would go smoothly and that there was no political 
intimidation across all contesting parties. The election was characterised by sporadic violence and 
mutual accusations of intimidation186  reminiscent of the era of the 1960s. The Rhodesian crisis 
was internationalised, and it was fitting that observation and supervision of the 1980 elections 
would bestow international acclaim on the victor, such that the losers would not dispute the results 
of the elections. Another important consideration was that the original Westminster model, from 
which the Lancaster House Constitution was drawn, bestowed tremendous or concentrated power 
in the hands of the Prime Minister.187  
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the 1980 elections ushered in a unity or coalition 
government that was predominantly ZANU-PF, although a few other members from PF-ZAPU 
and the Rhodesia Front were allocated posts in the new government. Many political parties were 
formed to contest the elections and that was indicative of the country’s espousal of democratic 
practices and participation. It should be noted that it appears that only the PF parties and the UANC 
appeared to have been representing the aspirations of the African people, probably because of their 
liberation credentials, because all other parties failed to secure even a single seat. Another reading 
of it is that the masses voted strongly along ethnic lines, which did not bode well for the post-
independence period. In terms of the Lancaster Agreement, the white minority community had 
twenty reserved seats that were not contested by the majority as a result of the determined effort 
by the British to preserve a special position for the minority white group in the new political 
dispensation.188  
The political transition process from Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to Zimbabwe was essentially cosmetic. 
Comparatively, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia echoed the Internal Settlement coalition between Africans as 
represented by ‘Zimbabwe’ and whites as represented by ‘Rhodesia’ and the nexus was maintained 
and modified in the independent Zimbabwe. Reconciliation was, indeed, an acknowledgement of 
this reality in a new dispensation under black tutelage. The firm commitment by the PF delegation 
at Lancaster to the letter and spirit of the British constitutional proposals eased the political transfer 
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of power in Zimbabwe through the 1980 elections, without which independence might have been 
prolonged, and at great cost. The promise of white personal protection and guarantees of security 
of property also generated government trust both locally and internationally. Chances are that the 
whites may have objected to change if their privileged position was completely wiped away. 
However, the Lancaster House Agreement that had made the PF concede to a multiparty political 
strategy had to contend with the political, ideological, ethnic and factional permutations now 
underpinning a new era of African majority rule. Under a system of proportional representation, 
all the parties that won seats in the 1980 elections combined to form a coalition government in the 
spirit of multiparty democracy. Proportional representation worked well for the UANC and the 
former Rhodesian whites because it guaranteed their participation in the new government. Whites 
were comfortable in the sense that their political and economic interests were protected.  
Although Zimbabwe became a multiparty state after the 1980 elections, the tendency by ZANU-
PF to emulate successful socialist revolutions in countries such as Cuba and Mozambique clashed 
head-on with political and economic realities on the ground. Implementing socialism or radically 
transforming an economy that had remained substantially capitalist would impact negatively on 
the transition process and raise white suspicion with the intentions of ZANU-PF. As Francois, 
Rainer and Trebbi189 noted, in Africa, political power assumes a winner-takes-all from respect to 
wealth and resources, patronage, prestige and prerogative of office. This observation was soon to 
find expression and meaning in Zimbabwe’s inter-party postcolonial historiography. The 
government had to grapple with the dilemma of balancing its populist strategies, for example, its 
promise to redistribute land equally and equitably to the landless blacks, against those of whites190  
who had chosen to remain in the country after Mugabe’s pronouncement of a policy of 
reconciliation. 
There was also need for the placement of divergent national and self-interests of the new ruling 
elite, in principle, guided by the socialist philosophy that ZANU-PF had espoused at the height of 
the armed struggle in 1977.191 The Western capitalist countries expected Muzorewa to win the 
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1980 elections and Mugabe’s election victory was the least expected outcome.192 This was based 
on a complete misreading of the support ZANU-PF enjoyed in the bulk of the countryside where 
the peasant majority resided. Multiparty voting that gave birth to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in 1979 did 
not involve the rural communities and this made the UANC a less credible party in the eyes of 
these rural people. Equally significant to consider was the reality that ZANU-PF had liberated the 
greater part of the country before the Lancaster House negotiations took place.  
The 1980 elections smacked of ethnic voting. Lord Soames noted that Nkomo unavailingly tried 
to cast himself as a national leader but tribalism proved too strong for him.193 Rich highlights the 
salience of ethnicity during the 1980 elections when he articulates the sentiments echoed by 
Stanlake Samkange, who was then a ZDP candidate, that the elections were a clear reflection of 
tribalism and there was no other way of interpreting the election results.194 He further posited that 
the Mashonaland people would never have Nkomo and the Matabeleland people would never have 
a Shona. This ethnic component needs to be problematised in the context of postcolonial 
Zimbabwean political history. Reference should be made to the patterns of National Assembly and 
Presidential voting over the years as indicated below. 
Table 2.3: Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe: 1990-2002195 
Year Party Candidate Number of 
votes 
Votes 
(% of 
total) 
1990 
Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) 
Robert 
Mugabe 
2 026 976 83.0 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) Edgar Tekere 413 840 17.0 
 Total 2 440 816 100.0 
1996 
ZANU-PF 
Robert 
Mugabe 
1 404 501 92.8 
United Parties 
Abel 
Muzorewa 
72 600 4.8 
Zimbabwe African National Union - ZANU 
(Ndonga) 
Ndabaningi 
Sithole 
36 960 2.4 
 Total 1 514 061 100.0 
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2002 
ZANU-PF 
Robert 
Mugabe 
1 685 212 56.2 
ZANU-Ndonga 
Wilson 
Kumbula 
31 368 1.0 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
Morgan 
Tsvangirai 
1 258 401 42.0 
Independent member of Zimbabwe African 
People's Union (ZAPU) 
Paul Siwela 11 871 0.4 
National Alliance for Good Governance 
(NAGG) 
Shakespeare 
Maya 
11 906 0.4 
 Total 2 998 758 100.0 
 
2.2.1 The 1980 unity government: Challenges to the sustenance of the Lancaster Constitution 
The negotiations that took place for three months from September 1979 are known variously as 
the Lancaster House Constitution, Lancaster House Agreement and Lancaster House Negotiations. 
The naming of the historic event posed problems in the identification of the driving force behind 
it. The nationalist PF parties that were waging the liberation struggle wanted an end to minority 
rule initially, from ZANU-PF standpoint, by outright military victory though they found it 
insurmountable. The question of land restitution was a key mass-mobilising grievance that earned 
the revolutionary parties substantial support during the war. Yet the land issue was tangentially 
discussed and resolved based on the ‘willing-seller willing-buyer’ principle as foundation for 
reconciliation, suggesting that the agreement was historically specific in terms of the period the 
arrangement could be altered. An agreement requires goodwill on the part of the parties to it and 
it can easily be dishonoured and broken. That in a way explains why the British preferred the word 
‘Constitution’ to ‘Agreement.’ Calling the ‘Agreement’ a Constitution gave the entrenched 
proposals, in British eyes, greater respectability and inviolability. The negotiations at Lancaster, it 
could be argued, were skewed in favour of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and the PF delegation could give 
their views based only on Lord Carrington’s list of constitutional proposals. At the time though, 
the PF delegation appeared to have no alternative to push for a harder bargain. 
Having said that, for a constitution to have a human face, it must be the product of popular 
participation when the people make decisions and create binding value systems because they will 
have designed them. A constitution that predictably shapes and determines the destiny of a given 
society. The 1979 deliberations at Lancaster involved politicians, guerrillas and strategists who 
connived to undertake a reductionist approach to the Rhodesian crisis, making it a constitutional 
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as opposed to a political crisis. Constitutions throughout the world take on board the collective 
desires and value systems of the people for posterity without being historically specific in terms 
of their life span. Constitution making, in effect, should not be a hegemonic agenda but a shared 
enterprise. It can be argued that even if the Lancaster Constitution imposed liberal ideals on the 
country, it was not a people’s project. The researcher argues that the Agreement reached at 
Lancaster did not warrant being called a constitution. The explanation for this argument is that it 
was historically specific in terms of how and when the new black government under the Patriotic 
Front could proceed to amend certain provisions that were unfavourable to it. Clauses on property 
rights and the entrenchment of white settler privilege presented a lot of problems because they 
were given timeframe within which they could be amended. The use of the word ‘constitution’ 
was meant to give the settlement some legality and to bind the black government to it. Constitution-
making is a process that should be free of political manipulation and be predicated on 
disinterestedness as well as representativeness as criteria for constitutional supremacy. The 
Lancaster Agreement was not conducted in good spirit, with the British threatening the PF 
delegation that the negotiations would proceed and be finalised without them should they pull out 
due the unresolved land issue.196 There was no viable alternative and Mugabe and Nkomo leading 
the PF delegation seemed to have accepted the concession of a constitution with a view to changing 
things once in power. 
The Lancaster House Constitution provided for a Prime Minister (PM) wielding executive powers 
and a President with ceremonial powers. Mugabe, the PM, was in favour of a one-party state upon 
assuming power in 1980 on the premise that his party had liberated the country because the 
majority of Africans supported it but was constrained to declare it by the Lancaster Agreement 
which entrenched a liberal democratic framework around multipartyism.197 The unity government 
retained the inherited capitalist economic, political and security institutions and this made the 
political transition peaceful. Land redistribution, which had been the rallying point during the 
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liberation struggle, remained on the drawing board because government had to honour property 
rights as enshrined in the Lancaster House Constitution.198  
It must be noted that Smith’s regime had strong state control of the economy to counteract UN 
sanctions, and this was more akin to the socialist policy of the ruling party government of 
controlling the means of production on behalf of the historically marginalised black people. 
Characteristically, the inherited economy was robust, dualistic and primarily designed to serve the 
minority white segment.199 Above all, the major proponents of a socialist transformation of the 
inherited economy had to reckon with the incompatibility of socialism co-existing with capitalism 
when no radical changes had been made to the economy that remained substantially capitalist. It 
was for this reason that the socialist transformation had to be compromised, leaving whites in 
control of a functioning capitalist agrarian economy.200 It can therefore be argued that the 
reconciliation policy that Mugabe announced had its origins in the Lancaster Agreement, which 
clearly safeguarded white privilege by reserving 20 parliamentary seats for them. Reconciliation 
is defined by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, as: 
… a process of addressing the legacy of the past violence … rebuilding the broken 
relationships… addressing the pain and suffering of the victim…bringing back estranged 
communities… to find a path to justice, truth and peace… is a process that redesigns our 
relationships so that a society can move from a divided past to a shared future.201  
Mandaza describes reconciliation as “the mourn of the weak”, even when pronounced from 
positions of apparent moral and political superiority over exploiters and oppressors of yesterday.202  
The basis of Mandaza’s argument was that the government embraced reconciliation as a policy 
towards nation-building because it did not have the capacity to go it alone but required the support 
services of the whites in the early stages of independence. The new black elite in the echelons of 
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power realised that maintaining the existing status quo of production relations would be 
exceptionally beneficial to them in terms of property and wealth accumulation so they could build 
on it or modify it in a gradual way.203 Chisi argues that the liberation solidarity of ZANU-PF 
members is a manifestation of a tired nationalism to the whole agenda of liberation, it being a 
solidarity built around the primitive accumulation of wealth.204 Put in another way, it was 
reconciliation with capital, and the avowed rhetorical commitment to socialism succumbed to the 
predatory aspirations of capital. Reconciliation entailed the government’s acceptance of existing 
production relations to ensure continuity of production structures.205 Continued white control of 
the economy also meant that most of the Africans would not accumulate capital because they were 
economically marginalised. Chung summarised the drawbacks resulting from reconciliation as 
follows: 
… the retention of settler security institutions meant that the values, systems and processes 
that the government embodied, including uncritical obedience to authority, use of torture 
and violence such that the word ‘interrogation’ meant the use of brute force, lack of respect 
for human rights including extra-judicial killings, remained an integral part of the 
inheritance... colonial laws were now laws of the country … the Rhodesian CIO led by Ken 
Flower was responsible for capturing, torturing and killing freedom fighters … were ready 
to teach the tricks of the trade to the newcomers.206 
The policy of reconciliation provided for the retention of white skills and gave Zimbabwe 
international recognition as a sovereign state. Mugabe had to moderate his image from a tough-
talking guerilla fighter to a leader amenable to the politics of compromise and national unity.207 
This dissertation contends that the reconciliation policy benefited the few elites in power and the 
white settler community much to the disillusionment of the majority black population. One of the 
key issues was that the nationalist bourgeoisie who dominated the national liberation movements 
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of ZAPU and ZANU was created by colonialism and so they were not to be trusted with the task 
of creating anything different from the colonial state that produced them.208  
The elite foundations of ZANU, whose founder members were educated and schooled in European 
traditions and culture, championed the adoption of reconciliation regardless of whether it was a 
viable socioeconomic and political proposition or not. As Moyo argued, the threats of South 
Africa’s destabilisation manoeuvres, fear of a coup plot by white Rhodesians in the military, police 
force and security organs, together with the challenges of integrating ZANLA and ZIPRA into the 
Rhodesian army fostered social conditions that required social domination in order for the 
governing party to secure legitimacy without sacrificing security and stability.209 This laid the basis 
for ZANU-PF’s fears which inevitably made open politics after independence in 1980 impossible. 
All these conditions worked at cross-purposes with the spirit of reconciliation which could only 
exist in principle and in the fulfilment of elite self-interest. It was generally meant to give the elite 
leverage to the economy in an extractive manner without necessarily addressing the legacies of the 
past. The antagonistic relations between blacks and whites as a result of many years of colonial 
oppression were assumed to have been forgotten with the sheer pronouncement of the policy and 
so remained a ticking time-bomb because the spirit and commitment to it were lacking from both 
sides. It was difficult to wish away the pains and suffering inflicted on the revolutionaries in one 
quick brush. Therefore, failure to address core issues such as negotiating about the violence 
perpetrated by both sides during the colonial era, bringing the perpetrators to book, and charting a 
path towards sustainable peace through truth and justice, meant that reconciliation was very fragile. 
The policy of reconciliation, as far as it related to political rivals of ZANU-PF, particularly ZAPU 
and UANC that lost in the 1980 elections, was narrowly understood in terms of its practicality as 
a programme for former Rhodesian whites and ZANU-PF. It was like indicating left and turning 
right in terms of policy inconsistencies regarding ZANU-PF’s former African opponents as 
evidenced by events in Matabeleland from 1982 to 1987, when PF-ZAPU struggled not only to 
remain politically relevant, but also to weather the storm against ZANU-PF’s campaigns to 
ostracise it by military means. The integration of the various armies into a single Zimbabwe 
National Army (ZNA) gave ZANU-PF numerical military advantage over other entities. The army 
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became an indispensable cog that was instrumental in disciplining ‘dissidents’. ZANLA made up 
60%, ZIPRA 35%, and RF 5% of the force.210 It is alleged that between 1982 and 1987, about  
20 000 PF-ZAPU supporters were killed in the Gukurahundi campaign on the orders of ZANU-
PF211 in its violent nation-building process and as part of its attempts to consolidate its power by 
eliminating rivals.  
Operation Gukurahundi targeted community leaders, chiefs, teachers, nurses and ZIPRA 
combatants for elimination for supporting dissidents, and civilians were rounded up and compelled 
to sing songs in Shona [which was not their language but that of the majority ruling group] that 
glorified ZANU-PF while others were beaten for resisting.212 Coltart regrets the government’s ill-
fated decision at a rally in Lupane in 1983 to sanction the burning down of all villages infested 
with “dissidents”213 leading to the deliberate shooting of 62 young men and women near Cewale 
River and the burning alive of villagers in Tsholotsho.214  
The Emergency Powers Amendment Act (1986) transplanted from the colonial Emergency Powers 
Act (1960) in regard to preventive detention was decisively applied to deal with dissidents  in 
Matabeleland to maintain law and order, thus ensuring that total dominance in the absence of 
political opposition would be achieved.215 When a huge arms cache was discovered in 1982 at a 
farm allegedly owned by ZAPU,  and when in the same year there were reports of fierce skirmishes 
in the Entumbane and Chitungwiza high-density suburbs of Bulawayo and Chitungwiza 
respectively between ZIPRA and ZANLA former fighters in camps, a crackdown on former 
ZIPRA commanders such as Lookout Masuku, Dumiso Dabengwa, Nicholas Nkomo, Tshaka 
Moyo, Masala Sibanda and Misheck Velaphi was launched, giving closure to coalition politics as 
Joseph Msika, Jim Ntini and Joshua Nkomo were expelled from the Cabinet.216 That was 
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particularly so when ZAPU meetings were banned and when its offices were raided using the 
Emergency Powers.  
Powers such as the above were extended to obliterate ZAPU electorally in the 1985 elections when, 
despite having won fifteen parliamentary seats, no ZAPU appointments to positions in government 
were made.217The violence of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland during the operation coerced 
ZAPU into signing the Unity Accord, ‘a surrender document’ as one analyst described it, on 22 
December 1987.218  
The formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) by Edgar Tekere in 1988 must therefore, 
be construed in the context of an anti-one-party state struggle when ZAPU had ceased to exist as 
a party, and when these was no longer any threat to a one-party political strategy that ZANU-PF 
envisioned for Zimbabwe. In comparing multiparty with single party systems, Akinrinade argues 
that the choice for a one-party strategy hinges on the imperatives of political, economic and social 
development and that African states could not afford the divisive trends inherent in opposition and 
confrontational politics.219 It is further argued that there is too much importance attached to 
multiparty elections without analysing the character of the postcolonial state itself because 
competing groups have historically been known not to have substantial policy alternatives.220 
Visible on the African continent are multiparty elections that give voters voting rights without any 
real options to choose since ethnic and primordial loyalties predominate, rather than a true exercise 
in democratic preferment.221 Ironically, multiparty elections in Africa have become battlefields for 
political control of states, making democracy from the point of view of liberal thought, difficult to 
operationalise. 
In line with the concept of multiparty elections and political openness, ZANU-PF did not transform 
itself into a democratic party upon entering the corridors of power: the guerillas had still not taken 
off their uniforms nor had they laid down their guns, because of the party’s adherence to socialist 
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organisational structures such as the Politburo and Central Committee.222 The party organs made 
executive decisions for the state as is the case with governments modeled on socialist lines. The 
government would rubberstamp party resolutions uncritically because the party structures were 
supreme. For example, during the Murambatsvina period in 2005, and in line with the Compulsory 
Purchase Powers under the new Land Acquisition Act of 1993, the government confiscated 
Ndabaningi Sithole’s Porta farm that the veteran nationalist had used to provide housing to 
desperate tenants from the Caledonia areas on the eastern fringes of Harare223. The acquisition of 
the farm led to his self-imposed exile in the USA on allegations that he solicited arms to overthrow 
the government.224 His persistent demonisation of Muzorewa as a traitor discredited him politically 
and eroded his urban power base that had already shrunk to a very low ebb.  
The other dimension of the policy of reconciliation was the interpretive framework within which 
it was originally designed to fit. The ZCBC, Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe and the ZCC 
analysed reconciliation from a different perspective. They affirmed the biblical ethic in which 
those people who acquired wealth through cheating or exploitation of fellow human beings were 
required to return that wealth with interest.225 The churches made appeals to the former colonial 
masters, including those who enjoyed privileges under the unjust economic system of white rule, 
to pay reparations to those they had exploited as a strong basis for creating a new society in the 
process towards genuine reconciliation.226  
The role of reparations and mediation to give finality to all land disputes in the reconciliation 
equation as proposed by the churches was not considered important, at least in the short term. 
Upon its declaration, the policy had political implications which were taken to mean that fighting 
enemies would become friends again and co-exist in the spirit of forgiveness. Its economic and 
social implications were not explored as the new African elite sought political power at the expense 
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of all else. As events in the first decade of independence were to show, ZANU-PF, far from seeking 
to reconcile with other black parties, engineered or fronted rifts with the result that serious tensions 
emerged which made it difficult to achieve reconciliation. The glaring fact was that reconciliation 
was imposed on the ZANU-PF led government by the Lancaster House Agreement and was 
initially the result of compromise because the armed conflict had not produced an outright winner. 
White sceptics of the reconciliation policy, and of the subsequent amnesty, left the country, 
resulting in the decline of the white population. Within the same decade, the relations between the 
ZANU-led government and the white community became polarised. In both these cases, tensions 
oscillated between racial, ethnic, factional and class struggles, which only galvanised the regime’s 
resolve to safeguard the hard-won independence by consolidating power.   
The challenge with regard to the policy of reconciliation was that of convincing Sithole, Muzorewa 
and Nkomo, all of whom likely felt from experience gained through their encounters and factional 
and ideological struggles with Mugabe, that the pronouncement of reconciliation could not be 
taken for granted. The history of the nation was given a ZANU-PF rendition that was so narrowly 
defined, obliterating the autobiographies of other contemporary nationalists and, indeed, Edgar 
Tekere’s disinterested narration of ZANU-PF in A lifetime of struggle (2004) and Joshua Nkomo’s 
The story of my life (2001) that could provide alternative histories227 worth celebrating. It was after 
independence that truth suffered at the hands of the ZANU-PF regime when it started to create its 
own history which was driven by a singular identity-based thinking and influenced by political 
interests.228 Tarusarira also argues that history ought to be open for revision and plurality in order 
to become a firm base for socioeconomic reconciliation, and that, if it is used as an instrument to 
serve the interests of one side of the past conflict, post-conflict healing and reconciliation becomes 
more difficult.229   
Presenting his independence speech in 2000 when the Third Chimurenga had just begun, and when 
the white community had become part of the rank and file of the opposition MDC, President 
Mugabe overtly stated: “Our present state of mind is that you [white commercial farmers] are now 
                                                 
227 J. Gonye, T. Moyo & J. Hlongwana, (2017). A revolutionary character, A dispensable rebel? Edgar Tekere's 
political point-scoring autobiography of a Zimbabwean Nationalist Movement. Journal for Studies in Humanities & 
Social Sciences, 6(1), p. 134. 
228 Tarusarira, J. (2016). Reconciliation and religio-political non-conformism in Zimbabwe. Routledge, Taylor and 
Francis, London, p. 620.  
229 Ibid., p. 611.  
66 
 
our enemies because you really behave as enemies of Zimbabwe.”230 This is an indication that the  
land issue had reached a tipping point especially when the government used the race card to justify 
a spate of land acquisitions that targeted white owned  farms. The political economy of land 
redistribution sounded the death knell for the policy of reconciliation.  
From the economic point of view of the nationalist government, the rich resources that lured the 
colonial invaders into the country-rich soils for agriculture in the Highveld and an assortment of 
mineral deposits scattered throughout the country, could not be allowed to remain in the hands of 
a few whites as originally envisaged at Lancaster. From a political perspective, land was stolen 
from the ancestors to begin with, and therefore Africans did not consent to the ownership rights 
that were still the basis for the commercial farmers’ claim to the land.231 The philosophy known 
as Mugabeism was developed in 2000 to show the paradigm change in government policy towards 
whites. The central concept – ‘Mugabeism’ – is therefore clearly a difficult one, as Mlambo 
convincingly explains: the difficulty in defining Mugabeism could be the result of scholars looking 
for a nonexistent ideological coherence in what may, in fact, be historically shaped and 
emotionally driven actions of a generation of nationalists that lived through a traumatic colonial 
period whose pain and scars they seek to assuage by hitting back at everything they regard as the 
source of their previous suffering. He contests that Mugabeism appears to be ‘merely a 
continuation of African nationalism of the1950s and 1960s and the economic nationalist ideology 
that accompanied it.232 These white settlers in 1980 were embraced as citizens theoretically equal 
to Africans in terms of economic, political and human rights through the policy of reconciliation, 
but became ‘others’ as aliens and enemies of the state under the Third Chimurenga discourse of 
economic liberation.233 The land issue contained within it the seeds of political, economic and 
racial conflict. 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlighted the fact that reconciliation as a national policy calculated to steer the 
country in the desired economic and political direction of ZANU-PF was problematic if 
consideration is given to the circumstances that gave rise to it. The Lancaster House Agreement, 
which was looked upon negatively by the Patriotic Front except for the political promises of 
majority rule pending elections based on universal adult suffrage, was conservative in the main in 
that it upheld the existing racial, ethnic, cultural, economic, class and political status quo. The 
white constituency stood to benefit most from the compromise agreement. Political rivalries within 
the African nationalist parties themselves resurfaced as early as 1982 because the new government 
selectively applied the policy of reconciliation. The reconciliation framework excluded perennial 
rival parties PF-ZAPU and UANC, which became the principal objects of state terror and political 
marginalisation. These developments set the tone for an unhealthy political precedent in the 
practice of democracy, as a culture of fear rendered meaningful opposition dangerous. ZANU-
PF’s exclusion of PF-ZAPU and UANC from the national reconciliation process is reminiscent of 
its own exclusion from the Internal Settlement process. ZANU-PF was caught up in the web of 
historical precedents previously used against it and which it ironically began to use against others 
to its own advantage. 
 
 
  
68 
 
CHAPTER THREE: URBAN POLITICS AND THE QUEST FOR REGIME CHANGE 
(1980-2015) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on the development of politics among urbanised Africans in Zimbabwe from 
the time of political independence in 1980 to around 2015 when the state machinery increasingly 
monitored the new thrust of political activism in urban areas. In the 1979 Internal Settlement deal 
with locally-based moderate African leaders such as Jeremiah Chirau, Chief Ndiweni and 
Ndabaningi Sithole, among others, Bishop Abel Muzorewa became PM as a result of the swing in 
urban votes in his favour. The Smith-Muzorewa partnership formed a coalition government and 
the country was known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Mere inclusion of the name Rhodesia gave 
credence to the role that the white community still had in the country in terms of its politics and 
economics.  
Although the Smith-Muzorewa government was internationally not recognised because liberation 
movements such as ZANU and ZAPU did not participate, at least Africans were given a taste of 
democratic practice for the first time in choosing a leader of their choice in a multiparty 
arrangement. What made the Internal Settlement government illegitimate both for the majority of 
Africans within the country as well as internationally, was the way the elections themselves were 
conducted. Rural communities did not participate in these elections. It was difficult to mobilise 
peasants for the elections because rural areas in Mashonaland and Matabeleland were controlled 
by ZANLA and ZIPRA forces respectively and were impenetrable. The greater part of 
Mashonaland was semi-liberated by ZANLA forces and in such areas, no party other than ZANU 
was known or supported [PF was included later].  
Throughout its military campaigns in the countryside, ZANU-PF used a mixture of patronage and 
coercion for its peasant support and this was rooted in the violent mobilisation techniques used 
during the armed struggle.234 The ZANU-PF elite that assumed power after the election victory of 
1980 did not trust residents in urban areas because of their participation in the 1979 ‘sell-out’ 
Internal Settlement, and for putting Muzorewa, a moderate, at the helm of political power. The 
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role of the urban government in terms of their participation in national matters to do with their 
welfare, how the two forces engaged each other, and how in particular, urban grievances as 
articulated by the workers’ trade unions became both political and explosive as to attract 
international attention, are key concerns of this chapter.  
Zimbabwe inherited a relatively enlightened urban workforce that had benefited substantially in 
terms of their social and economic orientation to the capitalist ethos. Such benefits accrued during 
the federation era when the industrial hub was Salisbury, the capital of Southern Rhodesia. The 
question of their exploitation as a labour force under a capitalist system was popularised during 
the armed liberation struggle. It might not have made any real sense to remind urban workers of 
their exploitation under the prevailing conditions because they were relatively better off than 
workers in neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Malawi. Southern Rhodesia emerged from 
the Federation as the most industrialised, having the most diversified economy of the partners.235 
Nyasaland supplied cheap labour to Southern Rhodesia to work on farms and in mines, and 
Northern Rhodesia contributed its copper export earnings that were invested in federal projects 
which largely benefited Southern Rhodesia.236 Historically, the federation enterprise from 1953 to 
1963, though short-lived, left Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, more advanced economically, 
industrially and in terms of infrastructure than its sister federation states of Zambia and Malawi. 
All development initiatives were focused on Salisbury, which was the federal capital. The facilities 
in urban areas were modeled on those of Britain to the extent that Salisbury was nicknamed 
‘Bamba Zonke’ (‘Grab all’).237 Many people in urban areas did not overtly support the struggle for 
liberation for fear of losing their menial jobs, and because of a very strong settler propaganda 
machinery put in place by the Smith regime that portrayed guerillas negatively as Marxists bent 
on destroying the “good” things that the white government had achieved for Africans.238 The urban 
environs provided fertile ground for opposition politics after independence and people were ready 
to rally behind ZUM and MDC when they emerged in 1988 and 1999 respectively to challenge the 
ruling establishment. 
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3.2 ORIGINS OF WORKER-GOVERNMENT CONFLICT 
Political activism by African workers in Zimbabwe started during the colonial era. When Africans 
and whites met in a colonial relationship induced by capitalism, they formed trade unions during 
the 1940s. The Federation of Bulawayo African Workers Union (BFAWU) was formed by Jasper 
Savanhu, the African Workers Voice Association (AWVA) by Benjamin Burombo, and the 
Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union by Charles Mzingeli.239 The three trade 
unions successfully organised the 1948 general strike which was a pioneer workers’ protest against 
colonial rule and its corollary exploitation.240 They also pioneered the rise of African nationalism 
through mass political formations. The City Youth League led by James Chikerema, George 
Nyandoro, Edson Sithole and Duduza Chisiza, among others, was formed in Salisbury in 1955. 
This was followed by the formation of the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress in 1957, 
which became the first mass nationalist political party to be formed by Africans in Rhodesia. There 
exists a thread in opposition politics in the country which reveals continuities rather than change. 
Strong and viable political challenge to a party in power in both precolonial and postcolonial 
periods originated from workers’ organisations which subsequently transformed themselves into 
formidable opposition parties.  
The liberation war in Zimbabwe culminated in an elite-driven constitution, as outlined in the 
previous chapter. The Patriotic Front agreed to a constitution that in all intents and purposes was 
tailor made for a new bourgeoisie class that was bent on changing the ruling class without 
necessarily changing the regime because they too aspired to be economically powerful in their 
individual capacities. Chung refers to them as ‘black Europeans of today’ (“Varungu vanhasi”).241 
Therefore, at the inception of political independence, Zimbabwean society had different sets of 
value systems and the new elite clung to the white Rhodesian capitalist one despite its declaration 
of a socialist transformation of the economy. Simply put, the elite that assumed government 
responsibilities was suspended in mid-air in that there was little public participation in policy 
formulation. ZANU abandoned its pre-independence revolutionary promises of fundamental 
structural change (while retaining the rhetoric) in favour of a pragmatic accommodation of the 
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capitalist sector, at the same time implementing a welfarist social policy and boosting the peasant 
economy with subsidies and infrastructural development.242 ZANU(PF)’s accommodation of the 
former beneficiaries of colonialism was rooted in the geo-political realities of the time with 
encouragement from the presidents of the ‘Frontline States’ which had suffered a wholesale flight 
of capital and skills after decolonisation.243 These considerations, coupled with the need to 
consolidate political power, led to a strategic alliance with white capital that preserved and 
promoted privilege, setting the stage for an elite co-option process and more ominously, preserving 
racist politics to be played out much later.244 The 1987 Constitutional Amendment on the Lancaster 
Constitution threatened the existence of whites in the country when their political safeguard of 20 
seats was removed. That destroyed the racial relations that had precariously existed for seven years 
and a racialised struggle ensued thereafter. 
The 1980 elections were conducted on the understanding that the white constituency would not 
contest the elections in the same constituencies with other black political parties. Whites would 
get all 20 urban seats. White Rhodesians did not need to carry out election campaigns in the urban 
areas because they knew that the Lancaster House Agreement preserved white political and 
economic privilege, and that whatever the outcome of the multiparty general elections of 1980, 
their wealth, industries, land, and political power would remain in their hands.  
The socialist ideology of the ruling ZANU-PF party determined national policy after 
independence.245 Ideology is a basket term for comprehensive visions of societies and social 
developments which contain explanations, values and goals for past, present, and future 
developments.246 In support of this socialist thrust by government, the then president of Zimbabwe, 
Canaan Banana, argued that the Kingdom of God could only be realised in socialism.247 It was 
argued that people in Africa had no more need of being converted to socialism than they had of 
being taught democracy, both of which were rooted in African traditional life.248 Mboya, in 
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supporting such a perspective, also argued that socialism was an attitude of mind towards people 
practised in African societies and did not have to be codified into a scientific theory in order to 
find existence.249  
The socialist philosophy was chosen during the course of the armed struggle250 and it was 
antithetical, in principle only as it later turned out to be, to the capitalist system in operation in 
Rhodesia at that time. The adoption of a socialist approach in addressing the economic 
discrepancies that existed in the country because of colonial rule should have meant that the means 
of production such as land, mines, and industries would be redistributed to the historically 
disadvantaged black people. The implementation of socialism was problematic in the sense that 
ownership and control of the economy of the country could not be transferred to African peoples 
in terms of the agreement reached. Ownership was thus not substantially altered after 
independence. In addition, the policy and strategies by successive white minority governments to 
block African people from gaining industrial experience and training meant that they were not in 
a position to take control of industries251  Thus, the government found itself in a dilemma and was 
half-hearted in its commitment to socialism. And 20 years into independence, the land had not 
been adequately redistributed with 4 500 white farmers still owning 70% of the prime land.252  
A clause in the Lancaster Agreement specified that in the first ten years of independence, European 
land could only be acquired through a ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer basis’ and government would 
pay market value compensation in foreign currency for any land that it acquired.253 The land reform 
programme in the first decade of independence had to take this proviso into account. On the one 
hand, the government was obliged to fulfil its liberation promises to the people who supported it 
during the war years by re-distributing land equitably between blacks and whites. On the other, 
there were no land, industries and mines to distribute to Africans because they still remained under 
the control of the whites in terms of the property clause in the Lancaster Agreement that blocked 
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the confiscation of property, condemning such a practice as defying norm of civilised existence 
and therefore unconstitutional. 
The colonial laws remained in full operation and were used to constrain the urban workforce. For 
example, the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA), which prevented the formation of African-led trade 
unions,254 was replaced after independence by the Labour Relations Act in 1985 that also tightened 
control of ZCTU labour activities. Some of the colonial laws had been effected in order to deal 
with the rise of black trade unions that had become used to engaging in anti-colonial struggles.255 
From this development, it can be argued that the ZANU-PF government inherited very weak black 
labour unions for which reason it became the prerogative of the government to help in the 
formation of a single federation, the ZCTU, to which other private unions would affiliate256 
According to Danserau, 257 the state’s response to labour between 1980 and 1981 was to support 
the establishment of ZCTU in 1981 under the slogan ‘One country, one federation’. To ensure that 
ZCTU was fully compliant with party policies, Robert Mugabe’s brother, Albert Mugabe, was 
proclaimed the first Secretary-General. Therefore, ZCTU depended on the state in its formative 
years, and according to Dansereau, it had to reckon with the authority of the ZANU-PF government 
to get permission to pursue union activities. 
It is imperative that some historiographical reflections be made on the development of labour 
militancy in Zimbabwe. The earliest post-independence strikes in most urban areas were wildcat 
in nature in the sense that unions by then did not have the power to challenge decisions made by 
ZANU-PF because they were subordinated to the state and so had no basis to organise workers 
against government policies. Their demands were essentially labour-related. In the 1990s, the 
policy shift by government from the professed socialism to ESAP betrayed the urban workers who 
were still held in high esteem, epitomised in the address to the nation by the then PM, Robert 
Mugabe on 17 April 1980 that “…we are socialist. Basic wages and working conditions of black 
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and white must be based on an equal footing”.258 During these early times, labour was not 
systematically organised and workers’ capacity to collectively bargain for improved working 
conditions was so circumscribed by the state. Increased labour militancy in urban areas as from 
1991 with the introduction of ESAP led to more strike action by workers, as reflected in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Number of labour strikes in urban areas, Zimbabwe, 1991-1997259 
YEAR Number of strikes 
1991 9 
1992 9 
1993 17 
1994 35 
1995 33 
1996 27 
1997 54 
 
The above table clearly shows the increase in the number of labour strikes from 1991 to 1997. It 
was estimated that by 1995, close to 100 000 formal sector jobs would have been lost through 
ESAP.260The government responded by reverting to colonial laws that prohibited organised strike 
action against ESAP and applied force where it saw fit to deal with urban militancy. The ZCTU 
President, Gibson Sibanda, in his May Day speech in 1991 entitled ‘Liberalisation or liberation’ 
confronted the government and stated that economic change that was built on disorganising and 
silencing the voice of labour was neither sustainable nor stable.261 It was feared that the 
implementation of the economic recovery programme would result in 100 000 workers losing their 
jobs through retrenchment.262 The increase in strikes around 1997 can be explained in terms of the 
organisational capacity of the ZCTU on the eve of its becoming a fully-fledged political party by 
taking advantage of the economic discontentment of urban workers. 
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Table 3.2: Growth of trade union membership263 
Union Name 1990 1999 Percentage growth 
ZPTWU 7 600 10 500 25 
CWUZ 3 000 20 000 600+ 
ZBAWU 1 200 3 800 300 
 
Table 3.3: Decline of trade union membership in the 1990s264 
Sector 1990 1999 
Textile industry 21 000 10 000 
Clothing industry 32 000 22 000 
National Railways of Zimbabwe 17 000 8 000 
Domestic Service 100 000 70 000 
 
As pointed out, the change in economic fortunes for urban workers in the early 1990s was a 
corollary of the government U-turn from socialism to quasi-liberal policies that smacked of 
capitalism. This later spread into worker struggles for democracy in the case of the MMD in 
Zambia and the MDC in Zimbabwe both of which started as black labour organisations. In 
Zimbabwe, the formation of the MDC was a direct outcome of ZCTU as labour demands 
increasingly became more political and politicised, and as government chose a confrontational 
approach in dealing with organised labour. These movements reflected a multi-class basis as 
evidenced by the groups that coalesced to form a broad front of urban workers and other affiliated 
institutions. One of the challenges that may confront a movement is the lack of a clear ideological 
standpoint because of the different and oftentimes irreconcilable political and economic interests 
of the affiliate organisations and individuals. In the case of the MDC, the background of 
subservience to ZANU-PF as ZCTU initially, until later when its new leadership became more 
confrontational and political, affected its operations substantially as it was now seen as the 
“enemy” by the ruling party.  
As alluded to in the previous chapter, the policy pronouncements of reconciliation, reform and 
gradualism that were declared by the then PM Mugabe, further cushioned the whites politically 
and economically. Conditions for a socialist take-off were absent. These policies encapsulated a 
very gradual transition process under the theme ‘Growth with equity’. Reconciliation per se not 
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only referred to racial harmony but was also an acceptance that the economy was to remain in the 
hands of private capital.265 Major policy shifts in the new government were constantly under check 
from the whites who could block their implementation especially where a two-thirds majority was 
inconceivably required for such policy to take effect. Regardless of these policy initiatives and the 
proclamation of amnesty, the white population dropped significantly. 
The white constituency that was in full control of urban areas exhibited colonial trends of African 
political and economic exclusion and inferiorisation. In Harare and Bulawayo, for example, the 
new Africa majority government had to grapple with workers’ demands for better living conditions 
and living wages. These were the same people who had earlier voted for Muzorewa in the Internal 
Settlement elections of 1979. These urban constituencies were relatively enlightened and educated 
as most of them possessed qualifications that allowed them to vote in 1979. In any case, they 
benefited from Muzorewa’s 1979 election campaigns in the form of houses with title deeds. It was 
possible for urban dwellers to compare and evaluate the progress of the new government against 
the gains they obtained under the short-lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Of keen interest to note was 
the lack of commitment to the economic advancement of urban workers by the new ZANU-PF 
government. Priority was given to the rural populace that had apparently demonstrated its loyalty 
to the party by overwhelmingly voting for it in the 1980 multiparty elections. The socialist rhetoric 
of ZANU-PF during the armed struggle required that attention be given to the rural population for 
the support they gave to the struggle for independence.  
National policies were tailormade to immediately satisfy these rural communities that had 
spearheaded the struggle for political independence. ZANU-PF had to accordingly transform itself 
from being a broad liberation front into a political party with a socialist ideology and programme 
to help in the socialisation of the means of production.266 One of the challenges that confronted 
the government was the failure by the ZANU-PF party government to transform itself into a 
political party. The peasants largely supported its revolutionary war and so the ruling party could 
not associate itself with the working class which it had accused of collaborating with the whites 
and undermining the revolution for a long time. Socialising the means of production, therefore, 
remained not only rhetorical, but also a political gimmick because the government could not 
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distribute industries, mines, and factories which it did not own. That, on the part of government, 
was a clear case of ideological ambivalence where it called for socialism, yet, at the same time, it 
reassured private white capital that its vital economic and political interests would be promoted 
and protected.267  
The social conditions for a socialist take-off after independence were absent, and the guerrilla 
mentality among the ruling elite was to be abandoned to pave way for the politics of reconciliation 
and compromise whose precedent had been set up at the Lancaster Conference. The dilemma of 
the government ought to be understood from the perspective that it had no alternative plan to 
substitute socialism upon the realisation that it was realistically untenable. In any case, the regime 
of Ian Smith, indeed, had characteristics of a socialist state as, due to UNSC sanctions, the 
economy had turned inward and had become relatively self-sufficient.  
For its international acclaim and legitimacy, the government chose to respect the provisions of the 
Lancaster Constitution by allowing white Rhodesians to stay inside the country as part of nation-
building. A new command economy, right from independence in 1980, came into existence 
whereby all planning was centralised and decisions cascaded from top to bottom much to the 
detriment of the black working class in urban areas. The Civil Society in the New Millennium of 
Zimbabwe, in a report by the Commonwealth Foundation, 268 summarised the following problems 
as having been inherited from the use of violence during the liberation struggle: a top-down 
decision-making structure; an unquestioning acceptance of commands from above; suspension of 
moral conscience; impunity by high office bearers and the belief that they are above the law and 
not punishable; and the use of distorted information, language and lies to cover up problems and 
plain truths.  
A completely different scenario prevailed in the urban areas from that which the urban workers 
had expected. The government under ZANU-PF stewardship did not trust them but rather accused 
them of having participated in the 1979 elections that ushered in the Smith-Muzorewa government 
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia which did not have the support of the people because it was essentially 
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white-controlled. The colonial system that had exposed African urban workers to exploitation 
remained intact as only cosmetic changes were made.269 Chung proceeds to argue that colonial 
institutions that were retained guaranteed a peaceful political transition in the country, but the 
drawbacks were also apparent: 
[The retention] of the settler security institutions meant that many of the values, systems, 
and processes that they embodied, including uncritical obedience to authority, use of 
torture and violence such that the word ‘interrogation’ meant the use of brute force, lack of 
respect for human rights including extra-judicial killings, remained an integral part of that 
inheritance.270 
The government also accused urban people of having betrayed them by not playing a part in the 
liberation struggle that was taking place in the countryside. Some of them had either chosen to 
remain in urban environs or migrated into urban areas because of the war. Most of the urban 
dwellers were viewed as siding with the discredited Muzorewa government. At the same time, 
whites in urban areas treated the urban Africans no differently than their treatment at the hands of 
whites during the colonial and white minority government era. This created a dilemma for urban 
people who were in an invidious position and had nowhere to fall back to for support of their 
interests as workers given the fact that the ZCTU in its formative stage was controlled by a partisan 
leadership.  
The announcement of a National Minimum Wage Bill in 1980 prevented collective job action by 
the workers, yet, in most cases, wages were set far below existing wage levels.271 Following the 
strike by transport workers in Harare in 1980, Kumbirai Kangai, the Labour Minister, threatened 
to whip all striking workers if the strike action continued.272 In response to the strike, Prime 
Minister-elect, Robert Mugabe intimated that democracy is never mob rule, and that the 
independence obtained must not be construed as an instrument that vested individuals and groups 
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with the right to harass and intimidate others into action against their will.273 From this discussion, 
it can be noted that workers’ organisations were not strong enough to push for workers’ rights and 
to articulate their grievances. The colonial administration had never permitted the establishment 
or recognition of organised workers’ unions. The only avenue open to them were trade unions that 
had been formalised to at least reduce, not remove, employer-employee tensions over working 
conditions. These trade unions became outlets for the articulation of workers’ grievances in towns 
and cities. They also became institutions through which to vent their increasing frustrations with 
the government by means of a series of strikes that were not sanctioned by the government.  
As shown by the passing of the Leadership Code in 1984, some critics have argued that the African 
elite that formed the government misconstrued reconciliation to mean reconciliation with 
capital,274 and that it was compensation time for them for the years spent or wasted in the bush 
fighting colonial injustices. The elite, therefore, stood to benefit more economically by establishing 
clandestine connections with whites in business for self-enrichment than supporting black trade 
unionism that would result in their own agendas being frustrated. The dilemma of the workers in 
the first decade of independence found expression in the continued antagonistic social relations of 
production given the fact that industries were still white-controlled and owned, implying that the 
whites had not lost ownership despite black political independence. Workers had expected the 
government to support them against whites who were still in full control of the country’s principal 
means of production such as industries and mines, but such support was superficial as the 
government was mindful of the Lancaster Agreement which partially tied its hands. Workers were 
perhaps sacrificed on the altar of racial reconciliation.  
In a remarkable paradox, white industry had more government protection in the first seven years 
of independence up to 1987 than they had had under the Rhodesian United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) sanctions since 1965. The exploitative nature of capital continued under the new 
dispensation and that explains the decision by the small trade unions in the broader ZCTU of 1981 
to replace the founding Secretary, Albert Mugabe (1981-1985), with Anselm Chitewe (1985-1986) 
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whom Morgan Tsvangirai (1988-2000) replaced.275 a more forward-looking and courageous trade 
unionist as its Secretary-General. The ZCTU became quite relevant against the background of the 
neglect of workers by both government and the white employers. However, the founding of the 
MDC as a political mouthpiece driven by the concerns and grievances of workers and other people 
in opposition to government policies was a welcome development, but it weakened trade union 
militancy as experienced under Tsvangirai. Isdore Zindoga (2000-2001) and Wellington Chibebe 
(2001-2011) were Secretary Generals after Tsvangirai, but their leadership coincided with the 
harsh realities of intimidation politics following the government defeat in the 2000 referendum, its 
precarious dominance in the National Assembly when for the first time an opposition party (in this 
case MDC) garnered 57 seats, and when government was facing a legitimacy crisis for the first 
time since gaining power in 1980.  
The Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) that was ruthlessly applied on African urban 
workers during the heydays of colonialism in the country with an objective view to preventing the 
organisation of black labour, was transplanted into the new dispensation of the revolutionary elite 
leadership. It became a notorious piece of legislation after independence as the ZCTU challenged 
its legality in a country that professed to be democratic. Six trade unionists were detained following 
a 1992 demonstration against the adoption of ESAP.276 ZCTU’s attacks on LOMA were based on 
the fact that ESAP exposed the workers to economic exploitation, loss of job security due to 
retrenchments and the apparent irrelevance of its significance in a liberalised economy. John 
Nkomo, who by 1992 was the Minister of Labour, categorised the ZCTU as a political party and 
threatened to deal with it in the manner government had always dealt with opposition parties in 
the country.277   
Parties such as PF-ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo, ZANU Ndonga under Ndabaningi Sithole, UANC 
under Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and the ZUM under Edgar Tekere had all been silenced by 1992 to 
the point of extinction due to the politics of intimidation, violence and fear that ZANU-PF used 
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during the armed struggle.278 Although the struggle supposedly ended with the cease-fire 
agreement of 1979, the violent support mobilisation campaigns that ZANU and ZANLA used, and 
the militaristic dimension of their canvassing for support, were applied in their future 
confrontations with old and new political parties seeking to electorally challenge ZANU-PF’s 
hegemony. Urban spaces were transformed into confrontation zones for government and labour, 
and labour and employer. Workers’ problems, which included their conditions of service, 
accommodation shortages, job insecurity because of ESAP, failure of tripartite negotiation 
between government, labour and industry, prohibitions on labour strike action and general 
economic malaise, prompted the quest by workers for change at political level. Appeals for change 
of the national constitution were made and a broad-based coalition of 96 organisations from 
churches, cooperatives, trade unions, citizens’ groups, human rights organisations and students 
formally launched the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) in 1998.279 Students who were to 
make a political impact later such as Tawanda Mutasa, Brian Kogoro and Deprose Muchena saw 
the NCA as a first step to strong opposition and the electoral defeat of ZANU-PF.280  
Lebas,281 as introduction to her work, and with reference to the situation in Zimbabwe around 
1998, intimated that “in a police state, you don’t need a party that is democratic: you need a party 
that is an army”. This implies that the citizenry would be expected to accept orders from above 
and not reason, question or seek justification for any government misdemeanor, where fear reigns 
over logic, where the state remains in a permanent state of undeclared emergency. It is not 
surprising that the formation of the NCA was a welcome development to many sections of society 
affected by the brutality unleashed by the government in quelling urban labour demonstrations 
during that period. The constitution required serious amendments or had to be drafted anew to take 
cognisance of the interests of all stakeholders affected directly or indirectly by the liberation 
constitution which they now regarded as restrictive and flawed. 
The multiparty election of 1980 was based on the Proportional Representation (PR) system which 
meant that every contesting party was assured of representation in parliament and other state 
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organs relative to the overall number of votes garnered in all constituencies. The party with the 
highest number of seats, ZANU-PF, progressively undertook to make Zimbabwe a de facto one-
party state.  
The one-party state project was believed to achieve national unity, and that would jeopardise PF-
ZAPU that had won most seats in Matabeleland in 1980 and 1985.282 The working class in urban 
areas, supported by students from the University of Zimbabwe (UZ) and other institutions of higher 
learning, overtly opposed the move. In this regard, they were supported by Edgar Tekere, a ZANU-
PF renegade who had been expelled from the party in 1988 for opposing the drive towards a one-
party state as undemocratic and a protective shield for corrupt elements within the political 
leadership.283  
After his expulsion, Tekere formed the ZUM which garnered a very large following from the 
dispirited urban populations throughout the country’s cities and towns. One of the strategies the 
ruling party used to make it possible for them to move step-by-step towards a single party strategy 
was the co-option of ZAPU into ZANU(PF) in the Unity Accord of 1987. This deal removed the 
PF-ZAPU threat that seemed to be the only one to ZANU-PF dominance at that time. The Forum 
Party formed by a former Chief Justice, Enock Dumbutshena, also had urban support. Meredith 
describes a state advertisement on television in 1989 in which the shattering of glass in a car 
accident was followed by a voice: ‘This is one way to die. Another is to vote ZUM. Don’t commit 
suicide. Vote ZANU-PF and live.’284 Another advertisement showed a coffin being lowered into a 
grave followed by the warning: 'AIDS kills. So does ZUM. Vote ZANU-PF'.285 In both cases, the 
electorate was urged to vote wisely for ZANU-PF and live or commit suicide by voting for ZUM. 
However, pressure against the adoption of one- party strategy mounted against ZANU-PF and the 
project was abandoned. The overall effect of all these developments was to heighten areas of 
conflict between urban workers and the ruling party. Populist strategies that stood to benefit the 
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rural peasantry and cushion them from the economic vicissitudes could not be shelved but 
remained high on the priority list.  
The confusion between democracy and populism ought to be clarified. A party seeks to gain 
popularity by crafting policies that have majority support regardless of their economic worth.  The 
policies are implemented even when the economy will not benefit. This populist strategy to garner 
political support involves the selective distribution of gifts to known potential voters so that other 
people are lured. This practice seems to afflict every political party in Zimbabwe. Multipartyism 
on the other hand, is one of the most visible expressions of the presence of democracy in a country 
although the juridical existence of many political parties might not necessarily lead to freedom, 
but reflect, in quasi-authoritarian states, the outward trappings of the respect for the rule of law 
and human rights. So, emphasis on democracy involves the institutionalisation of majoritarianism 
and political equality as the foundation of decision-making.286 Tambila also argues that 
colonialism was not a school in democracy, but in authoritarianism and therefore, colonial 
administrations throughout Africa bequeathed such practices to emerging postcolonial states 
which are expected to comply with democratic traditions as conceptualised by the rich western 
countries.  
Rwodzi and Mubonderi have contributed to this debate on democracy and pose the question: Do 
poverty-stricken African countries need the kind of political democracy that comes in prescriptive 
exotic packages?287 In the same vein, the Global Development Research Centre (2000) cited in 
Kamete (2003) posits that pre-independence Zimbabwe was judged to have been very 
undemocratic and therefore badly governed.288 Zimbabwe, using the analogy above, has ever been 
a de jure multiparty state as evidenced later, by the passing of the Political Parties  Finance Act in 
1994 which stipulated that a party with fifteen or more seats in parliament would be entitled to 
receive public funding for its operations.289 An Act such as this one was indicative of the presence 
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of different political voices represented by multiple political organisations that could be permitted 
to register as political parties and compete in elections freely. 
Towards the end of the first decade after independence, signs of economic decline were beginning 
to show and this hit the working class the hardest. The country had little foreign currency to go 
around resulting in company closures and lay-offs. The closure of Cone Textiles, which was one 
of the two largest textile producers in Southern Africa, resulted in about 6 000 job losses in late 
1994.290 A new historical phase of women assertiveness to cope with economic challenges when 
the breadwinners were no longer formally employed began. Migrating to neighbouring countries 
such as South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zambia was key to the survival 
strategies that both men and women adopted involuntarily. In this study, a sample of four 
companies was considered sufficiently representative to reveal the broader projections of lay-offs 
that took place throughout the urban centres of the country during the ESAP era as shown below. 
Table 3.4: Selected company closures in 1996291 
Company Number of workers 
G and D Shoes 2 000 
Bulawayo Clothing 1 200 
W S Craster Engineering 950 
Fashion Industry Holding 2 000 
 
The government adopt neo-liberal economic reforms proffered by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in 1991. Things came to a head in 1992 with the passing of the 
Land Acquisition Act that allowed for the compulsory acquisition of white land for redistribution 
to the landless peasants. There is need to establish the nexus between the Land Acquisition Act 
and ESAP to determine whether they were dependent or independent variables because the 
government implemented them simultaneously. ESAP created new societies of hopeless people, 
with streets in urban areas full of retrenched beggars and homeless job-seekers when industries 
were closing down. This urban trend grew in intensity as workers got more organised and affiliated 
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to trade union bodies in different towns and cities, resulting in increased strikes for better wages 
and security of work among other grievances from 1991 up to 1997.  
The government shelved the 1991 Land Acquisition Bill on land repossession which was set to be 
passed into law after the expiry of the Lancaster Constitution, particularly the clause on property 
rights that could be amended after ten years, ostensibly because it had to address economic 
fundamentals that were vital to the sustenance of the state and its citizens. ESAP was introduced 
in 1992 because of a persistent budget deficit of 10% of GDP; 20% of the GDP was being 
channeled into government debt; lack of employment creation in the formal sector; and strict 
foreign exchange rationing.292 In a way, the land issue was postponed, but not abandoned. The 
political and economic mayhem led to food shortages in urban areas especially as more people 
were retrenched or went for months without pay. 
The results of the 1995 National Assembly elections show that overall, ZANU-PF support had 
sharply declined. There were 1 126 822 votes cast for it in 1995 compared to 1 690 071 in 1990 
although the number of its seats remained at 117 out of a total 120 seats. This indicates that there 
was urban voter apathy in 1995 resulting from the disintegration of ZUM that drew its political 
support from urban areas as well as from Manicaland, the home province of Edgar Tekere. In the 
1996 Presidential elections, ZANU-PF received 1 404 501 votes for President Mugabe, which 
translated to 92.8 percent of the total votes cast.293  
After the 1995 elections with a very low voter turnout, the government realised that there was 
growing resentment to its rule as evidenced by a series of strikes that rocked urban centres from 
1996 leading to the mass stayaway of 1999 that almost paralysed the state. The mass stayaway 
was organised by the ZCTU in league with the NCA in all major cities of the country. Economic 
grievances were politicised to a point where the labour body felt that its working force that 
continued to sink into poverty required a political platform to articulate their plight as workers. 
The plight of workers required a political body that could wrest power from the ruling party. 
Against this background, the National People’s Convention that had in 1998 convened to form the 
NCA converted itself into a fully-fledged political party known as the MDC in 1999. Rather than 
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dealing precisely with the challenges confronting the urban poor, the government decided instead 
to deal with them politically, particularly when it emerged that MDC was a broad movement of 
disparate interest parties that differed in everything but were only united in a regime overthrow 
agenda.294  
Zimbabwe’s unnecessary military involvement in the war in the DRC in 1987, the award of 
unbudgeted gratuities to war veterans in 1997, the land reforms. and Operation Murambatsvina295 
all negatively impacted on the national fiscus and created an inflationary environment296 that 
proved difficult to mend. The operation spread to more than 52 sites throughout the country and 
no area designated as ‘urban’ was spared.297 Rupiya also gave an estimate of 700 000 people as 
having been left homeless and when the number of dependents was added, the figure rose to 2,4 
million people who were adversely affected, 298 so worrying from the point of view of the victims 
of the operation was the reality of an informal economy being the mainstay of the economy.  
The informal economy in the country was estimated to constitute 59.4% of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), the highest in Africa.299 Operation Murambatsvina indeed helped to inflate the 
figures of the unemployed, most of whom, under the prevailing social and economic conditions, 
then went to their rural homes. If, on the other hand, the estimate figures presented by the 
Combined Residents Association are anything to go by, the operation affected over 55 000 
households in the 52 sites, and that translated to between 250 000 to 500 000 people who were 
rendered homeless.300 The deterioration of the economy was not clearly and easily visible in the 
first decade of independence. The successful provision of services to the majority in rural areas 
was principally due to favourable international ratings of the government’s programmes and a 
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steady flow of donor assistance301 from international sympathisers after the arduous liberation 
struggle. 
The MDC was not clear on its ideology. The diversity of its stakeholders and its strong multiracial 
component prevented any ideological consensus. Tawengwa302 rightly argues that a political party 
without a clear ideology has difficulties in gaining momentum with the people because that 
ideology is the consciousness that maintains the party’s membership. He further argues that 
opposition party formations in Zimbabwe lack a clear set of principles and are ideologically 
bankrupt which explains how deeply divided they become during national elections and this has 
often given ZANU-PF plebiscitary power.  
The multiracial nature of the MDC at its inception, and the lack of ideological clarity enabled 
Mugabe to link it with the regime change agenda. Chung argues that the MDC was ambivalent 
about the need for land resettlement and continued to make vague statements that belittled the land 
issue in Zimbabwe. 303  The term ‘regime change’ first appeared when the USA president Ronald 
Reagan used this expression in a speech encouraging the American CIA to topple Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi and the Libyan government.304 Bill Clinton and George Bush are said to have 
used the expression as well to justify the USA’s repeated attacks on Saddam Hussein of Iraq after 
1992. Mtizira defines regime change as the successful attempt to force a leader or government out 
of their position of power either by political, economic, or military pressure.305 Why the 
government under ZANU-PF tutelage survived amidst both internal and external pressure cannot 
be adequately explained purely in terms of its ability to suppress and restrict the opposition’s 
organisational capacity in the urban areas, but largely in terms of the sufficient numbers of people 
who supported it.306 It is argued that while “Mugabe may be bad, and it may be sad, but he is 
certainly not mad”.307  
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3.2 GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES: SILENCING GROWING URBAN OPPOSITION 
AND MOBILISING ELECTORAL SUPPORT 
In the first decade after independence, the urban workforce adopted a wait-and-see approach to 
government’s initiatives that related to them as workers. They were more reformist than radical in 
their dealings with the government. In a way, price control mechanisms sanctioned by government 
worked well in protecting both the rural and urban populace from the exorbitant prices on food 
and other essentials at a time when whites still owned and controlled a functional capitalist 
economy. The establishment of Rural Service Centres, later known as Growth Points, prevented a 
phenomenal influx of young men and women from rural areas into towns because they had all the 
trappings of urban life. Fault lines began to develop between urbanites and the government 
especially after the latter had agreed to adopt ESAP as its blueprint for resuscitating the economy. 
Tawodzera308  intimates that ESAP laid the basis for a serious downward trajectory in the country’s 
economy.  
The Zimbabwean Minister of Primary and Secondary Education after Dzingai Mtumbuka, Chung, 
was convinced that ESAP led to the closure of about 3 000 factories throughout the country’s cities 
and towns, making Zimbabwe a primary product economy where meat and maize were not 
affordable by the majority of people and became luxuries, available perhaps only at Christmas.309 
The impact of company closures and the concomitant joblessness resulted in the diaspora 
phenomenon that cut across gender into neighbouring countries of Botswana, South Africa, 
Zambia, and Mozambique. With the skills required elsewhere in Britain, USA, Canada, and 
Australia, among other countries in the world, workers, some with professional skills, migrated, 
some with, and others without, proper documentation for entry. In a way, these migrations diluted 
the militancy of the dwindling urban workforce during the ESAP era, for which reason those who 
soldiered on were ready to embrace first, the more aggressive ZCTU and second, the opposition 
MDC party that was oriented towards the urban poor working class.  
The accompanying periods of drought in 1991/92 caused rural-urban migration and this strained 
the few resources in urban areas. Mechanisms to ensure party hegemony in all structures and tiers 
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of government sealed the fate of urban voters. It was a preparatory phase for the endorsement of a 
one-party state. The desire for a change of government by the informed urbanites was a direct 
challenge to the ruling establishment310 as trade unionism assumed the role of political opposition 
in the absence of a viable opposition party that could successfully compete for power. The ZANU-
PF government did not immediately grant urban residents the right to vote in urban governance 
issues even after the promulgation of universal adult suffrage.311 The government reacted in 
various ways after it had failed to win back the urban workers’ support. Legal, physical and 
administrative instruments were put in place to disenfranchise the urban electorate.312  
Since independence, ZANU-PF, until the 1987 Unity Accord with PF-ZAPU, had been angered 
for failing to win parliamentary and local elections seats in Matabeleland. Bulawayo became the 
battleground for political contestation as the dissident menace in the Matabeleland regions 
intensified against the government. The confrontation between ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU over 
control of Bulawayo made the government refuse to cooperate with the Bulawayo city council in 
coming up with solutions to the water shortages affecting the city because of its unfavourable 
hydro-climatic conditions. This was the position of the government up to 1992 in a bid to browbeat 
the city of Bulawayo into political submission313 thereby weakening any opposition to its rule in 
the city. Musemwa also intimates that development projects such as the Matabeleland Zambezi 
Water Project (MZWP) were suspended indefinitely due to insecurity and political considerations 
and Mugabe admitted that development programmes in Matabeleland came to a halt due to this 
conflict.314 This development in Matabeleland led many to conclude that resource allocation with 
regard to Bulawayo was compounded and underlain by ethnic imperatives315 where the residents 
of Bulawayo were being treated unfairly simply because they were Ndebele-speaking and 
perennial rivals for power to the Shona-dominated ZANU-PF since the formative years of 
nationalist politics in the country. 
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The MDC threatened ZANU-PF’s political hegemony especially in urban areas where its support 
had shrunk to a very low ebb. As a test of its growing strength, the MDC collaborated with the 
NCA in 2000 to successfully campaign for a ‘no vote’ to the proposed new constitution that was 
set to replace the defunct Lancaster Conference Agreement of 1979. The potential threat to ZANU-
PF of the swing of the urban vote in favour of the opposition in the 2000 parliamentary elections 
called for new violent strategies to intimidate and frighten the urban voters. In the Harare high-
density location of Budiriro, the medical surgery of a former freedom fighter, Chenjerai (Hitler)316 
Hunzvi, was used as a torture camp for arrested MDC activists317 ahead of the respective 2000 
parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections. A group led by Hunzvi and Joseph Chinotimba, 
both ZANLA war veterans of the liberation struggle, threatened war in the event that Mugabe lost 
the presidential election in 2002.318 Furthermore, ZANU-PF youths and supporters were inclined 
to use violent means to mobilise urban support against the MDC which they caricatured as a front 
for the protection of white minority interests. The provincial governor of Mashonaland Central, 
Border Gezi, at a political rally in Bindura on 26 March 2000 verbally attacked those involved in 
MDC activities and told ZANU-PF members that “[they] must warn supporters of opposition 
parties that ZANU-PF was well known for spilling blood”.319 Three days later, the MDC regional 
offices in Bindura were petrol-bombed, two MDC vehicles were burned and 28 ZANU-PF rallies 
and visits by prominent political leaders resulted in violence.320 Reports of war veterans and land 
invaders coercing farm workers and other individuals to participate in pungwes321 of war veterans, 
and party cadres violently punishing those who did not attend such rallies or buy ZANU-PF party 
cards created mayhem in the province.  
By 2000, there were very few people in rural Zimbabwe who owned black and white television 
even if these were more affordable than colour television sets. The Zimbabwe Television (ZTV) 
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was the only television station and it was under state control. ZANU-PF nationalists, then leaders 
of the country, emulated the previous Smith regime’s policy of harnessing the media to further 
their political agendas. It could reach out to the people in the countryside. Joy Television that 
traded as TV2 and was launched in 1997, was owned by Flame Lily Broadcasting Limited. James 
Makamba, a former MP of the ruling party, was the major shareholder of this independent 
station.322 The independent station was short-lived, having been closed down in 2003 by the 
enforcement of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2001) regulation on 
allegations of violating the Broadcasting Services Act of 2001.323 Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News 
Agency (ZIANA) that was pro-government, took over from Joy Television, maintaining the 
broadcasting monopoly of the state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). 
Dissenting political views could be disseminated via the channel. A modicum of freedom of 
expression existed although the independent television station was only reachable in Harare. Jeoff 
Nyarota, The Financial Gazette’s chief editor at the time, recounts: 
We published articles that the Herald and the Sunday Mail did not dare touch. We tested 
the limits of press freedom. While readers were ecstatic, the politicians were up in arms. 
At a time when there was no viable opposition party, the Financial Gazette which was the 
only independent newspaper, assumed that role.324  
The ZBC was appropriated to serve the interests of the ruling party and was put under the strict 
control of government. According to Chitando325, ZBC was viewed as an extension of the 
Department of Information in the Office of the President and Cabinet. 
The Daily News, a newspaper that emerged in the wake of the opposition MDC, became the 
mouthpiece of the political opposition in the country. With the banning of the Daily News in 2003 
and state attack on The Independent, The Standard and Financial Gazette for their lack of 
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‘patriotism,’326 readership sharply declined. People were shut off from getting alternative views 
about what was taking place in the country as they were subjected only to the Herald which was a 
state newspaper. It appeared as if it was an offence for one to be found in the cities and towns 
reading newspapers that the state had condemned as churning out opposition and western regime 
change propaganda. 
All this was coupled with the popularisation of ZANU-PF by way of historical narratives that 
sought to authenticate it as the only legitimate party with a claim to rule the country.327 This was 
propagated through various media such as the national television, radio stations that were state-
controlled, indoctrination of the youth at Youth Training Centres, and the teaching of National and 
Strategic Studies at Teachers Training Colleges. A prospective student at these colleges was 
required to have undergone intensive physical training at the Youth Training Centres apart from 
the patriotic history that was endlessly repeated, before enrolment. History textbooks were re-
written and Advanced Level history examination questions about the Third Chimurenga portrayed 
the imperialist character of the opposition MDC: one such paper had the following question: 
‘Which political party in Zimbabwe represents imperialist interests and how must it be viewed by 
Zimbabweans?328 Political correctness, which meant supporting the governing party, was imposed 
on the urban populace, albeit amidst unrelenting resistance that manifested itself in various forms 
such as job stayaways to cripple industrial production, breaking into known business entities 
belonging to members of the ruling elite and ransacking essential goods, violent demonstrations 
which had the capacity to paralyse state functions and civil disobedience which generally lent 
people into prison once courts determined that the actions were politically motivated. 
The urbanites, whose numbers swelled because of economic migrations from rural areas over the 
years, had election experiences every five years from 1980. In these elections, the opposition was 
organisationally too weak to unseat ZANU-PF whose rhetoric on land redistribution and liberation 
credentials still made sense to the general populace regardless of where they resided. Elections 
served to endorse ZANU-PF hegemonically. In any case, the black urban vote only began to make 
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sense with the removal of the 20 seats reserved for whites in 1987. This arrangement became a 
potential source of problems from the urban workers whose votes did not change anything because 
their electoral constituencies were constitutionally white-controlled and uncontestable. The 
urbanites were technically disenfranchised in equally the same manner as happened to them before 
independence: under the prevailing modus operandi, they could not express their political 
preferences even if they had wanted to. From the inception of the MDC in 1999, when there was 
no reserved white vote, the working classes in urban areas saw this as an opportunity for the first 
time to honestly express their grievances against government at the polls.  
Any political party in power has monopoly over the use of force and resources. The Chambers 
Dictionary329 gives the definition of a political party as: 
a relatively durable social formation which seeks office or power in government, exhibits 
a structure or organisation which links leaders at the centre of government to a popular 
following in the political arena and its local enclaves, and generates in-group perspectives 
or at least symbols of identification or loyalty. 
The definition above suggests that a political party must, of necessity, be able to survive even 
under harsh political circumstances if it hopes to become the governing party one day. It must link 
leaders to the people in a symbiotic relationship and decide on a common philosophical thrust for 
approaching national development issues. Another simpler definition of a political party is “…the 
articulate organisation of society’s active political agents, those who are concerned with the control 
of governmental power who compete for popular support.”330 Two issues alluded to in this 
definition are the appeal by the political agents to make binding decisions for the nation and the 
intellectual dimension that these political agents deploy to gain the support of those that they desire 
to rule. At election time, this involves the changing and twisting of the rules of the game by the 
incumbent party so that it remains in power in the absence of popular legitimacy. It also hints at 
how the party intelligently resorts to undemocratic or unorthodox means of mobilising political 
support from the people. This thesis considers this definition as a relevant one to explain ZANU-
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PF hegemony since independence, except for a brief interregnum of the GNU, a coalition between 
ZANU-PF under president Mugabe, MDC-T under Tsvangirai and MDC-N under Welshman 
Ncube that ended in 2013. 
Since independence, workers throughout the country celebrated and commemorated Workers’ Day 
organised by the ZCTU annually. All workers affiliated to this giant trade union so that it protected 
them from the unfair labour practices and unjustified dismissals from their jobs. At first, the 
government provided it with all the support it needed to challenge white industrialists who did not 
provide acceptable working conditions and reasonable wages and salaries to their workers. The 
government always sent representatives to attend the national May Day workers’ celebrations up 
until 1988. The new ZCTU leadership after 1988 was not ZANU-PF compliant but took an extreme 
leftist position in matters affecting the general welfare of workers.  
Although workers’ votes in urban areas in the first decade translated to naught because urban 
constituencies were white-controlled, the government received unanimous support in the first 
decade for its price controls and minimum wage scales. These policies were indicative of the 
government’s marriage to socialism. During this period, urban workers were more content with 
their welfare than with power politics. It is often the case that once the dominant parties in countries 
that experienced revolutionary wars face challenges from opposition and civic groups to their 
power, the exclusionary language of liberation re-emerges and, in the case of Zimbabwe, the 
language is such that the country cannot be ruled by a party that is not rooted in the struggle.331 
One of the initial strategies was to silence Bulawayo, a city that was regarded as harbouring PF-
ZAPU anti-government elements, based on the election results of the 1980 elections in which 
ZANU-PF failed to secure a single seat.  
The most immediate campaign, popularly known as Gukurahundi, which literally means ‘the 
wiping away of all the chaff by heavy rains in readiness for a new season’, involved a carefully-
orchestrated military project in the Entumbane suburbs of Bulawayo in 1982. Historians and 
political scientists alike do not make reference to the fact that ‘The year of the Storm’ was 
popularised in 1979 by ZANU-PF as its theme after realising that victory was almost certain due 
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to the successful military showdowns it had registered on the war front. The Gukurahundi policy 
hatched in 1979 was declared when it was apparent that the destruction of the settler regime was 
almost at hand and inevitable even without recourse to political negotiations as ZANU-PF finally 
did. Through this policy, alleged puppets of the earlier Internal Settlement such as Ndabaningi 
Sithole, Jeremiah Chirau, Chief Ndiweni, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, together with the capitalist 
system they portended to represent, had to be eliminated. An enemy list was published in mid-
1979 in which high-ranking personalities of the Internal Settlement parties were singled out for 
liquidation.332 This supports my argument that the reconciliation policy pronounced by ZANU-PF 
after its 1980 election victory may not have been sincere but was a strategy to buy time and 
eliminate all black opposition in its quest to attain one-party rule.  
Yet the Gukurahundi mentality of the fighting phase could not be applied as originally envisaged, 
because the social conditions were not conducive to its implementation. The army that was 
predominantly Shona-speaking, indiscriminately used helicopters to hunt down enemies of the 
state. Compagnon333 argues that given the legacy of the 1970s when ZANU and ZAPU almost 
always clashed over ownership of the mandate to lead the nationalist struggle, the electoral victory 
scored by ZANU-PF meant that there was no room for dissent after independence. He further 
intimates that Gukurahundi was a premeditated political purge to uproot ZAPU and to isolate its 
leaders, thus setting the precedent for the systematic harassment of future opposition parties.  
The concept Gukurahundi was adopted before independence when the ZANU-PF leadership 
intended to wipe away all institutions that it felt represented colonial oppression, and to deal 
decisively with those African leaders who had collaborated with the white minority regime against 
the armed struggle. It is my contention here that Gukurahundi must be understood generally as an 
attempt by the ruling ZANU-PF party to eliminate potential sources of opposition to its rule, and 
to its drive towards socialism when resistance to its implementation was high, and this was not 
ethnic in its execution, except that events in Matabeleland were blown out of proportion to settle 
old scores between the two parties. This strategy was not only confined to Bulawayo and the 
Matabeleland regions, but also filtered into other urban areas as the ZANU-PF government 
                                                 
332 M. Sithole & J. Makumbe, (1997). Elections in Zimbabwe, p. 133.  
333 D. Compagnon, (2011). A predictable tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the collapse of Zimbabwe, cited in K. Law, 
2014. Plundering the Past: History and Nation in Mugabe's Zimbabwe. Journal of Southern African Studies, 40, p. 
220. 
96 
 
consolidated its hold on power. This was interpreted to mean that any party that was formed after 
independence had no mandate to run the country. The table below shows how ZANU-PF’s 
parliamentary majority was under threat between 2000 and 2005 from the opposition MDC, yet 
the power to rule depended not so much on parliamentary seats than on presidential results. 
Table 3.5: Composition of the Zimbabwean parliament: 2000-2005334 
Political Party Legislative seats · % of votes 
ZANU (PF)  
MDC 
ZANU-Ndonga 
Non-Constituency 
Seats Provincial 
Governors  
Chiefs 
62 
57 
1 
12 
8 
10 
51.7 
47.5 
0.8 
- 
- 
- 
Total 150 100 
 
The partisan police and army leadership comprising war veterans of the armed struggle made 
political statements that were calculated not only to victimise the MDC into obscurity, but also to 
threaten war if Mugabe was voted out of power.335The Commissioner of Police, Augustine 
Chihuri, a senior member of ZANU-PF, distanced himself from the violence that characterised the 
2002 elections, arguing that he could not involve the police in political fights but threatened to 
resign from his post should an opposition party win the elections.336 Chihuri was one of the six 
service chiefs who issued a public statement that they would not salute nor support a presidential 
candidate with questionable liberation credentials as highlighted by the declaration: “The highest 
office in the land is a straitjacket, whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the 
armed struggle. Anyone with an agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty is 
unacceptable”.337 The pronouncement above prompted SADC’s response at its summit in Malawi 
where it also issued a statement that in accordance with the multiparty dispensation in the region, 
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political statements were not for the military but for politicians.338 The ‘Final Push’ organised by 
the MDC in Harare in 2003 ended in disaster for opposition politics in urban areas where it was 
stronger than ZANU-PF. It was anticipated that all workers and urban opposition supporters would 
march into the city of Harare from all directions and then finally march towards State House, the 
President’s state residence, to compel him to resign. The term itself connoted the illegitimate 
application of force to remove a popularly elected government. ZANU-PF opportunistically used 
this MDC strategy to link the opposition with violence and it initially deployed the army to disperse 
the demonstrators before militarising all institutions of government. Because the MDC’s political 
demands unsettled the governing party,339 it became imperative for the government to monitor 
MDC activities in towns and cities to ensure the source of its organisational strength in terms of 
party funding and support, was identified.340 
Regime change discourses in Zimbabwe between 1998 and 2009, instead of bringing sanity to the 
country, heightened political discord locally, regionally, continentally, and internationally. The 
government responded in many ways to ensure it survived the onslaughts from opposition forces 
and from the international community, both of which argued that the people in the country were 
being denied their democratic rights to choose and to participate in other national processes by the 
ZANU-PF regime in its determination to manipulate the electoral process and preserve the 
country’s sovereignty.  
Sovereignty as a concept was vaguely expressed to mean the protection of Zimbabwe’s political, 
economic, social, religious, ideological and cultural independence from western predators. The 
Legal Dictionary definition of the concept is the power of a state to do everything necessary to 
govern itself, such as making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; 
making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerce with foreign nations.341 
Based on this definition, opposition forces, with the support of the urbanites, became “enemies” 
of the state. Lacking in the conceptualisation of this definition is the government’s repudiation of 
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constitutional sovereignty. The constitution ceased to be the supreme document on the land as it 
was progressively fine-tuned to legalise decisions and activities already made against the law. The 
government usurped the monopoly to transmit the political culture of the country. The challenge 
that the MDC faced, unlike other opposition parties before it, such as ZUM and the Forum Party, 
resulted from its multiracial composition. White Rhodesians who had lost their Lancaster 
Agreement political privileges when the 20 seats originally reserved for them were removed, and 
when the government, in 1992, resolved to confiscate white-owned farms without compensation, 
joined the new opposition MDC party en masse. Among them were former Rhodesians such as 
David Coltart and Trudy Stephenson. This gave credence to the regime change project because the 
affected whites were fighting for their survival.  
One of the reactions by government after realising its growing unpopularity with the urbanites was 
to disenfranchise the urban electorate through legal, physical and administrative instruments.342  
Requirements for registering as voters were made more stringent as lack of proof of residence 
prevented the increasing urban populations from exercising their right to vote. Many people of 
voting age could not return to their rural homes to either register as voters or to vote on election 
day because of economic challenges that had pushed them to urban areas in the first place. It meant 
that people who could have registered as voters in urban areas, had conditions been simplified, 
could not vote. Disenfranchisement of urban voters was made possible when, in 2002, the Registrar 
of General Elections (RGE) reduced the number of polling stations in urban areas and increased 
the number of rural polling stations.343That gave the opposition sufficient ground for suspicion that 
the RGE was also a senior member of the ruling party.  
Even though potential voters had secured the requisite documents that could allow them to vote 
such as lodgers’ cards, Chitungwiza and Harare registered the highest numbers of voters who failed 
to cast their votes on the second and third day of voting in the 2002 parliamentary elections344 due 
to the reduced number of polling stations. The Delimitation Commission of 2000 whose principal 
task was to constitutionally re-define constituency boundaries in line with existing official 
population statistics in a geographic area, was constituted by Presidential appointees after every 
five years before conducting parliamentary elections. In terms of the Zimbabwean constitution, 
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the president appoints the commission. Its impartiality was questioned by Makumbe and 
Compagnon due to its vulnerability to ruling party influence.345In the 2000 elections, the 
opposition criticised the Delimitation Commission for gerrymandering in drawing up urban 
constituencies.346  
The 2005 Delimitation Commission set at the height of the MDC’s ascendancy and popularity 
among the urban dwellers was heavily criticised by the opposition and civil society organisations 
for its partiality towards ZANU-PF. New demarcations were made to increase seats in rural areas 
such as Uzumba Marambapfungwe and Mashonaland Provinces at large that were ZANU-PF 
strongholds, whereas constituencies were cut in urban areas where the opposition MDC enjoyed 
great support areas. The opposition argued that ZANU-PF was determined to subvert the 
democratic will of the people of Zimbabwe by turning national institutions such as ZEC, the 
Delimitation Commission, the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC) and the Election 
Directorate into ZANU-PF rigging apparatus to promote its tyranny.347 Also worrying at that time 
was that Harare and Bulawayo Provinces with predominantly MDC strongholds suffered voter 
migration to rural strongholds [largely due to Murambatsvina] that were the source of ZANU-PF 
electoral victory since 1980. However, urban voters remained steadfast in expressing their anger 
against the ruling party government as evidenced by the huge swing in urban votes towards the 
opposition MDC in the 2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections, as well as the 2008 
harmonised elections involving council, mayoral, parliamentary, and presidential elections. 
The worsening economic crisis in urban areas resulting from the phenomenal rural-urban 
migrations put strains on existing infrastructure and resources. Shacks proliferated in most high-
density suburbs as an indication of an acute housing shortage. The development coincided with a 
period in the country’s history when there was de-industrialisation and concomitant job layoffs 
due to ESAP. People resorted to informal employment using shacks that had sprung up on plots in 
formal townships.348 There was no money to repair dysfunctional sewer pipes or to provide other 
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traditional services such as water reticulation and general maintenance of existing infrastructure 
as the country’s foreign currency reserves were quickly depleted because of the sudden decline in 
regional and international trade.  
It was against above background that the government launched ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ in 
2005 throughout all the towns and cities across the country. From the point of view of public 
safety, government deemed it proper and necessary to launch this operation to eradicate illegal 
shacks and informal jobs that were not easy for the government agencies to regulate. The strategy, 
indeed, affected the urban poor the most. News analysts held the view that the Mugabe regime’s 
“war on the poor”, as the Murambatsvina campaign entailed, was a strategy to punish the urban 
dwellers for voting for the opposition MDC in the 2002 parliamentary elections and to drive them 
back to the rural areas where they would be ‘re-educated’ in the guise of eradicating the parallel 
market and removing the filth from the country’s cities.349 The campaign neutralised the militancy 
of the urban people by sending the urban homeless back home and disenfranchising them in the 
process. Re-education was relatively easy because rural areas were political constituencies of the 
ruling party where party functionaries used violent techniques to condition and coerce them into 
supporting ZANU-PF and to make them admit to having made mistakes in 2002 by voting for the 
opposition MDC. 
Potts350 argues that these shacks were tolerated in the 1990s and early 2000s as poverty continued 
to increase and there was apparently no visible threat from the new urban arrivals to existing power 
relations in urban areas. The methodology of executing the destruction of unplanned structures 
created urban mayhem and further distanced the urban residents from the government. Bratton and 
Masunungure351 perceive the clean-up campaign as a state-sponsored campaign to stifle 
independent economic and political activity in the country’s urban areas. The timing of the 
campaign when the opposition MDC was in an upward political trajectory confirmed the people’s 
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fears that the government move was calculated to banish urban dwellers to rural areas by 
permanently shutting down their illicit trade.352  
Trade deals that were not sanctioned by the government became illegal at the zenith of opposition 
politics in urban areas. According to Bratton and Masunungure,353 the approaches that the 
government deployed were repressive in the main as to deepen the polarisation between political 
parties. The most far-reaching contribution of Operation Murambatsvina was to swell the ranks of 
the opposition MDC party with anti-government, jobless and disillusioned urban residents who 
joined just to voice their opposition. That meant that some people who were never affiliated to 
existing trade unions because they were never formally employed, became politically active after 
the government had succeeded in destroying illegal structures. 
Operation Murambatsvina can be interpreted in socioeconomic and political terms. On the one 
hand, high-density suburbs such as Mbare in Harare and Sakubva in Mutare, for example, were 
ugly sites characterised by criminal activities, murder, prostitution and other social vices. This 
description, therefore, should have provided moral justification for government action to use force 
to drive out people from their illegal shacks. On the other hand, the operation was heavily 
politicised and government action was viewed by residents as an attempt to dilute opposition 
support in urban areas as people without accommodation would be compelled to go back to their 
rural homes. Government feared that rural people were migrating to towns and cities and swelling 
opposition numbers. The effect of the success of the operation impacted negatively on the MDC, 
the only viable opposition party around 2005 in the country. The opposition was constrained in the 
sense that it could not campaign freely in rural areas nor in areas outside urban centres. It could 
not easily follow up on its supporters who had relocated to their rural homes because chiefs were 
government workers receiving monthly stipends and they ensured that all their people rallied 
behind their government.  
The role of the army in sustaining ZANU-PF power in urban areas was evident in the manner in 
which the government engaged it in dealing with workers’ strikes and demonstrations. 
Ruthlessness to instill fear among striking workers in the period from 1997 up to 1999 led to 
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serious divisions within the working force. Strike action organised by the ZCTU in urban areas 
was paralysed and lacked coordination through the use of divide-and-rule tactics by the 
government. A parallel trade union called the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU) led 
by Joseph Chinotimba, a war veteran of the liberation struggle, was formed and made official, 
when the ZCTU was at the zenith of its popularity to create confusion within the workers. The 
ZFTU rivalled the ZCTU for membership and diluted the effectiveness of the latter. The rival trade 
union drew its strength and legitimacy from the ruling party, converting its members to ZANU-
PF. Elections became time-wasting exercises conducted routinely to extend ZANU-PF’s mandate 
to rule. Indeed, the urban electorate lost the interest to vote in elections after realising that, 
historically, elections maintained the political status quo.354 
The role of the military in determining the leader of the country, and in ensuring ‘political 
correctness’,  and its appetite for politics within ZANU, was first witnessed at the Bi-annual Dare 
ReChimurenga Conference where General Tongogara for the first time in ZANU’s history 
proposed that all guerrillas had the right to elect the Dare members on the basis of the ‘one man, 
one vote’ principle. By changing the voting arrangements, Tongogara and his High Command 
were then able to influence ZANU’s leadership, as was reflected by the ordinary guerrillas’ 
unreserved preparedness to vote for political leaders who enjoyed Tongogara’s support. Previously 
since 1967, Dare members were elected  into office by ZANU’s civilian members, who were then 
mostly based in Zambia. The same happened in 1975 when the ZANLA military leadership in 
Mozambique ousted Ndabaningi Sithole as party leader for his renunciation of violence to secure 
his release from prison. In urban areas, a substantial number of potential voters were enfeebled 
and this counted very much in government’s favour. As Rusero,355 a Harare-based analyst 
intimates: “Anyone who should succeed Mugabe should pass the vote of the military”. Before the 
2008 election which raised opposition hopes of forming the new government, treason charges were 
laid against Tsvangirai in 2002 for allegedly plotting to assassinate President Mugabe, and the 
state witness, Ben Menashe, produced a video tape that sought to incriminate Tsvangirai before 
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the case collapsed in 2004.356 From this we can deduce that the opposition parties led by 
individuals who did not have a history of the armed struggle, had a slim chance of getting into 
power through an election. Even when people expressed their votes through a secret ballot, 
Mugabe remained in power through chicanery and brute force.357 This was about the 2008 
presidential elections in which President Mugabe faced his first ever defeat by Tsvangirai’s MDC 
in an election. 
Tsvangirai and the MDC were accused of habouring a regime change agenda masterminded by 
western countries and multinational institutions such as the WB and the IMF, and this increased 
military hostility against the MDC. According to Chung, the refusal by the military to accept 
Tsvangirai and his MDC party contributed to Tsvangirai’s election defeat in the harmonised 
elections of 2013.358  
3.3 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the historical circumstances that gave rise to the development of militant 
urban politics in Zimbabwe. The workers in urban settlements during the colonial period did not 
have organisations that represented them. Even if they had wanted to have these, the colonial 
system prevented their development through a series of legislation. It must be remembered that 
the black trade unions of the 1960s evolved into mass political parties that also turned 
revolutionary upon realising that racial discrimination at work places continued unabated and that 
Africans were not allowed direct participation in the formulation of urban policies that affected 
them. 
The country’s political independence in 1980 meant that an urban workforce that was not relatively 
developed organisationally was bequeathed to a new dispensation under the new black elite. This 
elite government that assumed governmental responsibilities had shot itself in the foot by accepting 
the Lancaster Constitution that communicated the language of the political and economic status 
quo. The government’s dilemma in trying to resolve and balance the contradiction in its promises 
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to the white community and to the rural war supporters resulted in the urbanites not getting the 
attention of government that they expected. Instead, the brief period just after independence 
appeared promising to the workers in towns and cities as the quasi-socialist policies that Smith had 
devised because of UNSC sanctions were akin to a socialist order that ZANU-PF professed to 
embrace. The system was maintained and reformed cosmetically as the new national leadership 
stood to benefit materially from the inherited economic arrangement. The single workers’ 
federation formed in 1980 with the blessing of the government was conservative in the sense that 
the leadership was partisan and therefore less confrontational with the government regarding the 
rights of workers and their conditions of service. 
When Zimbabwe’s economy after the first decade of independence, and particularly after the 
adoption of ESAP, began to plummet, workers in urban areas were hit the hardest, forcing the 
ZCTU to elect a new leadership that was not subservient to ZANU-PF. The government dealt with 
the ZCTU as if it were dealing with an opposition party as indicated by the Minister of Labour at 
that time, John Nkomo. The period after 1990 was characterised by tensions between the ZCTU 
and the government as workers’ economic demands became political. The formation of the MDC 
party as a brainchild of the ZCTU worsened the plight of urban workers as the government was 
quick to associate the opposition party with a new form of colonialism ‘through the back door’.  
The presence of several white Rhodesians within the rank and file of the MDC’s structures, David 
Coltart and Eddy Cross among others, was a problem for the party for it allowed the Mugabe 
regime to brand it in Marxist jargon as a counter-revolutionary force that would be contained by 
deploying heavy-handed strategies. Murambatsvina was one such strategy which, indeed, 
neutralised urban militancy. Later, constituency boundaries, especially those relating to urban 
areas, were delimited so that fewer urban constituencies existed, resulting in mass 
disenfranchisement of urban voters. 
The next chapter discusses sanctions and the debates surrounding their legitimacy from the point 
of view of the opposition parties, ZANU-PF, USA, Britain, and western-oriented institutions such 
as the EU, IMF and WB. The chapter also interrogates regime change agenda as driven by internal 
opposition parties and analyses counter-arguments from ZANU-PF which constrained the 
advancement of multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SANCTIONS DISCOURSE: AGENDA SETTING AND 
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS, (2000- 2008) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on sanctions, both political and economic, comprehensive or limited, and 
seeks to interrogate their effectiveness in achieving the intended goals of the Western countries 
who imposed them. Sanctions are a coercive response to an internationally wrongful act authorised 
by a competent social organ.359 The sanctions against Ian Smith’s Rhodesia had international 
legitimacy as they were imposed by the UNSC. The sanctions on Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean 
government, in contrast, lacked international legality in that they were imposed by institutions, 
countries and organisations without the mandate of the UN. Mugabe’s intransigence over the land 
redistribution modalities which victimised the white landowners in the country in 2000 made 
Britain to contemplate sanctions against the political elite. These were ‘smart’ in the sense that 
they targeted those elite in influential positions of power and in government.360 The American 
Congress followed suit in 2001 by passing Zimbabwe Democracy Recovery Act (ZIDERA)in 
2001,  to provide transition to democracy and to promote economic recovery following 
Zimbabwe’s slip into anarchy and lawlessness that characterised the land reform process. 361  By 
2002, Zimbabwe was the fastest shrinking economy in Southern Africa when Britain stopped 
funding land reform and when it succeeded in persuading the EU, IMF and WB to suspend their 
programmes since Zimbabwe had become uncreditworthy and implement targeted sanctions 
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against the government.362 The understanding was that once there was a return to the rule of law 
and respect for ownership to property [land],the senders of sanctions would re-engage the 
government of Zimbabwe and help it to prosper.  
To ensure the Mugabe regime complied with the return to good governance, or in the words of 
Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, “until a more representative government was in 
place”,363 assets of those people on the sanctions list the senders of sanctions had prepared were 
frozen and that involved money in their foreign bank accounts so that they could not access it364. 
The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe pushed for the suspension of Zimbabwe from 
the Council of the Commonwealth for twelve months and the South African president Thabo 
Mbeki contacted the Australian PM, John Howard, to convey the message that he did not want to 
see the Zimbabwean suspension renewed.365  On the other hand, Howard maintained his position 
that Zimbabwe should not be allowed to resume participation in Commonwealth Council affairs 
until there was a complete change of approach which could only happen with the disappearance 
of the Mugabe government.366 The SADC  region comprising twelve members of the 
Commonwealth distanced itself from this so-called McKinnon ‘broad held view’ but accused both 
McKinnon and Howard of being consumed by racist emotionalism.367 It comes as no surprise that 
ZANU-PF, with the support of the SADC members in the Council of the Commonwealth, could 
construct a very strong regime change intentions spearheaded by Britain and Australia and targeted 
to undermine Mugabe and his government. This common front against Mugabe and his 
government was cemented after the 2002 presidential elections won by Mugabe against the 
backdrop of massive rigging, voter intimidation, opposition disappearances, torture and 
manipulation of the voter’s roll and the whole electoral process which made a potential loser to 
win the election.368 The same elections that Britain and other western countries, including human 
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rights organisations, lambasted as  fraudulent were described by the Tanzanian president, 
Benjamin Mkapa, as democratic and that Mugabe was a champion of democracy because the 
people of Zimbabwe had spoken loudly and clearly in favour of Mugabe.369The controversy 
surrounding the character of Mugabe helps to interrogate the moral worth of these sanctions as 
they, instead, devastated  poor Zimbabweans. 
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of sanctions, as well as the adaptive 
capacities of the targets to strengthen their resolve to stay in power by envisaging new 
philosophical thrusts that were appealing even to those poor people most disadvantaged by them.  
Although sanctions are intended to evoke conformity or, in extreme cases, regime change, an 
unintended opportunity is created to improve self-sufficiency. There is a thread that runs through 
the imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe respectively: enforcement proved 
problematic due to breaches by countries that would have been seriously affected economically if 
they had committed themselves to the implementation and maintenance of such sanctions. This 
chapters undertakes a comparative analysis of how sanctions largely influenced Smith’s and 
Mugabe’s political and economic policies, and how these sanctions gave rise to more recalcitrance 
and a democratic deficit. 
Wigell has identified four typologies of regimes: democratic, constitutional oligarchic, electoral 
autocratic and authoritarian.370 These are important to this study because they collectively assist 
in defining the political trends that have shaped the history of Zimbabwe for over three decades. 
They are all relevant in the sense that they have been effectively applied in different political 
scenarios and with varying levels of intensity, depending on the uniqueness of the circumstances. 
Zimbabwe can be described as democratic because elections are routinely held to elect leaders and 
representatives throughout the country.  Another supporting development is that Zimbabwe agreed 
to a multiparty system through the Lancaster House agreement and no declaration was ever made 
to proclaim a one-party status.371 Zimbabwe has a constitution, just like other countries in the 
world. What needs to be established is whether the key principle of democracy (government by 
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consent), which is the right of the governed citizens to change their government if it no longer 
serves their interests, is ingrained within the political and electoral culture of Zimbabwe.   
The term oligarchy refers to the adoption of decisions that serve to protect the selfish interests of 
a ruling clique through constitutional manipulation and electoral fraud. The developments in 
Zimbabwe since the 2002 elections are arguably a case in point, where opposition parties could 
win votes and seats while being denied victory.372 So many amendments were made to the 
constitution, the effect of which was the constitutional entrenchment of ZANU-PF’s hegemonic 
power. This was accompanied by many electoral irregularities that gave privilege to the ruling 
party, as seen in the previous chapters. This also happened when it was felt that the British had 
reneged on the promise to fund the Zimbabwean land resettlement programme, hence the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1991. Electoral autocracy is well documented in CCJP publications, one of 
which is the The Catholic Observer Report of 2013.373 Authoritarianism was what colonialism was 
about and the ruling elite emerged from, and was nurtured by, a colonial system that was manifestly 
authoritarian. An examination of the Zimbabwean political regime needs to take cognizance of the 
set criteria above so that a broader perspective on the sanctions discourse can be made. 
From the Zimbabwean ZANU-PF revolutionary perspective, sanctions were part of the agenda of 
the west to paralyse the ZANU-PF government so that an alternative government friendly to the 
western powers would take power. An agenda functions to set alternatives and priorities for 
decisions and involves the specification of political issues, and the origins and manipulation of 
issues.374 These issues are discussed in this chapter because debates about multiparty politics in 
the country, and the reluctance by the ruling government to liberalise the political space, both 
revolve around the regime change agenda which was, and remains, the major stumbling block to 
a genuine political transition story. The chapter also illuminates the longitudinal historical 
challenges that resulted in the western blackmail of Zimbabwe as undemocratic. The popularly 
asked question in pro-government circles in Zimbabwe was whether opposition parties were 
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pursuing their own home-grown political agenda or one that was typically not their own but that 
of outside forces.  
Historically, Rhodesia was the first former colony to have economic sanctions imposed on it by 
the UNSC in 1965375 when Ian Smith, the leader of an exclusively white Rhodesia Front Party, 
declared what became  known as the UDI on 11 November 1965. The Central African Federation 
made up of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland 
(now Malawi) had been in existence since 1953 but started to crumble under the sheer weight of 
African nationalism in both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Events in Southern Rhodesia were 
moving in the opposite direction, given that nationalism in the other two federation states, with the 
support of the British government that was also driven by the spirit of decolonisation after the 
Second World War, resulted in self-determination for Africans, whereas in Southern Rhodesia, 
white independence was proclaimed instead. As envisaged in the Federal constitution, African 
interests in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were paramount because there were fewer whites in 
those territories as compared to Southern Rhodesia where there was a substantial white minority 
with vested political and economic power. This proclamation became the basis for sanctions by 
the UNSC, supported by the General Assembly as a test case, to enforce compliance with its 
resolutions on the illegal regime as opposed to punishment. The UNSC Resolution 216 (1965) on 
12 November, a day after the UDI was declared, condemned the usurpation of power by a settler 
minority in Southern Rhodesia. Instead, the UNSC regarded the declaration of independence by it 
as having no legal validity, whereupon the government of the United Kingdom was called to quell 
the rebellion and bring the minority regime to an immediate end.376  
Smith’s regime attracted the wrath of the international community by acting contrary to UN 
declarations that expressed the need for peoples throughout the world to rule themselves. In 1965, 
Smith enacted the Emergency Powers, later referred to as Law and Order Maintenance 
Regulations, which he used to detain African nationalist leaders without trial, ban African public 
meetings, and curtail political activity.377 Apart from promoting European interests, the Rhodesia 
Front curtailed multiparty democracy by banning African opposition parties and, as Matikiti puts 
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it, defied domestic and international pressure for change in the minority governance of 
Rhodesia.378 The era of colonisation had passed and continued political control of territory by 
outside powers or minority groups was no longer tolerated. 
Debates on the UNSC sanctions on Rhodesia have attracted the attention of  many scholars who 
argue that they did not really work.379 Part of the explanation of the ineffectiveness of these UN 
sanctions was that the British and the Americans who sat in the UNSC would not have deliberately 
designed a sanctions package to bring the Rhodesian economy to a standstill. Even if the sanctions 
remained in force until the multiparty elections of 1980 which ushered in the ZANU-PF 
government, they must be understood in this context of leniency to a “kith and kin” group in 
Rhodesia, notwithstanding the ever-growing trade that continued unabated between Rhodesia and 
South Africa, Zambia, Portugal, and even the USA itself.380 However, the sanctions against 
Rhodesia had a direct impact on economic performance. Smith responded by turning inward, 
harnessing and mobilising locally available resources and even making the country do without 
outside assistance. This is a key element to any study of economic sanctions, particularly when 
these sanctions produced unintended outcomes that were positive to the receiver.  
Admittedly, the African elite that assumed political power in Zimbabwe in 1980 inherited a very 
robust economy. President Julius Nyerere pleaded with Mugabe to preserve the jewel of Africa he 
had inherited.381 resulting from the successful attempts by the Rhodesian regime to mitigate the 
effects of sanctions by popularising a culture of innovativeness and survival strategies in crisis 
situations. Smith’s regime developed widespread state control of the economy to counteract UN 
sanctions, and this meant that the independent Zimbabwe government inherited an economic 
system that had many nationalized companies.382 The inherited economic setup was akin to the 
socialist-oriented economy that the new ruling African elite sought to build.383  
                                                 
378 Ibid.  
379 W. Minter & E. Schmidt, (1988). When sanctions worked: The case of Rhodesia reexamined. African Affairs, 87, 
p. 207. 
380 R. A. Murphy, (2011). The development of economic sanctions in the practice of the United Nations Security 
Council: University of Nottingham, p. 63. 
381 D. Dewa, E. Musara, & E. Mupfururi, (2013). Industrial decline in Zimbabwe, Gweru post 2000: Which way 
now. World Journal of Arts Commerce and Sciences, 1, p.3. Also Megahey, A. (2005). A school in Africa: 
Peterhouse. Education in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe 1955-2005. Macmillan, Oxford. 
382 F. Chung, (2015). Zimbabwe: Looking east, p. 90. 
383 J. N. Moyo, (1992). State politics and social domination in Zimbabwe,p. 322.  
111 
 
The success of the Rhodesian economy under a sanctions environment required that the 
government be authoritarian and commandist in its approach to political and economic matters as 
it was. The government directed all operations and continued to make decisions that further 
entrenched white political and economic supremacy. Interestingly, many jobs that did not require 
skills were created during the sanctions era and Salisbury, now Harare, became a major economic 
and industrial hub in Southern Africa. Very few Africans could vote and a majority did not have 
the requisite qualifications that would allow them to vote. The law was skewed in favour of the 
ruling minority and the violent nature of the Smith regime was clear to see from the arbitrary 
arrests and summary detentions of nationalist leaders that preceded the UDI. The argument here is 
that authoritarianism was the response of the regime to sanctions and it worked well to counter the 
effects of those sanctions. Sanctions, as originally designed, failed to evoke compliance from the 
Rhodesian government, but rather strengthened its hostility towards the outside world as well as 
internal opposition. Sanctions made reality, the unchallenged existence of authoritarianism, 
accompanied by the ethos of hard work and a spirit of solidarity from the minority regime in a de 
facto one-party state. As part of the demonstration of the ineffectiveness of sanctions, it is argued 
that it was the military might of the African nationalist guerilla forces as well as the heavy 
diplomatic pressure from western powers and South Africa that brought about the transfer of power 
to the majority in Rhodesia, with sanctions playing a minor role in the process. This was a lesson 
the same western countries might have missed when they imposed sanctions on the Mugabe regime 
because they were again viewed as inconsequential in bringing about the desired economic and 
political change. 
The maintenance of economic sanctions on Rhodesia up to 1980 cannot be adequately and 
reasonably defended. The United States honoured them more in the breach than in the observance, 
especially when both Smith and Mugabe, though at different times, were allowed entry into the 
US despite their subjection to travel bans, 384 and when the British government was half-hearted in 
its commitment to the Rhodesian sanctions. Perhaps a more plausible explanation is that those in 
favour of sanctions could not possibly annul them without justification, and their withdrawal 
would impact so much negatively on their reputation. Reneging on the sanctions issue could have 
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brought the British government into disrepute internationally. Such action could be interpreted as 
failure of its planned decolonisation agenda which initially arrogated to the University of London 
an educational colonial empire as part of the road to decolonisation., and since they were not 
enough compradors to take over political power in British colonial Africa, more could be created 
in a characteristic neo-colonial planning.385To argue that sanctions were an instrument predicated 
on bringing the rebel government into line, thereby preparing the country on the road to majority 
rule and democracy, would be to ignore the impact of their replication after the African majority 
had taken over the reins of power.  
At the Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, Bishop Muzorewa, who had been elected PM of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, challenged the British government to remove sanctions on the newly born 
country for the simple reason that the country was under black rule and there was no point in 
maintaining them.386 Despite all the pressure to having these sanctions removed, they remained in 
full force because the government of Muzorewa lacked both local and international legitimacy. 
This illegitimacy was premised on the fact that ZANU-PF and ZAPU had not contested the 
elections and were seen as representing the voice of the majority of Africans in the country. 
The 1980 elections, won by ZANU-PF, were supervised by Lord Soames, the last British Governor 
of Rhodesia, who oversaw the transfer of power to the winners in a dramatic ceremony that 
witnessed the lowering of the Union Jack-the British flag- and the hoisting of the Zimbabwean 
flag to herald the dawn of independence. PM, Robert Mugabe, was quick to pronounce the policy 
of reconciliation and managed to shed off suspicions in the western world held about his 
communist inclination. Hodder Williams made a prediction that the transfer of power from the 
Rhodesian government to the new African elite would be merely a prelude to an essentially 
reformist administration.387Inherited capitalist structures and institutions were adopted and 
adapted to ensure continuity despite the change of government. 
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 Between 1980 and 1981, there was record-breaking economic growth rate of 26 percent, creating 
the impression that Zimbabwe was a successful democratic state.388Such growth rate was due to 
the removal of sanctions and the termination of the war and a façade of democracy was cloaked in 
authoritarianism that originated from both the colonialist and nationalist legacies that were 
impervious to democracy and respect for pluralism.389 The chapter on reconciliation discusses this 
policy at length, but it is important to reiterate that the provisions of the Lancaster Agreement had 
a neo-liberal slant to protect settler property and economic interests, and that there was nothing 
under these compelling conditions that the new government could do outside these stipulations. 
Sanctions were lifted in 1980 and during the first decade of independence, relations between 
Zimbabwe and Britain and other western countries were very cordial. 
The thrust of this chapter is to interrogate the factors that led to the imposition of the so-called 
illegal yet contentious sanctions by Britain, USA, the WB and IMF, a development that has had 
strong bearing on the current political and economic impasse in Zimbabwe since 1991. It is in the 
context of sanctions that multiparty politics, with reference to democracy discourses in Zimbabwe, 
can be understood. The nexus between sanctions and regime change, and regime change and 
appeals for democracy, becomes central in studying the behaviour of the ZANU-PF government 
and the opposition parties over time. 
The decision by the ZANU-PF government to confiscate white-owned farms without 
compensation because the British government had reneged on their promise to finance the 
resettlement programme, was regarded by most whites and many in the Western world as being in 
contravention of the Agreement and as the first step towards socialism.  According to Taylor and 
Williams, the problem came to a height in 2000 when the government’s draft Constitution, which 
contained a clause providing for compulsory land acquisition without compensation unless paid 
for by the British government, was defeated in a referendum.390 Another view was that the British 
discontinued funding the resettlement scheme in protest at the corruption engulfing the process 
resulting in personal gain by Mugabe and the ZANU-PF elite.391 Western governments stopped 
financing Zimbabwe’s land reform programme as protest against Zimbabwe’s entry into the war 
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in the DRC in 1998 on the side of Laurent Kabila.392 Tendi posits the “Anyaoku Narrative” for the 
delay in the land reform programme which argues that the ZANU-PF government delayed land 
redistribution because of a request from the then Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka 
Anyaoku who stated that land redistribution in Zimbabwe would affect the transition from 
apartheid in South Africa to democratic rule.393 Mugabe agreed to this suggestion, which accounts 
for South Africa’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, when 
Mugabe’s regime was at its most ruthless but Mbeki ignored these gross human rights violations 
because he had to pay and please Mugabe  by pursuing ‘Quiet Diplomacy’.394However, Tendi does 
not provide concrete evidence to support his argument but a more plausible explanation could be 
that the reconciliation policy delayed land redistribution, as well as ESAP and Mugabe’s support 
for Laurent Kabila in the DRC.  
What stands out very clearly from this discussion is that the decision by the government to 
confiscate white-owned farms was seen by its critics as a violation of democratic principles 
because coercion and violence were the sin quo non for the successful implementation of the land 
reform programme. The liberation struggle was re-lived and was defined as solely about land.395 
Manheru, cited in Ranger (2005), states that under the circumstances, whites were fitting 
candidates for an African “Nuremburg”.396 This was a direct reference to the attempts by Hitler in 
Germany before and during World War II to exterminate Jews and other non-Aryan races. 
Photographs showing the horrific brutality meted against whites in Zimbabwe turned into a racial 
conflict that saw white victims of land invasions become vulnerable to brute force, and human 
rights watchdogs were quick to parade such acts that were inconsistent with the rules of democratic 
and orderly rule. 
This forms the background to the imposition of sanctions against the Mugabe regime. It is 
important to note that Zimbabwe’s long history of struggle against sanctions meant that it had 
developed survival strategies that relegated democratic norms and practices to the dustbin. 
Advocates of sanctions failed to take cognizance of realities on the ground. For example, expecting 
                                                 
392 F. Chung, (2015). Zimbabwe: Looking east, p. 147. 
393 B-M.Tendi, (2010). Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe: Politics, intellectuals and the media, p. 7.  
 www.beck-shop.de/fachbuch/vorwort/9783039119899_Intro_006.pdf Accessed 23 September 2017. 
394 Ibid., p. 73.  
395 T. Ranger, (2005). The rise of patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe and its possible implications,p. 16.    
396 Manheru cited in T. Ranger, (2005). The rise of patriotic journalism in Zimbabwe, p. 15.  
115 
 
the Smith regime to be democratic in the presence of nationalist groups vying for power was 
untenable. On the other hand, imposing sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe, though in line 
with the liberal discourse that theoretically endorsed the principles of private property and respect 
for human and other fundamental rights, hardened the Mugabe government and led to the full 
mobilisation of the country’s resources in an act of outright defiance. The liberal views were 
antithetical to the new land resettlement thrust where consensus on redistribution methodologies 
between the white landowners and the black government was hard to reach. The argument has 
been that whites used force to evict Africans from their fertile lands and there was never talk about 
how undemocratic the exercise was. To expect democratic principles in the new spate of land 
acquisitions throughout the country after the referendum of 2000 was attempting to correct a 
practice that was inherently skewed in favour of authoritarianism to achieve the desired outcome. 
The nexus between sanctions and multiparty democracy was exploited opportunistically over the 
years by the ruling party and the opposition forces. That resulted in the deployment of regime 
change as a ZANU-PF discourse to undermine the efficacy of opposition parties. As David Coltart 
argues, in the Zimbabwean context, sanctions failed to achieve the intended purpose for they were 
viewed as a tool for western imperialism and that after ten years of their implementation, sanctions 
instead became an effective tool for ZANU-PF.397 
4.2 REGIME CHANGE DISCOURSES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTIPARTY 
DEMOCRACY 
This dissertation adopts a multiparty definition of democracy. In this perspective, democracy 
consists of respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, periodic free and fair elections, 
and freedom of information through a free mass media.398 In the words of Lord George Brown, 
the British Foreign Secretary in the 1960s, “…democracy means that there shall be no one to stop 
us from being stupid if stupid we want to be”.399 This definition points to the fact that democracy 
is a relative term that means so many things to different people, and that it is problematic and 
multifaceted in its interpretation. It suggests that people are free to make choices on what affects 
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them, whether for better or worse. A democratic political system is one where the government is 
elected by, and answerable to, the people and all people are free from harassment and 
intimidation400 regardless of their different political affiliations.  
The western conception of democracy with its emphasis on the proliferation of many political 
parties in a country assumes that different standpoints are allowed to compete meaningfully for 
the control of the country’s resources, and that competent people would fill in positions of power 
on merit. For example, western liberal traditions consider multiparty systems as the most reliable 
systems for the cultivation, development and institutionalisation of democracy and they allow a 
hundred flowers to bloom and a hundred schools of thought to contend.401 Prah402 intimates that 
democracy’s definitional boundaries relate to the character and interests of specific groups at a 
given point in history. He makes use of the USA example of democracy where African Americans 
remained disenfranchised in large areas of the south for so many years, yet it professed to be the 
epitome of democratic practices.  
Challenges to a genuine political transition in Zimbabwe find expression in the long history of 
authoritarianism. Zimbabwean nationalist leaders, who themselves were products of a brutal 
colonial system, had been schooled in the use of force to achieve objectives of a political nature. 
African nationalists who assumed power eventually came to reflect the tyranny they categorically 
opposed during the war of liberation. All structures associated with the one-party state under the 
Smith regime were maintained and, in some cases, adapted, to suit the political interests of the new 
elite in leadership. These included settler security institutions and some of the most notorious 
inherited laws.403 The debate about political regime change must be understood from the era of the 
revolution when Ndabaningi Sithole was replaced by Mugabe after he had renounced the use of 
violence and how and why thousands of ‘dissidents’ in ZANU camps in Mozambique were 
detained for allegedly plotting to overthrow Mugabe in 1978.404 The term ‘dissidents’ referred to 
ZANLA freedom fighters in Mozambique who refused to acknowledge Mugabe as the new leader 
of the party and who protested his endorsement as the party’s President after the ouster of 
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Ndabaningi Sithole by the ZANLA High Command. An interesting development after 
independence in Zimbabwe was the self-imposed exile of Ndabaningi Sithole in the USA on 
allegations that he had solicited arms to overthrow the government.405 
In 1965, Ndabaningi Sithole was hailed as the leader of all true patriots but became a ‘traitor’ in 
2005 for betraying the liberation war.406 It was because of Sithole’s alleged complicity in seeking 
to change the regime that he was not awarded the status of a national hero upon his death. Such 
claims against the founder president of ZANU by government have not been substantiated, but it 
can be intimated that the government made a deliberate attempt to trivialise his revolutionary 
credentials while at the same time consolidating its hold on power. This dealt a death blow to 
Sithole’s political career. Even if people in the Chipinge constituency from whence he came 
continued to show solidarity with him in subsequent elections, his party literally became tribal and 
not national in its composition. It can be argued that although Zimbabwe was a de jure multiparty 
state after independence, repressive measures were implemented leading to the harassment of 
ZANU Ndonga out of existence. The post-independence euphoric mood that pervaded all areas 
liberated and semi-liberated by the military wing of ZANU, ZANLA forces, made it difficult for 
other political figures to be relevant in an atmosphere that was heavily tilted politically in favour 
of ZANU-PF. Tambila Kapetwa, writing about democracy in Tanzania, states that in a one-party 
democracy, the ruling party is supreme.407 In the first five years after independence, ZANU-PF 
was the supreme authority to the extent that a state party was created, leaving no other party for 
the electorate to cross over to. 
The Gukurahundi debacle in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands province barely two years 
after independence was also characterised as a state attempt to rid of dissidents whom ZANU-PF 
accused of receiving their blessings to destabilise the country from PF-ZAPU.408 Although there 
was no formal declaration of a one-party strategy in the country, the operating environment for 
political opposition was circumscribed. The discovery of arms cache on a PF-ZAPU farm 1982 
and the subsequent sacking and escape of Joshua Nkomo worsened relations between the two 
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revolutionary parties.409 As Laakso410 puts it, the Ndebele had to reckon with ZANU-PF power 
and if they wanted to be represented in government, they had to support ZANU-PF. This paved 
way for the signing of the Unity Accord in 1987 when PF-ZAPU ceased to exist as a party: it 
became part of the enlarged ZANU-PF. 
There was no clear distinction between party and government and efforts by the party government 
to consolidate its power continued even after Sithole and Nkomo had been silenced. Indeed, the 
elimination of Sithole and Nkomo as political rivals was part of the power consolidation agenda 
by the ruling ZANU-PF party. Origins of political violence emanated from the 1960s when Smith 
declared the UDI.411 Shire further intimates that the British government contributed to the 
downward economic spiral in Zimbabwe by using coercive diplomacy in the EU, Commonwealth 
and the USA to secure the imposition of declared and undeclared sanctions on the government of 
Zimbabwe and its leadership. Jack Straw, who was the British Foreign Secretary at the time, in his 
address to Parliament in 2002, stated: “I can tell the house today that we will continue to oppose 
any access by Zimbabwe to international financial resources”.412 Britain was accordingly 
implicated as pursuing a regime change agenda which involved the replacement of government 
structures, institutions, and related processes. It is important to note that this statement came in the 
wake of the formation of the MDC in 1999 which was the first formidable opposition party to have 
emerged in Zimbabwe since independence. It also came immediately after the USA had passed the 
ZIDERA whose thrust was not to punish President Mugabe and his party, but to push the people 
of Zimbabwe to their lowest so that they revolted and did away with ZANU-PF.413 From this 
perspective, it can be averred that ZIDERA acquiescently expressed regime change as the ultimate 
intention of sanctions.  
The enactment of ZIDERA, ostensibly to support the Zimbabwean people in their quest for 
‘democratic change’, to grow the economy, and to bring back the rule of law, was taken advantage 
of by ZANU-PF. The principal objective of ZIDERA was democratic change and it was quickly 
linked by the Mugabe regime to the MDC, as the act was seen as giving advantage to the opposition 
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in the political arena.414 Western targeted sanctions were expected to bring democracy and human 
rights to Zimbabwe, and this included property rights and freedom from torture 415 The name given 
to the opposition MDC resonated with the neo-liberal ideals as contained in ZIDERA and this 
made it indistinguishable from, and [coincidentally] similar in its democratic thrust, to the 
resolutions made in Washington about the Harare administration. What could have worsened 
relations between western governments and Zimbabwe was their interpretation of ‘Mugabeism’ as 
anti-democratic and anti-human rights, and their definition of the Zimbabwean crisis hinged so 
much on governance whose solution required regime change.416 Major and McGann cited in 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni417 argue that conventional wisdom assumes that the imposition of economic 
coercion [sanctions] would exercise sufficient bite that citizens in the target country would exert 
political pressure to force a change of government, and that this remains the modus operandi of a 
sanctions policy. 
In the context of a politically and economically disorderly situation, it became important for the 
ruling ZANU-PF to rally behind their revolutionary icon, giving rise to Mugabeism. As Sabelo 
Ndlovu puts it, Mugabeism was an ideological concoction from Nyerereism, Marxism, Stalinism, 
Maoism, Nkurumaism, Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African neo-traditionalism, and 
nativism.418 Mugabeism as a philosophy became popular with ZANU-PF supporters because it 
sought to address issues to do with liberation and oppression, peace and war, reconciliation and 
retribution, empowerment and dispossession, victimhood and heroism, social justice and 
injustice.419 Attempts by western powers to make sense of Mugabeism, and in particular, for them 
to come to terms with the land question, created deep divisions even among scholars interested in 
the unfolding drama in the country. In the early 1980s, Mugabeism was viewed by the west as 
progressive, having embraced whites as citizens by means of reconciliation and through 
maintenance of existing state institutions that abundantly rewarded whites in economic terms.420  
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After 2000, Mugabeism was viewed as a hegemonic programme, or an ideology, that listed whites 
as ‘Enemy Number 1’ under the Third Chimurenga discourse of economic liberation, which also 
articulated exclusionary discourses of citizenship.421 Mugabe consequently portrayed the Third 
Chimurenga as the logical conclusion of the first two Chimurengas.422 It also became a concept 
that meant different things to different people, both locally and globally. Due to the failure of the 
2000 plebiscite which the government had intended to use in its bid to develop a new constitution 
for Zimbabwe, an unorthodox economic plan came into existence, one that was diametrically 
opposed to western sanctions whose key objective was regime change.423 The strategy involved 
deliberate defaulting on foreign debt obligations; undertaking a foreign policy that worked at cross 
purposes with the former coloniser, Britain; state intervention in the conduct of business in the 
country; and orchestrating a fast-track land reform programme.424 Mamdani and Moyo and Yeros 
blame sanctions that were meted out against Zimbabwe by the western powers in league with 
international financial houses as having radicalised the state, making a reality of the Zimbabwean 
political and economic crisis.425 They represent a crop of scholars whose sympathy lay with the 
ZANU-PF government and who have tried to make sense of Mugabeism. According to Mamdani, 
the land reform programme was a democratic revolution as part of a strategy of achieving mass 
justice for those who were denied justice by the colonial system. It was from this analogue that 
Mugabism developed as a concept to differentiate real men (varume chaivo) from pretenders 
(amadoda sibili). Western reaction by way of sanctions to the government’s land reform 
programme which they argued violated an individual’s right to property, regarded as a fundamental 
principle in any democratic dispensation, gave all elections after 2000 a new dimension. Elections 
became synonymous with war and confrontation as evidenced by the number of political victims 
who were murdered, raped, maimed and tortured for belonging to the wrong party as shown in 
Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Cases of human rights violations reported to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO 
Forum 2001-2008426 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 206 2007 2008 
Abductions 115 223 52 62 18 11 19 137 
Arrest/detention 670 274 627 389 1286 2611 2766 922 
Disappearances 0 28 4 0 0 0 0 19 
Murder 34 61 10 3 4 2 3 107 
Political discrimination 194 388 450 514 476 288 980 2987 
Torture 903 1172 497 389 136 366 603 723 
 
The concept Mugabeism, therefore, grew in reaction to sanctions. The war cabinet in the war 
against sanctions was expected to propagate the same spirit of  bravery imbued in ‘real men,’ hence 
the philosophy of Dodaism427 which manifested itself in their performing courageous deeds, their 
readiness to shed blood in defence of the country’s sovereignty, their outright defiance of western 
ideals and, above all, their sacrifice.428 The history of the total emancipation of the country began 
to revolve around Mugabe in line with what Coleman in Prah429  refers to as “personalismo”, which 
refers to the tendency for political groups to rely on a strong personal leader. This tendency was 
to regard the views of the president, Mugabe, as the belief system of the entire ZANU-PF party. 
The sanctions era from 2002 up to 2008 witnessed the nationalisation of Zimbabwean history by 
the incumbent ZANU-PF government and the cautious revival of nationalist or nativist politics 
around the concept of the ‘enemy’. All people who were not card-carrying members of ZANU-PF 
fell into the enemy category. The enemy concept was devised when the focus of the ruling party 
was on creating a one-party state. Mugabe alluded to the one-party state ideology when he 
commented: “when all people carry party cards, the present national registration cards would be 
abolished … it would be easier to identify the enemy”.430 What is important to note from the 
discussion is that all opposition activities were circumscribed and the MDC in particular, was 
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implicated in conspiracies that were designed to effect the recolonisation of Zimbabwe and, from 
the point of view of ZANU-PF, the ousting of Mugabe from power. 
Scholars such as Ranger, Schanecchia, Jocylyn, Alexander and Campbell represent the school of 
thought that places human rights, democracy, and violations discourses as central in inviting 
western sanctions on Zimbabwe.431 It is argued that Mugabe was a political creation of colonialism 
because colonialism was not a terrain of democracy, but rather a terrain of conquest, violence, 
police rule, militarism and authoritarianism.432Therefore, the authoritarianism of the colonial era 
reproduced itself within the nationalist political movements. In the case of ZANU-PF, this 
authoritarian culture was reinforced during the war of liberation433 when those people associated 
with the Rhodesian colonial system, or with other African political parties, were murdered in 
celebratory style at pungwes (night meetings) by the ZANLA freedom fighters. This was intended 
to eliminate so-called sell-outs, and cow potential political enemies into submission. Of course, 
there are examples of anti-colonial fighters who were subject to extreme brutality, respecting the 
rule of law once they came into power. While the conditions in Zimbabwe would have shaped 
Mugabe’s actions, the general point about the culture of impunity and violence preceding 
independence, is well taken.  
One very important constraint in opposition politics and their call for democracy was the lack of 
strategies to confront an authoritarian state with very strong regional support and liberation 
legitimacy through peaceful means.434 The MDC politics did not prioritise the structural 
inequalities in Zimbabwe that were created by colonialism, but drew its inspiration from neo-
cosmos, which is the politics of human rights.435 While the Third Chimurenga, because of the 
abuse of human rights associated with it, resulted in international condemnation, there was little 
practical support from proponents of sanctions for rank-and-file Zimbabweans. On the contrary, 
western, especially British rhetoric suited the Mugabe regime which used it to affirm that the 
country’s sovereignty was under threat. Tsvangirai was portrayed as a “puppet” of the British 
                                                 
431 S. J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, (2009). Making sense of Mugabeism, p. 1143. 
432 Ibid., p. 1144. 
433 H. Melber, (2002). Zimbabwe's presidential elections 2002: evidence, lessons and implications. Nordiska 
Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, p. 11. 
434 B. Raftopoulos, (2006). Reflections on the Opposition in Zimbabwe, p. 58. 
435 Neocosmos, M. (2007). "Development, Social Citizenship and Human Rights: Re-thinking the Political Core of an 
Emancipatory Project in Africa." Africa Development, XXXII (4), p. 50. 
123 
 
government whose ultimate aim was to re-colonise the country.436 Try as it may, Tsvangirai and 
the MDC failed to counter patriotic history’s version of its role in Zimbabwean history, simply 
being branded as lackeys or stooges of white farmers and international capital.  
Key among the factors that enabled the ordinary people in rural areas to view the MDC as a party 
that served the interests of the whites was the financial support it received from Scandinavian 
countries when the party was launched in Mount Pleasant,437 a predominantly white upper-class 
suburb in Harare. As McLaughlin438 contends, outside funding for any political party gives it a 
certain visibility and ability to move around with vehicles, and, in any election, political parties 
get sponsorship both from within and from without. That is the reason the US recently passed laws 
to limit the amount of foreign support in American politics because Saudi Arabia and other Middle 
East countries were having considerable influence on election outcomes. McLaughlin agrees with 
Mandiwanzira over the issue of opposition funding from outside the country in the form of 
governments, individuals and NGOs, all of which wanted to maintain a colonial hang on the 
economic resources of Zimbabwe.439 Mandiwanzira repeatedly makes reference to MDC mafia 
organisations in Cape Town in South Africa and Australia, as well as the Westminster Foundation 
in Britain that was viewed as the seed funder of the regime change strategy. He views them as 
institutions keen on propping up the opposition against ZANU-PF.440 ZIDERA, passed in USA in 
2001, the same year the House of Commons in Britain empowered the Westminster Foundation to 
fund democratic transition processes in Zimbabwe, was specific in terms of its commitment to 
fund opposition party activities and civil society organisations in the guise of strengthening 
democracy in the country. As Porto441  notes, the Westminster Foundation sought to transform the 
MDC into the best opposition party in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.  
Deficient in the MDC counter-narratives was the conspicuous absence of direct references to itself 
as a trade union movement. It is this history of trade unionism that led to the struggle for liberation 
when economic grievances were politicised. The political struggle involving people like Joshua 
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Nkomo, Charles Mzingeli and Masotsha Ndlovu gave the trade union movement a noble history 
which the MDC could have capitalised on to provide a strong counter-narrative rooted in the 
nationalist, as opposed to a liberation, struggle dating back to the early 1960s. McLaughlin, a 
journalist, adult educator and promoter of peace and justice on the continent, was arrested and 
deported to USA from white-ruled Rhodesia in 1977, but returned to Mozambique where she 
ministered to ZANU refugees in Mozambique and became familiar with ZANU members there, 
including Fay King Chung.442  The weakness of the opposition narrative was its persistent 
critiquing of ZANU-PF without presenting a counter-narrative, which was why, in the USA, Hilary 
Clinton fared badly against Donald Trump in the elections.443  
The two schools of thought discussed above represent the debate over sanctions. Cameron and 
Dorman identify nationalism and democracy as competing discourses that clashed head on post-
2000, resulting in the development of antagonistic social relations of civil society.444 The era of 
sanctions is estimated to have started in 2002, but to have peaked in 2008 when democracy sharply 
declined due to massive human rights abuses, accompanied by a plummeting economy which 
witnessed the presence of the military  in the political state apparatus.445 The head of the EU 
election observer mission, Pierre Schori, was expelled from the country in 2002 by the 
Zimbabwean government for “political arrogance” and the incident attracted targeted sanctions by 
the EU against Mugabe and 20 others.446  
Tony Blair had no reservations in announcing in 2004 that Britain worked so closely with the 
MDC on the measures that Britain should take in respect of Zimbabwe, although he was afraid 
that the measures, which included sanctions, would have limited effect on the Mugabe regime.447 
He was right. Targeted sanctions failed to make the ZANU-PF government concede to western 
and opposition demands for the restoration of human rights and the rule of law. Instead, politically-
motivated violence escalated unabated, whereas constraints on neutral election observers, on 
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freedom of expression and of press, and on judicial independence, became a necessary aberrant 
that buttressed the hegemony of ZANU-PF institutions in the 2002 elections.  
It is evident that sanctions were intended to discipline the Mugabe regime in terms of the neo-
liberal definition of the Zimbabwean crisis which lays primacy to militarisation of domestic 
politics, lawlessness by the executive, limited democratic space, dubious electoral practices and 
economic decline.448 Ndlovu-Gatsheni also regards the crisis in Zimbabwe as a reflection of the 
risks encountered by an African country when it attempts to defy the disciplining forces of 
globalisation and neo-liberalism.449 The nationalists responded by abandoning their commitment 
to the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, which had placed limitations on their policies. The 
government embarked on an aggressive land reform programme in outright defiance of the spirit 
of reconciliation of the Agreement. Mandaza commented: “…the reconciliation exercise serves a 
political function, facilitating the necessary compromise between the rulers of yesterday and 
inheritors of state power within the context of incomplete decolonisation”.450 The argument stems 
from the loopholes in the Lancaster Constitution which was historically specific in terms of the 
time the new government would need to start making the constitution more people-centred than it 
was. Addressing the land question heralded the countdown towards the scrapping of the Lancaster 
House Constitution.451 That meant amending it to allow for land restitution and removing some 
protective clauses that gave whites monopoly over power and resources. Mandaza’s analysis 
subscribes to the view that the elite that assumed power after the 1980 elections knew that it was 
an empty victory and that decolonisation was far from complete. Apart from having reconciliation 
rigidly enshrined in the Lancaster Agreement, Mandaza argues that it was proclaimed because 
there were limited options for Mugabe given that his political power was still quite unstable, and 
the political climate was full of suspicion452 from military threats by the white military machine. 
There is a need to put the crisis in Zimbabwe in its proper context. Some reductionist critiques 
blame the crisis on the long incumbency of President Mugabe. When the 2000 referendum failed, 
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Mugabe and his lieutenants planned to use land as their main campaign theme.453 Chenjerai 
Hunzvi, a Soviet-trained fighter and medical doctor nicknamed ‘Hilter’ because of his brutality, 
and ZANU-PF war veterans and youths, backed by elements of the army and Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO), were engaged and deployed to administer selective violence on white farmers, 
farm workers, MDC activists, rural teachers and nurses suspected of supporting the MDC.454 
Compagnon455 is of the view that the threat by the militia that ZANU-PF would resume the bush 
war meant that Mugabe and his comrades believed that the state belonged to them by privilege of 
conquest because they won the war. Since sanctions, despite the semantic usage of ‘smart’, 
‘targeted’ or ‘illegal’ to describe them, were declared outside the UN mandate, the economic 
meltdown and the concomitant breakdown of law and order in the country can be viewed as a 
responsibility shared between the Mugabe regime and the sanctioneers. 
Scholars from the neo-liberal school of thought, which lays the blame for the crisis in Zimbabwe 
on a human rights and democracy deficit, are convinced that the crisis in Zimbabwe had nothing 
to do with sanctions, but with the sheer lack of democratic principles in the country. It was from 
the neo-liberal traditions that the MDC borrowed so heavily for its party philosophy. ‘Regime 
change’ developed into a discourse that pervaded MDC politics to the extent of adopting the 
mantra of change of government as the only solution to the Zimbabwean crisis.456 Yet, the 
operations of the MDC were somehow limited in the sense that the issue of sanctions was tabled 
in London just before the formation of the MDC and that gave credence to the assumption that 
Tsvangirai and his MDC party had called for them, hence the name ‘Tsvanctions’ for sanctions.457 
From a nativist or indigenisation paradigm, the crisis was caused by the western countries and their 
affiliate organisations such as the IMF and WB that imposed sanctions as punishment on 
Zimbabwe for undertaking land reform with a view to addressing past colonial distributive 
injustices that the new state had inherited. From a nationalist perspective, the inevitable land 
reform programme sought to relieve the congestion on the non-productive land into which the 
former colonial masters had driven Africans. 
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4.3 THE LINK BETWEEN SANCTIONS AND REGIME CHANGE 
The sanctions imposed on the ZANU-PF leadership were dubbed as ‘smart’ or targeted 
sanctions.458 Grebe contends that targeted sanctions were aimed at selected individuals who were 
directly linked to the state apparatus because of the positions they held. Such sanctions were 
intended to reduce economic harm on the ordinary citizens and to prevent a humanitarian crisis in 
Zimbabwe.459 It means that in the case of Zimbabwe, no comprehensive sanctions were declared 
because it could still conduct trade and financial transactions with other countries. ZANU-PF 
interpreted the imposition of targeted sanctions as a strategy by those who imposed them to effect 
regime change by creating an uneven playfield where ZANU-PF was caricatured as a clique of 
bad governors, and where the MDC was hailed as having the remedy to the economic and political 
woes affecting the country.460  
Many issues arose because of the sanctions. Whether restrictive, as the opposition MDC preferred 
to call them, or targeted, as understood in the western sphere, they indeed impacted negatively on 
the applicability of democracy and on the viability of multipartyism. ZANU-PF regarded sanctions 
as a western project to effect regime change by using the MDC that they viewed as a puppet of the 
west.461 Sanctions were perceived by ZANU-PF as tantamount to a declaration of war and were 
regarded as unwarranted outside interference in the affairs of a sovereign state.462 Bracking463 
argues that sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the west enabled the government of Mugabe to 
gainfully apply the regime change narrative and to effectively present itself as a liberal democracy 
suffering from imperial interference. There was negative publicity about Zimbabwe in the western 
media which led to the pulling out of investors and de-industrialisation giving it a pariah status.464 
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Zimbabwe was placed in a state of emergency where rules of doing business, norms that shaped 
the country’s philosophical underpinnings and democratic freedoms in their various manifestations 
were suddenly curtailed in a typical retreat to a one-party arrangement. Opposition parties, civic 
society organisations and churches, though not formally legislated out of existence, had to contend 
with a heavily-militarised environment that was designed to rescue the country from 
‘recolonisation’ and forcible regime change. 
ZANU-PF opportunistically exploited the sanctions discourse to lay claim that they were a victim 
of a western agenda to prevent land repossession from the white minority in Zimbabwe.465 This 
line of reasoning received support from China and Russia who vetoed decisions against Zimbabwe 
in the UNSC on many occasions and from many African leaders such as Thabo Mbeki of South 
Africa, Sam Nujoma of Namibia and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania who fraternised with Mugabe 
in a spirit of revolutionary brotherhood. For example, by 2012, China had used its Security Council 
veto eight times to veto sanctions against Zimbabwe.466 The pariah status of Zimbabwe as a result 
of sanctions was defended by other African leaders within the discourse of anti-colonialism467 
Commenting on the EU sanctions on Zimbabwe, Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania remarked: “… the 
EU wants to divide Africa at Brussels just as they did in Berlin where a conference that regulated 
colonialism was held in 1884. Africa must say ‘no’”.468 South Africa, the arbiter in the political 
crisis between ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC, adopted ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ as a strategy to 
deal with Mugabe and its overall framework was diplomacy rather than sanctions or military 
action, preferring ‘negotiations behind the scenes’ with Mugabe.469 According to Mhango, Quiet 
Diplomacy was a naïve approach to a peace-making strategy in Zimbabwe470 which was viewed 
as silent approval of Mugabe’s violations of human rights and a culture of impunity.471 South 
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Africa denied the request by other SADC countries such as Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana to 
expand the mediation team member states to help in crafting a peaceful settlement to the political 
crisis in Zimbabwe. The allegation was that Mbeki was afraid that the Confederation of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) might follow the MDC example and transform itself into a 
formidable opposition movement.472 Whatever the argument, South Africa’s policy in the crisis 
made it complicit in prolonging the Mugabe phenomenon. The EU was divided over the sanctions 
issue and France extended bilateral development cooperation with Zimbabwe at a time when most 
other EU countries were reducing cooperation.473 After the travel ban imposed on President 
Mugabe, his cabinet and other key members in the regime, Mugabe in 2002 used the bilateral 
relations to travel to the UN in New York via France and in June of the same year, Mugabe traveled 
to Rome for a UN and Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) meeting.474  
From the foregoing, it is apparent that sanctions were not effective because they did not have the 
desired effect of making the target, the ZANU-PF government, change its policy position. The two 
binaries remained unresolved nor unreconciled: ZANU-PF viewed sanctions as illegal punitive 
measures put in place by the EU and the US as punishment on the government of Zimbabwe for 
embarking on a ‘democratic land dispensation’475  that empowered the historically unprivileged 
Africans by implementing the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000. 
Ndakaripa476  compares it with the collective view of the US, EU and the MDC that contended that 
sanctions were collective persuasion measures that were meant to compel ZANU-PF to respect 
democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and proper governance. Whatever name was 
given to the sanctions – ‘smart’, ‘restrictive’ or ‘targeted’ – inevitably made the Zimbabwean crisis 
very complex. The reason was that ZANU-PF, through its tight control of the media in order to 
propagate a diehard stance on the irreversibility of the land reform programme, and the need to 
outwit the advocates of the sanctions, proffered justifications for the economic crisis from the point 
of view of western interference in the internal affairs of Zimbabwe. Such a stance hardened the 
ruling party against western political, imperial, and economic designs to the extent that no 
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substantive democratic and governance reforms could be implemented. Doing so would be 
detrimental to ZANU-PF’s hegemonic power, and to its control of the most critical state 
institutions, the bureaucracy and the party leadership system. One remarkable paradox is that 
ZANU-PF grew even stronger under the prevailing sanctions so that no regime change would take 
place. In response, Mugabe declared that only God who appointed him would oust him from 
power.477 This resonated with the divine right of kings of 18th century Europe when criticising and 
challenging rulers was sinful and criminal. It was this strength and the intransigence of ZANU-PF 
and the military that became impediments to democratic reforms which might have led to its loss 
of power.478  
Much has been documented about the role of economic sanctions as a strategy to cause a change 
of regime. According to Bonfatti,479 regime change theories have also been used to study attempts 
at regime change by western governments throughout the world, especially after the fall of Soviet 
communism in 1989 and the emergence of the supposed unipolarity in the immediate aftermath, 
or as Fukuyama480 puts it: it was the “End of History”. Most direct forms of western intervention 
such as military force, diplomatic persuasion, political and economic conditionalities and 
democracy assistance programmes failed to produce the desired democratic outcomes.481 These 
authors argue that democratic outcomes are predicated on the strength of civil society in a given 
country. Operation Murambatsvina was launched in Zimbabwe’s urban areas in 2005 and the 
government justified such an operation because there were so many shacks in high-density suburbs 
which had become virtual habitats for social misfits, resulting in increased crime and cases of 
murder, rape and disease due to limited infrastructure. According to Bratton and Masunungure, 482 
the operation was a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economic and political activity 
in the country’s urban areas and to banish urban dwellers to rural areas. A counter-argument by 
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Potts483 holds that the huge growth in informal employment resulted in the development of shacks 
within the plots of formal townships but the practice was not tolerated by government due to the 
increase in poverty levels among the people. Such an argument supports the actions of the 
government which held that order had to return to the cities through the eradication of illegal 
housing structures. 
The Murambatsvina campaigns were carried out with so much force that a humanitarian problem 
arose when those people whose shelters had been destroyed by state bulldozers either had to go 
back to their rural homes or became vagabonds and squatters. The timing of the Murambatsvina 
campaign coincided with the period when the opposition MDC controlled all urban areas and the 
campaign was criticised as a ZANU-PF strategy to dilute urban constituencies that favoured the 
opposition. ZANU-PF destroyed the capacity of opposition parties to organise meetings in several 
ways. First, people who migrated back to rural areas weakened the opposition because they were 
disenfranchised: most found themselves not being able to vote either in their rural constituencies 
or in urban ones because their names did not appear on voter’s rolls. Second, due to de-
industrialisation, civil society groupings became less vibrant and trade unionism literally ceased 
to exist, nor could they, in all reasonableness, serve as institutions for the articulation of labourers’ 
demands. 
Operation Mavhoterapapi (“Who did you vote for?”) in the 2008 elections was executed 
vociferously by the ZANU-PF youth militias, war veterans, party youths, and the military 
following the defeat of President Mugabe by Tsvangirai in the presidential race by 42.56% and 
47.12% respectively.484 The diaspora phenomenon that originated during the ESAP era after 1991 
because of economic decline, grew in intensity from this Mavhotera papi campaign ahead of the 
June 2008 run-off presidential election as known opposition activists were hunted down and 
selectively killed in cold blood.485 The era was characterised by massive abuses of power, the 
militarisation of the bureaucracy, the politicisation of economic issues and a state of insecurity. 
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The era was code-named ‘Jambanja’ which in the Shona dialect connotes the use of force, rampant 
lawlessness as well as violent and angry confrontations with white farmers over the land by war 
veterans of the liberation war.486 Relations were quite personal and intimate in rural areas where 
people knew each other, and so opposition supporters were easy to identify. Mugabe won the 
presidential re-run in June 2008 from which the opposition MDC withdrew, citing state terror and 
political intimidation on its supporters, was won by Mugabe. The Herald newspaper had an item 
in which General Chiwenga declared that Mugabe would win the run-off elections of June 2008 
resoundingly487 The Daily Telegraph ran a heading ‘Zimbabwe Generals have taken Mugabe’s 
power’ and the Herald showed an item ‘Rally behind president in run-off, soldiers told’488 and this 
shows military interference and influence in the run-off elections. The Masvingo Resident Minister 
and Governor, Willard Chiwewe, made a blunt statement: “Zimbabweans had no choice but vote 
for ZANU-PF. This is a choice with no choice. It’s either you vote for war or peace”.489 By election 
day, more than 80 opposition supporters were dead, hundreds went missing or were injured, and 
Tsvangirai dropped out of the contest and took refuge in the Dutch Embassy.490 Cases abounded 
in rural polling stations where civil servants, who included teachers and nurses, were ordered to 
affirm their illiteracy so that trusted people could cast votes on their behalf. A culture of silence, 
fear and uncritical compliance with ZANU-PF’s definition of enemies was institutionalised as 
political correctness became the watchword that pervaded every aspect of human endeavour in the 
country. 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
ZANU-PF met the sanctions that were imposed on identified ZANU-PF executive members and 
organisations affiliated to the ruling party by the EU, WB and the IMF under the auspices of the 
USA and Britain with an equal determination to render them less effective. The MDC that was 
formed in 1999 was viewed as a mouthpiece of the British given the substantial number of former 
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white Rhodesians in its rank-and-file membership. Because of the consequences for the public that 
would accompany the imposition of smart or targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe, the nationalist 
interpretation was that the western nations had declared war on the state. In a war situation, human 
rights, the rule of law and other liberal freedoms that are consistent with democracy and multiparty 
practice could be circumvented. Opposition politicians, although theoretically legally permitted in 
the country, had to grapple with a shrinking political space because they fell within the enemy 
camp. 
It must be noted that sanctions on key government leaders were exploited to advance and 
strengthen ZANU-PF’s power retention or power agenda. It was these sanctions that led to the 
resuscitation of liberation memories and the appropriation of history by ZANU-PF. The liberation 
discourse was re-lived and even the heroes and heroines of the First Chimurenga, such as Kagubi 
and Nehanda, were reference points in justifying the restitution of land to the black or indigenous 
people. The word ‘indigenous’ became synonymous with ‘black’ and whites fell out of this racial 
characterisation. The Third Chimurenga, which essentially focused on the land issue in line with 
the government’s empowerment and indigenisation programmes, was carried out arguably with a 
ferocity that surpassed the violence perpetrated by the colonial regime. The CCJPZ posits that the 
political climate after the 2000 referendum that humiliated ZANU-PF was characterised by 
unacceptable levels of violence which prevented the electorate from freely voting for their 
opposition parliamentarians in the national election in the same year.491It also affirmed that 
politically motivated destruction of property, beatings, abductions, torture and killings were 
widespread at a level not seen in Zimbabwe for many years and, overwhelmingly, ZANU-PF 
supporters were responsible for 90% of the systematic violence.492  
The government led by ZANU-PF took advantage of incumbency to mobilise state resources to 
build relations based on patronage politics. A political party in power has monopoly over the use 
of force and resources. The 2002 elections are a case in point. The Defence Forces in the 2002 
presidential elections that pitted Mugabe against the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, vowed 
to execute a coup d’état if Tsvangirai won. In their statement of intent, they categorically stated: 
“…let it be known that the highest office on the land is a straightjacket whose occupant is expected 
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to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle…we will not accept, let alone salute, anyone 
with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our 
people.”493 The interference by the military in political affairs was a major setback to freedom of 
political conviction during the sanctions era from 2000 to 2008. In chapter two, I alluded to the 
fact that Mugabe in the 1970s in Mozambique, became the president of the party using Ndabaningi 
Sithole’s renunciation of violence while in prison in a bid to secure his release, as an excuse to 
oust him as ZANU president for having betrayed the revolution. The military leadership endorsed 
Mugabe as president, much to the dismay of ordinary guerillas, most of whom were thrown into 
prison for voicing their discontent in the 1977 ZIPA clean-up campaign in Mozambique. The party 
leadership, it can be argued, was rooted in quasi-dictatorial practices that brooked neither dissent 
nor criticism. The military factor was an essential component of Zimbabwean politics whose 
precedent was set during the armed struggle and was illuminated in subsequent elections in the 
country. 
The ZANU-PF armed struggle and the colonial state structures were both conceived in violence 
and were maintained throughout through the free use of violence. The sanctions era entrenched the 
military and security establishments within mainstream state politics and that explains why 
incidences of violence and intimidation made the presidential election results of 2002 locally, 
regionally and internationally questionable. The playing field was uneven especially with the 
promulgation of the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Bill (AIPPA), which was 
meant to control information dissemination and reportage. Simply put, the government did not 
condone any criticism and journalists had to articulate the state position in their reporting. Freedom 
of assembly was prohibited by the POSA and according to CCJPZ, these colonial pieces of 
legislation were timed to start working just before the Presidential elections of 2002. The 
developments highlighted above are illustrative of the responses the ruling party gave to western 
sanctions. Apart from the continuity of the ZANU-PF government having inherited violence and 
undemocratic colonial state apparatus that continued into the independence period, sanctions were 
viewed by those targeted by them as violence, and the argument was that violence begets violence.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE THIRD CHIMURENGA (2000-2015) AND POLITICAL 
DEADLOCK 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Third Chimurenga, connotes the continuation of a political struggle that was started in 1896. 
This political struggle was resumed in earnest in 2000 with an emphasis on land redistribution, 20 
years after independence. It suggests that the unresolved land issue resulting from restrictions 
imposed on the new African majority government by the Lancaster Constitution, and buttressed 
by the policy of reconciliation, in 1980, was a salient source of future racial conflicts. This chapter 
focuses on the seizure of white-owned land by the Svosve people in the Marondera area and how 
this act was first used by the ZANU-PF government and then nationalised in order to trigger 
disturbances that later became known as the Third Chimurenga.  
The Third Chimurenga was the culmination of sporadic land grabs by rural communities that 
coalesced into a state project. It impacted variously on the country’s political system and 
governance style. The democratic struggles that accompanied the popular rejection of the draft 
constitution in 2000, from the perspective of ZANU-PF, spoke the language of human rights and 
the rule of law, which principles did not augur well for the government’s land redistribution 
programme that needed force and complete retraction of such principles for it to be successful. 
The concept Jambanja (‘direct action’) was interchangeably used with the Third Chimurenga and 
was a redistribution process marked by considerable coercion and violence.494 This chapter looks 
at the relations that ensued between the party government and opposition political parties in the 
context of a broader interpretation of the Third Chimurenga up to 2015. 
There is another dimension to the Third Chimurenga. Indeed, the Svosve people in Marondera 
district could have ignited it with or without intervention from the government. It would be 
reductionist to link the Third Chimurenga with land redistribution alone. Rather, it became a 
summary of the whole ZANU-PF programme, to be unpacked under compelling conditions of 
war. War itself is not without violence. This category of the revolution was different from the first 
two in that it was fought from a position of strength when the elite were in power and could use 
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state power and resources to ‘discipline’ whites and their black accomplices who were declared 
enemies. The campaigns from 2000 sought a new definitional conception of independence, to be 
widened to cover not only the repossession of land but also of mines, industries and factories. This 
interpretation fitted in well with indigenisation and empowerment programmes bankrolled by the 
government. In this regard, another definition, or description, of the Third Chimurenga is that 
which broadly focuses on purges in ZANU-PF with a view to eliminating identified or alleged 
neo-colonial accomplices who masqueraded as patriots. The Third Chimurenga institutionalised 
land grabs when the British government reneged on its commitment to provide funding for land 
resettlement. It was a radicalised and racialised approach to policies of indigenisation and 
empowerment that, of necessity, demanded the deployment of coercive force to produce results; 
celebrating the indispensability of Mugabe and, lastly, popularising Mugabeism and the 
Zanufication of Zimbabwe.  
The First Chimurenga of 1896-1897 witnessed the massive humiliation of Africans in their war 
of resistance to colonial occupation of the country. The Second Chimurenga from 1966 up to 1979 
was led by black nationalists cum intellectuals who had received western education. It was a 
struggle that was justified on the premise that the first war of resistance had ended in disaster for 
Africans in that they lost all they had – land, rights, freedom, and independence. The Second 
Chimurenga, therefore, was deemed a continuation of the first, except that in this, confrontation 
was through the use of arms obtained from international sympathisers during the Cold War era, 
especially socialist bloc countries such as Yugoslavia, China, Romania and the Soviet Union. 
Although the Second Chimurenga ushered in an African majority government that assumed office 
in 1980, the incompleteness of the decolonisation process, from the perspective of African 
nationalists, was evident in the continued white ownership of the principal means of production 
such as land and industries. That was what reconciliation was seen to entail – the constitutional 
entrenchment of multiracialism that translated to co-existence without radically altering the 
relations of production that were skewed in favour of a white segment of the population in the 
country. 
A more empirical historical study of the land question in Zimbabwe is required. This is because 
the government led by ZANU-PF has always harped on equitable land redistribution as an issue 
that defines the completeness of the liberation struggle. The Third Chimurenga was thus the 
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continuation of a land narrative connected to the First and Second Chimurenga. The land issue was 
pivotal in determining the extent to which the government under the tutelage of ZANU-PF was 
prepared to liberalise the political space and allow for a genuine, democratic, multiparty tradition 
in the country. 
The disproportionate redistribution of land formerly owned by white farmers to the indigenous 
African people in Zimbabwe can be viewed as modern replication of the colonial 1930/1 Land 
Apportionment Act (LAA). The LAA was a piece of colonial legislation that demarcated land into 
black and white areas, dispossessing Africans of the most productive regions in the process. The 
‘willing-seller willing-buyer’ arrangement reached at Lancaster was based on the understanding 
that whites who were willing to dispose of their farms to the government so that it would resettle 
its black peasants would receive compensation from government. The British and the Americans 
had also agreed to make compensation money available to government. Through British money, 
few historically-marginalised blacks at the inception of the land reform programme were resettled 
by government on farm land peripheral to Agro Region 1. These generally were areas that differed 
slightly from their places of origin in terms of climate and soil type. Not surprisingly, former white 
landowners could easily dispose of such land on the ‘willing-buyer willing-seller’ basis as agreed 
at Lancaster in 1979.  
The resettlement model adopted in the 1980s targeted the poor from the countryside as the main 
beneficiaries. After the passing of the 1992 Land Acquisition Bill, which vested government with 
the power to revise the stringent clause on property rights enshrined in the Lancaster House 
Constitution, government focus turned to the middle-class blacks who would benefit from Model 
A1 and A2 schemes. The A1 scheme created about 145 000 farm households of smallholder, self-
contained farms and village settlements with individual arable fields and communal grazing by the 
end of 2002.495 The A2 scheme resettled around 16 500 householders on larger-scale plots that 
aimed at small-scale commercial farming.496 Qualifications for one to benefit from this A2 land 
scheme were based on property and collateral agreements497 which prevented the ordinary poor 
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peasants from applying and competing. The moment land was usurped without compensation, 
financial institutions stopped giving value to farming land due to the nature of the land ownership 
system and this was apparent in the huge number of A2 farmers who possessed offer letters which 
were not accepted by financial institutions as collateral security.498  
The withdrawal of British commitment to continue funding the resettlement programme brought 
the Third Chimurenga in its wake and this involved the forced removal of white farmers usually 
from land adjacent to towns and cities. Arguably, that was the only available option for the 
government to get land to resettle blacks without British money as fulfilment of liberation war 
promises. Later, it turned out that white-owned farms adjacent to urban areas and situated on the 
most fertile Highveld were reserved for the political ruling elite class. The position of this chapter 
is that instead of land being redistributed to the most deserving and economically-deprived classes, 
land barons emerged from the ruling elite and war veterans who allocated to themselves land and 
multiple farms in a neo-colonial fashion. This chapter further argues that land resettlement must 
be problematised in view of the fact that the Third Chimurenga land redistribution methodologies 
exhibited not only elite competition over the most fertile land around urban and other renowned 
centres of mineral production, but also the absence of institutional regulatory mechanisms on the 
politically powerful. Of interest to note from the Third Chimurenga is that it targeted white-owned 
farmlands that were near towns and cities. The white farmers had invested a lot in their farms 
economically and emotionally, given the fact that Rhodesia was a settler colony and the few whites 
who settled in the country had come to stay permanently, making the country their home. The 
ruling elite and others who provided safety props to the regime established patrimonial networks 
and scrambled against each other to own these farms.  
The chapter thus investigates the social class dimension of land redistribution in Zimbabwe using 
nonreactive methods, content analysis and existing statistics. The central argument is that objective 
conditions for finality on land reform are absent, and democratic practices in a Zimbabwean 
society characterised as it is by factual inequalities in land ownership can hardly be sustained. 
Democracy becomes firmly established in political systems that allow for justice and equality to 
take place. A political approach, as opposed to a developmental approach to land reform, proffered 
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partisan strictures regarding beneficiaries of land under the Third Chimurenga. This chapter, 
indeed, takes the ongoing debate further, linking the Third Chimurenga with the erosion of the 
rights of whites to Zimbabwean citizenship, their disenfranchisement and the categorisation of 
opposition parties as cohorts of the west seeking to bring back white control of the country.  
5.2 BACKGROUND TO THE THIRD CHIMURENGA, 2000 
The 15-year-old revolutionary struggle for independence in the then Rhodesia culminated in a 
negotiated settlement at Lancaster in Britain in 1979. One of the key reasons for the continuation 
of the armed struggle after Bishop Abel Muzorewa had become PM of a coalition government 
ushered in by the 1979 Internal Settlement, was that the Patriotic Front of ZAPU and ZANU 
regarded it as a sell-out settlement. The Internal Settlementtheoretically transferred power to 
blacks while the capitalist system remained intact under white control and ownership. Nationalist 
hopes were high at Lancaster that the land issue as well as the principle of majority rule would be 
discussed fully and conclusively. Lord Carrington, representing both the British government and 
the Commonwealth, ensured that negotiations were going to be based on the proposals that he had 
framed. Yet when Lord Carrington finally presented the draft constitution, it contained no 
reference to the land.499 Given the fact that Britain did not have its own written constitution, it was 
worrying to the nationalist delegation how it could create one for a post-independence Zimbabwe. 
Because of mounting pressure on the PF delegation from the Frontline States among which were 
Mozambique and Tanzania, to bring an end to fighting in Rhodesia, so many compromise 
agreements characterised the negotiations. One of the compromised issues was the land question. 
The British proposals were translated into a constitutional framework, suggesting that as the 
negotiations progressed, the thrust was on ‘constitution-making’ and not on land, nor majority rule. 
The multiparty elections held in 1980 were won by ZANU-PF with 57 seats against 27 for PF-
ZAPU, 3 seats for Muzorewa’s UANC and 20 seats reserved for whites as prescribed by the 
Lancaster Constitution. The influence of the Mozambican President, Samora Machel, in shaping 
production relations in Zimbabwe soon after independence was apparent when he advised ZANU-
PF against frightening away white settlers by implementing radical changes as that would result 
in a precipitate flight of white technical skills and capital.500 Through experience from hindsight, 
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the liberation party in Mozambique, FRELIMO, had forcibly driven out their Portuguese settlers 
after inflicting an outright military win over them with disastrous consequences. The socialist 
government under the tutelage of FRELIMO learned that Portuguese colonial institutions and 
structures should have been replaced gradually to allow for continuity through the systematic 
transfer of skills to blacks. As a result, it was compelled to start from nothing as most people with 
skills had sabotaged the economy and industries before they left for Portugal. 
In the early years of independence, the ZANU-PF government had an ideological battle to fight 
and a dilemma to contend with. It was theoretically wedded to socialism which was the rallying 
economic principle during the era of the armed struggle. It had to grapple with the need to satisfy 
its revolutionary promises of distributing land to people who had supported the struggle on its side, 
and at the same time to reassure whites who owned private capital that their interests would be 
protected and promoted.501 The ideological contradictions that ZANU-PF found itself immersed 
in after independence, and after the declaration of national reconciliation, raised debates about the 
party’s genuine commitment to a socialist dispensation, particularly when the political leadership 
had multiple farms themselves.502 It can be argued that the Lancaster Constitution circumscribed 
the operations of government and robbed it of the needed political space to expeditiously determine 
the economic destiny of the country with reference to land redistribution. As Meisenhelder503 
argues, the Lancaster Constitution delimited the economic power and transformational option of 
the new Zimbabwean state. In a way, it reduced the bloody armed struggle to a constitution-making 
process while maintaining the economic status quo that favoured the white landowners. 
The crisis over land, the ruthlessness that accompanied the redistribution exercise and the 
reallocation modalities after 2000 must be understood in the context of war. That was the reason 
the events after 2000 were characteristically referred to as the Third Chimurenga as an indication 
of a continuing struggle dating back to the First Chimurenga. It should be noted that the reluctance 
by the whites to release adequate land for redistribution, the reneging of the British government to 
continue funding the process of land resettlement and reform and the corruption that crept into the 
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process of distributing land availed to government through the ‘willing-seller willing-buyer’ 
principle made the land issue a complicated one. It, indeed, became both political and economic. 
The confrontational state ethos adopted after independence in 1980, for example, the Gukurahundi, 
disrespected the interests of its society at large because it was suspicious of its pre-independence 
enemies. It is estimated that the average farm size for a family in Britain is 65 hectares, 35 hectares 
in France, around 200 hectares in the USA; but a massive 3 000 hectares in Zimbabwe, with some 
farms as large as 15 000 to 20 000 hectares.504  Only 40% of such huge farms owned by whites in 
colonial Rhodesia were utilised.505 Independence in 1980 was hollow in that it gave birth to a neo-
colonial state where all colonial institutions of repression and all the apparatus of the colonial state 
were retained and maintained.506 The nationalist agenda at Lancaster was watered down to a 
transfer of power from white minority to black majority without attacking the colonial state 
structures that were underpinned by settler-native binaries.507  
The land issue remained unresolved at Lancaster and it was potentially explosive in the long run 
as 6 000 white farmers were left in possession of about 40 percent of the total agricultural land of 
Zimbabwe and this status quo was maintained until the early 1990s 508 when the constitution was 
amended. As part of its fulfilment of the obligations enunciated at Lancaster, Britain financially 
supported land redistribution in the early 1980s but suspended its support after evidence of alleged 
corrupt tendencies that surrounded the redistribution exercise.509 In support of this argument, 
Taylor intimates that the British government suspended payments with three million pounds left 
unspent in protest at the corruption of the process for personal gain by Mugabe and his elite.510 
With the expiry of the ten-year period, the Land Acquisition Act passed in 1992 gave the 
government power to acquire land and this was conditional on the payment of what was deemed 
to be ‘fair’ compensation to the white farmers who had voluntarily elected to dispose of their 
properties. As heated debates on the land issue followed the promulgation of the Land Acquisition 
Act, it was a countdown to the scrapping of the Lancaster Agreement itself.511  
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The 2000 Draft Constitution that was defeated in a referendum by 57% to 43% was designed to 
counter the 1992 Land Acquisition Act which hamstrung the government to strict compliance to 
compensating white farmers who had willingly released their land for redistribution. The defeat of 
the referendum also meant a defeat for ZANU-PF, the first defeat that ZANU-PF as a government 
had faced since independence in 1980. According to Hammett, the rejection of the draft 
constitution in 2000 impelled the government, out of political necessity, to close space for 
democratic dissent and deploy war veterans of the Second Chimurenga and armed militiamen to 
undermine opposition parties.512 One of the reasons for the rejection of the draft constitution was 
that it contained a clause that provided for the acquisition of white-owned land without 
compensation unless paid for by the British government.513 Despite the rejection of the draft 
constitution as a result of the popular mobilisations made in both rural and urban areas against it 
by the NCA and MDC, President Mugabe in the same year signed the Presidential Powers 
Temporary Measures Land Act. This legislation gave power to government to acquire farms as 
required by the 1992 Land Acquisition Act to fast-track the resettlement of black peasant farmers 
on the 2 102 gazetted farms without compensation being given to the losing white farmers.514As a 
response to this development where whites were losing out economically through losing both land 
and compensation money, they resurfaced in 2000, making court appeals against the ruling to 
confiscate their farms515 and getting actively involved in opposition politics of the MDC that had 
been formed in 1999. 
Mamdani draws a link between sanctions and land reform and concludes that sanctions contributed 
to the deepening economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe.516 He regards the land reform 
programme that began in 2000 as mass justice for people who were denied that justice under the 
colonial system. Ndlovu-Gatsheni517 analyses the concept of ‘nativism’ that was developed after 
2000 as a policy framework that informed the indigenisation and black empowerment programmes 
subsequently undertaken by government. Of interest to note in his conceptualisation of nativism 
is its slant towards the indigenous black people who should be empowered because of their long 
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history of economic marginalisation under white rule since 1890. From this background, a 
powerful discourse, centred on indigenisation of the economy as the last step towards completing 
the decolonisation process that was started in the 1960s with the formation of nationalist parties, 
was launched and it excluded whites. Land could not be repossessed from white farmers unless 
the right to Zimbabwean citizenship was taken away from them around 1999 when whites joined 
the opposition MDC which ZANU-PF regarded as a puppet party of the British government. This 
reasoning in ZANU-PF circles was motivated by the fact that the MDC was joined by whites with 
money and the original founders of this party had their objectives subverted once they had white 
farmers coming to join up.518  
When the European Union (EU), Britain and the USA imposed sanctions on the government elite 
in Zimbabwe after the violent FTLRP that was started in earnest in 2000, ZANU-PF viewed these 
measures as illegal punitive actions for its bold decision to address the historical land 
imbalances.519 In the USA, the ZIDERA, which was passed in 2001 to put pressure on the 
Zimbabwe government to uphold democracy and the rule of law, to ensure non-violent free and 
fair elections and respect for property and human rights520 aggravated the situation instead of 
remedying it in that it restricted the US to vote in support of new assistance to Zimbabwe from 
international financial institutions.521   
The state was radicalised in response to sanctions and the land narrative assumed critical 
proportions in mobilising people against the perceived ‘enemies of the state.’ Both the opposition 
MDC and ZANU-PF that were competing for control of the state, opportunistically used sanctions 
to further their party objectives, each making repeated references to these sanctions in contrasting 
ways. The polarisation of relations between Zimbabwe, its former colonial power Britain, the USA 
and other EU countries, and the resultant ‘targeted’ sanctions that were calculated to effect ZANU-
PF compliance to neo-liberal ideals such as the rule of law and accountable governance enabled 
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Mugabe to harp on the land issue as his major campaign theme to gain political mileage at home, 
regionally and internationally with support from the army. 
By 2000, there were spontaneous mass land occupations on white-owned farms in Marondera 
district following government inaction and the lack of commitment to the land redistribution 
programme by the ZANU-PF government. The government had betrayed its supporters and it 
could not descend heavily on the people who were desirous of taking ownership of pieces of land 
illegally. By 2000, the government also had to deal with urban mobilisations against it by the 
opposition MDC. Under these conditions, violence was unavoidable either against land occupants, 
against neo-colonialism or against the opposition.522Moyo and Yeros523 further argue that the 
predicament that ZANU-PF found itself in is poorly understood by left-wing critics whose analyses 
focus on human rights morality. Such analyses become important when considering ZANU-PF 
behaviour after 2000 when it was technically at war, or when the country was deemed to be in a 
state of emergency. The question of human and other rights was incompatible with the situation 
on the ground from a ZANU-PF point of view.  
5.3 ZANU-PF LIBERATION NARRATIVES: EVOLUTION OF THE ENEMY 
CONCEPT 
ZANU-PF liberation narratives were born out of the developments that took place after the rejected 
referendum in 2000. The sovereignty of Zimbabwe, expressed in terms of black land ownership, 
was rekindled against the background of growing opposition to ZANU-PF rule. The perspective 
of the opposition is that the defeat of ZANU-PF in the referendum represented an opposition 
narrative that had a telling effect on the elite in power as that awakened them to the realisation that 
their power base had diminished. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni524 puts it, ZANU-PF inscribed a national 
monolithic history to re-invent itself amidst deteriorating control over the popular will. Ranger525 
concurs by intimating that the national history served to proclaim the continuity of the 
Zimbabwean revolutionary tradition which was averse to all other historical perspectives on the 
Zimbabwean story except the one sanctioned by ZANU-PF.  
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As had happened in Tanzania when Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) lost its grip on 
people and systematically intimidated other parties out of existence in 1963 and legislated itself as 
the sole party, 526 the ruling ZANU-PF party started to monopolise the transmission of the political 
culture of the state through state-owned media and propaganda. Propagandists who were 
intellectuals themselves, were charged with the task of orienting the history of Zimbabwe to fit-in 
with ZANU-PF thinking, making proclamations that the land is the economy and the economy is 
the land.527 In December 2000, Mugabe told ZANU-PF that it must continue to strike fear into the 
heart of whites who were their real enemy.528 When Ian Smith came to power in 1964, his Rhodesia 
Front party appointed propagandists from apartheid South Africa to articulate what it perceived as 
a serious communist menace, and to caricature Mugabe as a communist.529 This political practice 
was bequeathed to the black government and was literally applied in its original form against 
groups and organisations that ZANU-PF classified under the ‘enemy concept’. A version of this 
propaganda in the present era may be what is now called ‘fake news’. 
The land question enabled the ruling party to reconfigure itself ahead of the presidential elections 
set for 2002. Mugabe threatened to resume the bush war should the electorate reject the party as it 
had done in the referendum two years earlier. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony aptly underscores 
the link between hegemony pand dictatorship both of which are mutually inclusive and 
complementary.530It must be noted that by threatening to resuscitate the armed struggle, Mugabe, 
in a collegial relationship with the war veterans, had a firm belief that the state belonged to them 
and to ZANU-PF because they liberated it. Compagnon531  sharply contradicts this ZANU-PF 
claim, arguing that it is a characteristic distortion of history to say that the country belongs to them. 
Mugabe rhetorically kept reminding people that Zimbabwean sovereignty was not negotiable and 
that he would rather eat grass than compromise the country’s sovereignty.532 From the perspective 
of ZANU-PF, targeted sanctions imposed on Mugabe and his war cabinet were intended to 
persecute them for their bravery in challenging the west’s international hegemonic control of the 
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weaker states such as Zimbabwe (ibid.). It was for this same reason that western countries wanted 
regime change in Zimbabwe to secure their economic interests and the ESAP was considered part 
of the regime change strategy.533 The land narrative temporarily lost significance as evidenced by 
the rejection of the draft constitution of 2000 that prioritised land redistribution based on proactive 
legislation that was fast-tracked through a predominantly ZANU-PF parliament. For the land 
project to succeed, ZANU-PF manipulated the discourse of nation-building and made itself privy 
to sustainable development in Zimbabwe, making sure that it remained legitimate as a party both 
at home and internationally even after systematically eliminating the opposition.534  
Gramsci also refers to the inseparable nature of cultural and intellectual factors in historical 
development, highlighting the role of intellectuals in designing society’s destiny, enforcing 
consensus through dictatorship as means to create and achieve party hegemony.535 In Zimbabwe, 
intellectuals such as Tafataona Mahoso from the Harare Polytechnic,  Vimbai Chivaura from the 
English Department of the UZ,  Claudius Mararike (UZ) and  Mupepereki from the UZ Agriculture 
Faculty took turns to present a programme entitled National Ethos on the only available television 
station that operated in the country. The programme was designed to create a patriotic citizenry, 
the assumption being that the renowned professionals would hoodwink the audiences by their 
repeated patriotic arguments. These intellectuals sought to extend the worldview of the rulers to 
the ruled and to secure the consent of the masses to the law and order of the land. However, it is 
when these intellectuals fail in their assignment to create party domination that the ruling class 
engages the coercive apparatus to discipline those who do not see things through their lenses. 
The ruling ZANU-PF party after 2000 had the advantage of almost two decades of incumbency 
before the formation of a formidable opposition MDC party in 1999. However, ZANU-PF got a 
rude awakening in the 2000 parliamentary elections when its parliamentary hegemony was broken 
for the first time since independence. Despite ZANU-PF’s concerted efforts to de-campaign the 
MDC as a party with no liberation war credentials536 or as a party that was not rooted in the armed 
struggle, the opposition garnered 57 seats against ZANU-PF’s 62 seats under conditions of state-
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sponsored violence 537that saw the murder of the leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai’s 
campaign manager, Tichaona Chiminya, near Murambinda Growth Point. The struggle for control 
of the state before the 2002 presidential elections demanded a meticulous re-definition of key 
concepts such as independence, heroism and belonging to the exclusion of all organisations and 
individuals that dared to challenge ZANU-PF. These were labeled as traitors who would be dealt 
with by the ruling ZANU-PF party. The CCJPZ and the WCC covered the 2002 presidential race 
that pitied Tsvangirai for MDC and Mugabe for ZANU-PF. It argues that ZANU-PF “stole” the 
election in view of the high incidences of intimidation and violence that were sufficiently serious 
to question the legitimacy of the election results.538  
The role of the media in disseminating ZANU-PF party propaganda was a key aspect in state denial 
to proffer political space for opposition politics immediately after the government defeat in the 
2000 referendum. The opposition MDC and individuals who were critical of ZANU-PF were 
targeted for media attack. Their interests were reframed and repackaged by the Ministry of 
Information and Publicity led by another intellectual, Professor Jonathan Moyo so that the so-
called unpatriotic behaviour of black Zimbabweans who were vehicles of the white-driven regime 
change interests would be laid bare. When Tsvangirai visited one of the remotest villages in 
Zimbabwe it is said that people asked to know why he was black because ZANU-PF had always 
been telling them that he was white. This also was the extent to which mainstream media played a 
very destructive role. The government made illegal the operation of independent radio and 
television stations, a decision that saw the closure of Joy TV in 2002 so the listeners were exposed 
to the state ZTV that churned out information that was pro-ZANU-PF. Mugabe and ZANU-PF 
were openly supported whereas the opposition was viciously attacked.539 It was for this reason that 
Chitando substituted ‘Terror vision’ for ‘television.’540 The new land politics in Zimbabwe after 
the annulment of the Lancaster Constitution revived racial conflicts that had been subdued under 
the dispensation of reconciliation in the first decade after independence. The whites were an 
irreplaceable enemy of the state for their close association with the MDC which was not clear on 
its party policy regarding land redistribution. One of the challenges the MDC faced was that it was 
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a movement that represented diverse political and economic interests whose common denominator 
was removing Mugabe from power. Its composition was such that unanimity in strategy and policy 
implementation was difficult to achieve as evidenced by the 2005 split of the party into MDC-T 
and MDC-M over the government decision to create the Senate as the Upper Chamber of the 
Parliament of Zimbabwe.  
The use of the race card by Mugabe to regain his fading popularity at home after losing the 
referendum gave him adequate guarantees of support from the war veterans who in 1997 had been 
given gratuities of $50 000 each.541 Consequently, war veterans were easily systematically 
mobilised and deployed as ambassadors in resolving the land problem that colonialism had 
created.542 Chung admits the political acumen and the intellectual sophistication in Mugabe. His 
political skills in the 2002 presidential elections were demonstrated by his consistent attempts to 
portray the presidential race internally as black versus white, and internationally as the west (USA 
and Britain) versus Africa.543The CCJPZ report further discusses advertisements for Mugabe on 
television and state-controlled newspapers that consistently referred to the MDC as a British-led 
opposition and its leader, Tsvangirai as Judas Iscariot.544This was a biblical analogue that equated 
Judas Iscariot who, because of the love of money, sold out his master to the Jews for crucifixion 
in the same manner Tsvangirai was, according to ZANU-PF, selling the country, notably the land, 
to the former colonisers for the love of money. It was not surprising that in the 2002 presidential 
and subsequent elections, African leaders endorsed the election results that Mugabe had won 
despite glaring evidence of electoral fraud and manipulation on a grand scale.  
The liberation narratives of the ruling ZANU-PF party were re-invigorated towards the 2002 
presidential elections. New strategies were deployed to blackmail the nascent opposition MDC 
party. ZANU-PF mobilised war veterans to make pilgrimages to ZANLA bases in Mozambique 
that had been subjected to aerial bombardment by the Smith regime during the war and towards 
the finalization of the 1979 Lancaster Constitutional Conference. Such pilgrimages brought 
reminiscences of the experiences that the war veterans had gone through and of how they survived 
                                                 
541 N. Kriger, (2000). Zimbabwe today: hope against grim realities. Review of African Political Economy, 27(85), p. 
444.  
542 M. Adelmann, (2004). Quiet diplomacy, p. 250. 
543 CCJPZ. (2002). The presidential elections; March 9, 10, 11 2002. 
544 Ibid. 
 
149 
 
the military onslaughts of the white regime. To be part of the teams that visited Chimoio, 
Nyadzonia and other ZANLA bases in Mozambique was to undergo an emotional experience. 
Mass graves at Chimoio and Nyadzonya were stark reminders to the war veterans that back home, 
the opposition parties should not be allowed to compromise the independence that the country now 
enjoyed. That hardened their resolve to deal with the MDC in the same manner they would deal 
with the whites who were alleged to have supported the ‘no’ vote in the 2000 referendum that was 
so clear in what the government’s position was about land repossession and redistribution. Medium 
spirits of reputation accompanied the war veterans as a way of showing that the exercise had 
blessings from custodians of African culture and tradition, and to give legitimacy to the land 
redistribution that was already underway.  
ZANU-PF became synonymous with Zimbabwe in the sense that there was no separation of power 
between ZANU-PF and the state. In terms of the socialist vanguard approach which specifically 
hailed the supremacy of the party all the way,545 national institutions are subordinated to party 
interests, and not the other way around. From another perspective, a state party or a party state are 
juxtaposed concepts in political circles and in Zimbabwe, they point to the capture of the state by 
ZANU-PF, a development which has made it difficult for the opposition to win elections and take 
power, even when the electorate overwhelmingly voted for it. 
The next presidential elections were held in March 2008 and they were harmonised with the 
parliamentary and council elections for the first time in the history of electoral politics in the 
country. The land issue was ZANU-PF’s rallying point. By then much of the white-owned land 
had been confiscated for redistribution under Models A1 and A2. In the first round of presidential 
elections, Tsvangirai won by 47 percent against Mugabe’s 4 percent, but failed to win an absolute 
majority for him to be able to form a government. This was even though it took ZEC about five 
weeks to announce the winner, raising suspicions that the results could have been doctored to give 
ZANU-PF a second chance. As Chisi laments: “You cannot explain a victory of an opposition and 
holding of results for thirty days. No explanation for that [is given] and finally the winner had to 
humble himself to become a subordinate of a loser to form a GNU.”546 This was a direct reference 
to the 2008 first round of presidential elections that did not count for the opposition because it 
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failed to get an absolute majority. However, so worrying to the voters was the announcement of 
presidential results which delayed by more than a month. To complicate matters, the principle of 
‘absolute majority’ got different interpretations: whether it meant 51 percent or 50 percent plus 1 
remained unclear. This seems to resonate with the view that in Zimbabwe, opposition parties can 
win votes and seats while being denied victory.547  
Masunungure states that there is evidence to suggest that the regime concluded that its party had 
failed in the March 2008 presidential elections and so the military should lead the march to the 27 
June elections which was the date set for the election run-off.548 Masunungure remarks that 
Mugabe had to institute a military style leadership to campaign for him in the re-run and this was 
not without violence to coerce voters and reduce the contest to a battle between the bullet and the 
ballot.549 The military, the bulk of whom were former fighters of the ZANLA outfit, accepted their 
deployment in villages and communities that they served during the armed struggle and there, they 
used their familiarity with the peasants to relive the Chimurenga networks which were instrumental 
in regaining electoral support for ZANU-PF. The Operation Makavhotera Papi (Operation Who 
did you vote for) code-named CIBD (Coercion, intimidation, beating, displacement) sought to 
identify and punish those who did not vote for Mugabe in the March 2008 elections.550 Throughout 
the period from 2000, ZANU-PF reverted to the use of chiefs, soldiers and the police using fear 
management, mobilisation and electoral processes. In Komichi’s views, the President, under 
circumstances of fierce political competition surrounded himself with several layers of protection: 
he became unreachable, became king, became ‘God’ to be worshipped as the Almighty, and people 
were subdued to the whole setup of that nature.551 
The state monopoly over control of media was damaging to the opposition political parties. Chisi 
laments the style of reportage in the Herald newspaper in Harare and the Chronicle newspaper in 
Bulawayo during the Gukurahundi era. There was much negative reporting on dissidents while the 
newspapers were silent on the mass graves and the mass killings of the Ndebele people who were 
alleged to be supporting their destabilisation campaigns against the government of ZANU-
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PF.552  The Chronicle, located in Matabeleland, could not report on the mass killings and 
disturbances in Matabeleland because it belonged to the public media controlled by ZANU-PF. 
Chisi asserts that “the Chronicle is given ‘copy and paste’ articles [for publication]. The headline 
in The Herald becomes the headline in The Chronicle as if there is no news in Matabeleland.”553 
Mashakada posits that ZANU-PF staffed newspapers and media houses with their own 
functionaries.554 He relates the bombing of the Daily News offices by state functionaries, yet it was 
the voice of the people at that time. He also relates to the TV programme called “Face of the 
Nation” in which he, on behalf of the MDC, debated against David Chapfika of ZANU-PF whom 
he outperformed, and another between Learnmore Jongwe and Jonathan Moyo which produced 
similar results.555 That led to the banning of the MDC from state television, and the banning of 
Tsvangirai’s face from television. It shows that media’s role became pervasive to the 
disadvantaged of the opposition.  
The promulgation of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and POSA 
prior to the 2002 elections constrained the opposition in several ways. Commenting on the AIPPA 
Bill, Edson Zvobgo declared the unconstitutionality of twenty of its provisions thus:  
The original Bill was manifestly unconstitutional. As chairman of your committee, I can 
say without equivocation that this Bill, in its original form, was the most calculated and 
determined assault on the liberties guaranteed by the constitution in the twenty years I 
served as Cabinet Minister.556  
It was POSA that led to Tsvangirai’s torture and arrest in 2002 on treasonous charges because of 
a clause relating d to insurgency and banditry. The two pieces of legislation cushioned Mugabe 
from open criticism and criminalised frank debates on the state.  
Viewers had no alternative sources of news and information particularly after the 2008 March 
presidential elections that were won by MDC. The ZTV and ZBC complemented the efforts of the 
state newspapers in disseminating information regarding opposition parties. They were viewed as 
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western-backed and as parties that were devoid of any liberation credentials. Before the election 
run-off scheduled for June 2008 to decide the winner between Tsvangirai and Mugabe, these state 
institutions spread messages about the intentions of the opposition parties to return the country to 
whites. This campaign was augmented by the deployment ZANU(PF) supporters, government 
officials, ‘war veterans’ and state security forces who conducted brutal daily ‘re-education’ 
meetings in which they beat and tortured residents, forcing them to denounce the MDC, swear 
allegiance to ZANU(PF)557 and vote ‘correctly’ in the June Presidential re-run. The song Ndimi 
Mega (You Alone) was popularised and repeatedly sung on the state-controlled radio stations that 
were operative from around 2008. The ‘singular mentality’ elevated Mugabe to the level of 
infallibility and indispensability, where the ruling party made serious claims that the country could 
not progress in the desired direction without him, and that he should rule for as long as he lived. 
He was regarded as irreplaceable. News on television and radio, or any reference to the President 
on the electronic and mass media platforms, portrayed Mugabe as the epitome and guardian of the 
sovereignty of Zimbabwe and Africa. Chisi admitted that ZANU-PF would, for as long as Mugabe 
was alive, remain a very sophisticated party.558  
It can be anticipated that Mugabeism has become in Zimbabwe, a philosophy whose legacy might 
live on even after his death because of how deeply entrenched the philosophy has become in all 
institutions of the state. McLaughlin, Chisi, Chung and Coltart in their interviews intimate that 
ZANU-PF remains a difficult party to beat because it has its party machinery all over the country, 
aside from the regional solidarity that comes from support from organisations such as the South 
West Africa People’s Organisation in Namibia, and the ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, as 
well as the leaders of those countries. Mugabe was described as the “Godfather” of the African 
Revolution and was addressed by a chain of titles such as ‘His Excellency, the President of the 
Republic of Zimbabwe, Head of State and Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Zimbabwe Defence Forces.’ Some were reminded of the titles that Idi Amin, the president of 
Uganda from 1971 up to 1979 who was also addressed as ‘His Excellency, President for Life, Field 
Marshal Al  Hadji  Doctor Idi Amin Dada, Lord of all the Beasts of the Earth and Fishes of the 
Sea and Conqueror of the British Empire in Africa in General and Uganda in particular.’559The 
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rural areas were sealed off and the opposition could not penetrate them to sell their agendas and 
defend themselves. The government, which indeed was the ruling party, violated a constitutional 
provision which states that all people must access media. Since the land reform that was started in 
2000, the media has been used to fan factionalism and violence, and opposition parties were denied 
room to express themselves and to appeal to the public through the Zimbabwean media platform. 
5.4 OPPOSITION COUNTER-NARRATIVES: EVALUATING ITS POLITICAL 
TRAJECTORY 
Several opposition parties have been formed since 1980. The presence of opposition parties, most 
of which have appeared on the political scene and have since disappeared, such as ZANU Ndonga 
under Ndabaningi Sithole; ZUD under Margret Dongo, a former freedom fighter under ZANLA 
forces; ZUM under Edgar Tekere; Democratic Party under Emmanuel Magoche; former Chief 
Dumbutshena’s Forum Party, among others, makes it difficult to characterise Zimbabwe as a 
dictatorship. Each of these parties had supporters, thus demonstrating one of the democratic tenets 
of freedom to belong to an organisation of one’s choosing, or even the freedom to differ.  All of 
the parties failed to dislodge Mugabe in their quest to bring real democracy that could go beyond 
the mere holding of elections on a regular basis in accordance with the constitution. The 
explanation given is that they were permitted to freely operate because they offered no serious 
challenge to ZANU-PF.  One good example was Dzinemunhenzva, from Wedza who, in every 
election, was a presidential candidate, but beyond his grinding mill, nothing was heard about his 
African Political Party. These opposition parties failed to offer credible policies to the electorate 
upon which to build a strong economy to achieve long-term development.560None of them 
succeeded in mobilising the rural electorate due to financial constraints. Mashakada alludes to the 
fact that the early democratic formations failed to galvanise people adequately enough and they 
did not come up with a new narrative of change because they were all pitied in the liberation mold 
without breaking the barrier. Mashakada and Coltart agree that the opposition formations that came 
before the MDC in 1999 failed because they were not clear on statecraft, on the ideological thrust 
to take in terms of developing the economy, and on the alliances that they needed to build to secure 
electoral victory. As Coltart puts it, opposition parties have been their own worst enemies in two 
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respects: either policy did not so much divide them but personalities, or their party positions have 
been irreconcilable.561  
The opposition narrative of change is implicit and central in the name of the main opposition MDC 
party that was founded in 1999. All interviewees agreed that the opposition had counter-narratives 
except Mandiwanzira, who felt that they did not have any because the agenda they were pursuing 
was not their own indigenous ones.562 He gives reference to the opposition taking western neo-
liberal positions that were irrelevant to the situation on the ground, resulting in confusion “when 
they hit against a brick wall.”563 This argument can further be developed along the line that when 
the opposition MDC was popularising and theorizing western ideals such as the rule of law, good 
governance and human rights, among many other ideals, ZANU-PF was being practical, going out 
and parceling out land to the people. Mandiwanzira is supported in this argument by Kori 
who   opined that the opposition was not clear on the land reform programme and that by insisting 
on an orderly land redistribution programme, respecting property rights, the need for a new 
constitution, and the replacement of the obsolete Lancaster Constitution, they took the narrative of 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that were regarded as an opposition mouthpiece.564 The 
government regarded the MDC’s neo-liberal tendencies as an attempt to get the support of friends 
from overseas who could sponsor them. What emerged clearly from the responses on the issue of 
opposition counter-narratives was the attempt by interviewees to link opposition solely with the 
MDC. 
The opposition ‘MDC is a name that can be unpacked as follows. A movement refers to interest 
groups, organisations, associations and civil society coming together for a common good, even if 
their interests are either irreconcilable or at variance with each other. The only challenge with a 
movement is that when what united the disparate groups in the beginning ceases to exist, each 
segment can recoil into its cocoon. If the movement is set to continue after a real or perceived 
common enemy disappears, fissures inevitably occur and often with devastating effect. 
‘Democratic’ derived from ‘democracy’ assumes that the operating environment is 
characteristically authoritarian and the ordinary people do not enjoy political rights to determine 
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and choose their leaders, or to freely express themselves without fear. In Africa, some of the 
authoritarian political regimes are led by ‘democratic’ parties. Democracy is built on the 
assumption that the electorate is informed. Change becomes key to any meaningful transformation 
in each society, particularly where and when the leadership, or the ruling party, becomes clueless 
and is bereft of ideas after many years in control of the state. Again, change is not always positive, 
because the electorate could be swayed into voting for a more effective oppressive regime than the 
one being voted out. 
It is evident that it has been very difficult for the opposition political parties in Zimbabwe to 
communicate their policies to the electorate because they did not have access to the electronic 
media. Limited resources to disseminate and publish their manifestos compounded this existing 
challenge. Opposition budgets were stringent and the opposition could not exhaust the media 
platforms to sell their narratives. There was also general consensus from the respondents that 
public media in Zimbabwe, both print and electronic, were controlled by the ruling ZANU-PF 
party. Mutsvangwa was alone in arguing that MDC did not have its own narrative to sell to the 
people because it was a concoction of conflicting interests, with different organisations getting 
united only to push ZANU-PF out of power.565 On the contrary, Maziriri, who belonged to the 
same ZANU-PF party with Mutsvangwa, insisted that the opposition MDC had a strong counter-
narrative, which was the reason why in 2008, ZANU-PF had no option but to get into the GNU 
after losing in the first round of elections.566 He believes that it was the opposition’s positive 
narrative that resulted in urbanites voting for MDC since 2000 as it appealed to the unemployed 
but educated young people who dismissed the ZANU-PF’s liberation narrative.567 According to 
Maziriri, the opposition MDC narrative was a product, just like a ZANU-PF product, which, 
nonetheless, did not get them into office, but got them something by way of participating in the 
GNU. 
One of the challenges confronting opposition political parties in Zimbabwe has been their failure 
to associate their opposition with the liberation struggle. Kori argues  that it was difficult to support 
the liberation narrative or the land reform programme since this would have seen them being 
labeled as ZANU-PF supporters, or at the very least, they would not have been distinguished from 
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ZANU-PF.568 Kori and Chung intimate that land is democracy and the reluctance by the opposition 
to support land, which in itself was a key element of democracy, went against what the name 
‘MDC’ stands for. MDC did not have its roots in the liberation struggle and so it did not have a 
liberation struggle narrative. The basis of this argument is that if one is in opposition, supporting 
ZANU-PF-initiated programmes such as land redistribution and indigenisation of the economy 
would throw them into the ZANU-PF ‘enemy camp.  Kori argues that the opposition could have 
been relevant to people if it did not oppose for the sake of opposition: it could have embraced land 
reform as a policy, developed its own land narrative within the framework of that which already 
existed, then tried to improve it in terms of what people wanted as well as what was in the best 
interests of the country. To summarise Kori’s views, for the opposition to be associated with the 
historical liberation narrative and gain support, there was need for it to improve on the existing 
ZANU-PF narratives of land and war. 
ZANU-PF espoused three distinct narratives. The first on land revolved around the redistribution 
of land that was by 2000 still essentially under the control of white farmers in the Highveld which 
is the richest of all the regions in Zimbabwe in terms of soil type and mineral resources. The land 
narrative was presented in such a way that it appeared that the MDC was not interested in the land 
question, and once it got into power it would return land to the whites. The land narrative became 
important to the government under ZANU-PF as a reaction to its defeat in the referendum of 2000 
which the opposition regarded as an outcome of a strong counter-narrative. The Southern African 
Development Corporation (SADC), at the height of the state orchestrated violent land campaigns 
in Zimbabwe, acted as if that country’s liberation struggle was still underway.569 The South 
African ANC was also accused of ideologically supporting Mugabe’s undemocratic policies 
pertaining to land as a future land redistribution model for South Africa.570  
The second narrative, the liberation narrative, was predicated on the Zanufication of the struggle 
for the independence of Zimbabwe, making ZANU-PF the sole liberator of the country from 
colonialism. This narrative also sought to deify ZANU-PF in perpetuity for ‘dying’ for the sake of 
independence. This suggests that the ruling party was still cast in the liberation mould, a 
development which made the party remain a liberation party, as opposed to a political party, after 
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independence.571 The violence that became a characteristic feature in land restitution programmes 
was driven by such a narrative that regarded the war, or the revolution, as still incomplete and 
ongoing. Mandiwanzira argues that the liberation struggle was not won on the basis of firepower 
alone, but also because of mobilisation by freedom fighters, political prisoners and former 
detainees of the Smith regime who spread the messages that the people were able to internalize.572 
People in all regions of Zimbabwe already knew the importance of independence and what it meant 
to them, according to this argument, so they could not abandon a party with liberation war 
credentials. 
Contrary to this argument, Chisi dismissed all interpretations of liberation, and posits that the only 
liberation narrative, by definition, is the one that includes what is contained in the 2013 
Constitution that is operative currently. He also reviews the ZANU-PF liberation narrative as elitist 
not only because it supersedes the general sentiments of the citizens, but also because it was 
propaganda disseminated to reach the electorate using state-controlled media and an abusive state 
machinery to enforce wrong narratives. The opposition parties have not been able to outwit ZANU-
PF’s liberation war rhetoric because ZANU-PF has continued to do what it had promised to do 
during the liberation war. 
The third narrative was that of regime change with which all opposition parties were linked. It is 
interesting to note how ZANU-PF used it to undermine opposition and to give itself title deeds to 
the state as protector and guarantor of the sovereignty and values of the country. Coltart argues 
that even in a free and fair election, it was unlikely that any other political party would have fared 
well against ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU because of their legacy of ending minority rule in the 
country and that earned them respect from a majority of the electorate.573 He further intimates that 
ZANU-PF could not rely on its liberation credentials during 1997  and 1998 when opposition to 
its rule gathered strength following the country’s participation in a war in the DRC574 in which 
Zimbabwe was spending over thirty million Zimbabwe dollars daily in financing a war in support 
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of Laurent Kabila.575 That was not sustainable in a country facing diminishing foreign currency 
reserves due to ESAP that had led to the closure of many big foreign-owned companies. 
Edgar Tekere and Margret Dongo, both of whom were war veterans in the Second Chimurenga, 
broke away from ZANU-PF to form ZUM and ZUD respectively when land was not an issue 
because the government still honoured the Lancaster constitutional provisions in relation to 
property rights. The MDC was formed in 1999 under the leadership of charismatic trade unionists 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda, both of whom had experience in labour politics and 
appealed to urban workers who had no interest in land. The MDC’s urban support base unsettled 
the government that conversely had rural constituencies on its side for political support. It can be 
argued that the MDC gained urban support at a time when ZANU-PF’s popularisation of the land 
and liberation narratives reached peak levels and when, after the referendum, emotions were 
allowed to reign over reason, resulting in events becoming ‘real war.’ As Mashakada puts it, 
ZANU-PF has played these narratives to their advantage, capitalizing on the yesteryear fears of 
the rural people about war and whites and the brutality of the Smith regime.576 
The ‘no’ vote in the 2000 referendum was interpreted by ZANU-PF as a reflection of the potential 
of opposition forces to unseat it. The MDC, according to Mashakada, made the “mistake” of 
winning the referendum, hence alerting ZANU-PF of the possible demise that awaited it in the 
2000 parliamentary and 2002 presidential elections.577 This analysis partly underscores the violent 
nature of these elections. Violence was used as a justificatory myth to subvert the opposition that 
was allegedly being sponsored by the western countries to effect regime change. The government 
led by ZANU-PF could not adopt a new constitution because of this defeat. It has been argued that 
most people in rural areas did not have time to read the heavily-worded draft constitution which 
demanded much more time to read than was available before the plebiscite. The ‘no’ response to 
the plebiscite was a protest vote ostensibly not against the contents of the draft, but against the 
incumbent regime for presiding over a country with worsening economic conditions due to ESAP. 
The MDC got 57 against 62 for ZANU-PF and one seat for Ndabaningi Sithole’s ZANU Ndonga 
in the 120-member parliament in the 2000 parliamentary elections578 in the face of state 
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orchestrated violence against the opposition, which strategy worked more in the rural than in urban 
areas.  
To the MDC-T, gaining 57 parliamentary seats was a “victory” for democracy in that the legislative 
hegemony that ZANU-PF had enjoyed unchallenged for twenty years was finally broken.   It was 
a sign that the balloon of ZANU-PF’s invincibility could be pricked if opposition was organised 
around a narrative that was more appealing to the electorate than the one on land that were made 
aware of. The decline of ZANU-PF support in parliament was perhaps an indication that the land 
narrative was losing significance and did not have the same potency for support mobilisation even 
in rural areas. Evidence of the continuation of the protest vote was exhibited in the same 2000 
parliamentary elections in urban areas where opposition candidates who were totally unknown 
were elected with margins as wide as 70 to 80 percent, and this was a prediction for the likely 
outcome for the 2002 presidential elections.579 The Tsvangirai-led MDC beat ZANU-PF under 
Mugabe again by 47.9 percent to 43.2 percent in the Presidential results of the harmonised 
elections held in March in 2008.580The opposition used the declining importance and popularity of 
the incumbent regime to build their own counter-narrative. 
Dzinashe Machingura, a war veteran and former senior commander of ZANLA forces, joined the 
opposition MDC arguing that there was need for a reinterpretation of the liberation struggle outside 
the ZANU-PF narrative that premised it on land alone. To him, the liberation struggle 
encompassed political, social, economic and cultural aspects and those who shouted the slogan 
‘land is the economy’ were the real opponents of the land reform programme.581 Quite importantly, 
Chung refers to ‘Dzino’ Machingura who, despite being a war veteran, crossed over to join 
Tsvangirai’s MDC, but was not given a post in the party. She concludes that Tsvangirai had many 
opportunities which he did not utilize, including having Machingura on his side, and argues that 
MDC never had its roots in the liberation struggle.582 Such an analysis becomes problematic given 
the fact that MDC was a post liberation political outfit and, as such, did not claim to have its roots 
in the liberation. More importantly, however, having a war veteran in the MDC party and giving 
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that person the vote would not have automatically and necessarily have benefited give party, for 
some, in fact, contend, that such individuals infiltrated the MDC which, in fact, contributed to the 
2005 split within the MDC.  
Opposition parties argued that they, indeed, had alternative narratives to the ones that ZANU-PF 
had repeatedly used to remain in power. There are numerous manuals in opposition party offices 
that contain counter-narratives such as democracy, human rights, freedom of expression, new 
generation issues, non-violence, christianity, love, forgiveness, national healing and health among 
others.583 These, according to Coltart, are said to be narratives couched in neo-liberal democracy 
discourses and are deemed to be more powerful than liberation narratives which could hardly be 
understood by people born after the war.584 The challenge for the opposition parties, Coltart 
insisted, was their inability to access the electronic media which was wholly controlled by ZANU-
PF.  Coltart also described the conditions under which the opposition political parties had to 
communicate their policies to the electorate as exceptionally difficult, and this was compounded 
by the fact that they had limited resources to disseminate their views or to have their manifestos 
published for public consumption.585 Radio stations in Zimbabwe are all owned by ZANU-PF 
politicians and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of state-controlled newspapers are also all 
ZANU-PF aligned, and around half the civil society groups are Central Intelligence Organisation  
(CIO) members who are appendages of the state.586 The Herald, Chronicle, Manica Post, 
Kwaedza, and The Zimbawean are all state newspapers which do not strike a balance in their 
reporting and no one from outside can penetrate these media houses that are rigidly controlled by 
the state. There is a very strong media setup run by government Ministers on the one hand, and 
Executives recruited based on party loyalty, on the other. One such radio station is Z-FM owned 
by Super Mandiwanzira, the Minister of Information Technology. Thirty to forty percent of the 
so-called Independent media was run by people who were wedded to ZANU-PF.587 Independent 
media was only independent to the extent that newspapers were privately owned, but ZANU-PF 
controlled their editorial policies and this act alone took take away that independence. 
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Because of limited space for opposition political parties to disseminate their political views to 
counter ZANU-PF narratives, use was made by opponents of ZANU-PF, and continues to be made, 
of diasporic radio stations such as the VOA Studio 7 which broadcasts from Botswana and USA, 
the Short Wave and Radio Africa that beamed into Zimbabwe from US and UK. Even then, these 
stations were jammed by means of Chinese-sourced jamming technology which Biener (2008) 
referred to as Bob’s Fire Dragon.588 That involved erecting communication barriers to block 
alternative media influences and make it difficult for consumers to benefit, and for the opposition 
to articulate its counterpoise. What further worsened the situation for the opposition, particularly 
the MDC, was that Studio 7 as a broadcasting station was controlled by its broadcasting ethics and 
it did not want to be portrayed as an opposition radio station. That was the reason the station 
interviewed politicians from across the political spectrum in Zimbabwe, including both the MDC 
and ZANU-PF. The MDC increased its visibility internationally when ZANU-PF was still 
reluctant to be associated with a station that reported on it negatively. When it finally elected to 
also participate in the Studio 7 radio programmes, the decision stifled the MDC as its ideological 
monopoly was lost. Studio 7 programmes that pitted ZANU-PF and MDC against each other in 
debates transferred the battle for control of the state of Zimbabwe to Botswana, as presenters took 
the opportunity to size each other up and outwit each other. The opposition parties have always 
proffered counter-narratives which, however, failed to reach out to the people because this single 
station was insufficient to counter the state monopoly of the media within Zimbabwe itself. 
Opposition parties can do little other than reaching out to people in their own local communities 
and hoping to spread the message widely. In contrast, ZANU-PF has had monopoly over the media, 
both electronic and print, as well as over the use of force to induce acceptance of its narrative on 
the electorate. 
5.5 MILITARISATION OF ELECTORAL PROCESSES: STATE-SANCTIONED 
OPERATIONS, VOTER DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND PARTISAN POLITICAL 
IMPUNITY 
Hardliners within the ranks of the war veterans made repeated references to the liberation and land 
narratives as the cornerstone for the survival of ZANU-PF when the opposition challenge grew 
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stronger. General Zvinavashe, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) commander, with support 
from the military and state security personnel, became a crucial cog in the ZANU-PF machine 
when it was almost certain that Tsvangirai would win the 2000 presidential elections. He made the 
following declaration:  
We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organisations 
will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, 
traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-
won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. The highest 
office in land is a straitjacket.  Whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the 
liberation struggle. We will…not accept, let alone support or salute anyone with a different 
agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.589  
This was the first public statement from the military and security organisations since 
independence. It indicated that the army and the police, other security services notwithstanding, 
had abandoned the barracks to become fully engaged in exclusionary politics. The stated position 
of military leaders and high-ranking security personnel not to salute anyone ‘with a different 
agenda’ from theirs as stated above, remained in force up to the 2008 run-off elections which saw 
the opposition MDC losing about 300 of its activists who were murdered allegedly by ZANU-PF 
agents. Among those murdered were Tonderai Ndira, Godfrey Kauzani and Cain Nyevhe.590 There 
was, however, no one caught and proven to be from ZANU-PF. Such information remains 
secretive  which makes Raftopoulos argue that given the extra-judicial killings and displacements 
following the defeat of Mugabe in March 2008, the impunity with which people perceived to 
support the political opposition have been murdered suggests that this was an official policy of the 
state.591 One of the elements of impunity592 in Zimbabwe, according to Amnesty International was 
the role of the government in taking steps to obscure or prevent the identification of the state agents 
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in perpetrating human rights violations and human rights defenders and the independent media 
were barred from investigating and publishing such accounts.593  
The rigid political stance that the military pursued, which did not hide the quasi-military formation 
of ZANU-PF at the time, held sway through to the GNU in 2009 when Tsvangirai became PM. 
The Council of Ministers that he chaired in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) was predominantly ZANU-PF and it declined to acknowledge him as such.  It is therefore 
important to consider the military factor in the politics of the country after 2000, and how it 
interfered with election outcomes. The voter apathy that crept into Zimbabwean elections since 
2000 was believed to have been caused by the involvement of the military in politics which made 
elections ‘exercises in wasting time’ because results were preordained before people voted.  
The influence of the military leadership in passing decisions about who was to rule the country has 
its precedence in the events surrounding the nomination of Robert Mugabe in 1975 by the ZANLA 
High Command as president of ZANU.  Mhanda and Chung concur that members of the ZIPA, 
among whom were Wilfred Mhanda, Elias Hondo, Augustus Mudzingwa, James Nyikadzinashe, 
Tendai Pfepherere and David Todlana were imprisoned for demanding transparency in the running 
of ZANU’s affairs following the ouster of Ndabaningi Sithole in 1975.594 Mhanda writes from the 
point of view that he was personally involved in the fracas and he was imprisoned for his 
complicity in the plot to undermine Mugabe’s nomination to the leadership of the party. The much 
talked about elections of 2008 in March and June for the first round and re-run respectively, in a 
way, generated criticism about the validity of the electoral system in the country, and the openness 
of the institutions that regulated them, such as ZEC and the RG’s office.  Following the June 2008 
run-off election, the Zanufication of state institutions became an obstacle for opposition parties to 
challenge state power because the people in key positions were ZANU-PF loyalists and apologists, 
one of whom was Tobaiwa Mudede, the Registrar-General and outspoken pro-Mugabe official 
responsible for all national elections in the country and, according to Smiles, the man who knew 
the secrets about Mugabe’s re-election over years.595  
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A statement by Joseph Stalin that in elections, people who cast the votes decide nothing, and people 
who count the votes decide everything aptly describes election scenarios in Zimbabwe since 2000. 
It was not for nothing that Dorman wrote an article entitled ‘Make sure they count nicely this time’ 
to refer the 2005 elections.596 In the 2008 re-run elections, democracy was put to shame when 
Mugabe asked in protest: “Should one just write an X and then the country  goes like that?”597 The 
statement testifies to his belief in the uselessness attached to elections in general, and to multiparty 
voting in particular. It defied the logic of holding the same elections in the first place. The 
electorate was likely dispirited knowing that they would be voting to change nothing, and when it 
was implicit in the president’s stupefying statement that elections were merely window-dressing 
public national exercises calculated to proffer an aura of democratic participation in a system that 
was essentially seen as being averse to ballot outcomes. It was a question of the ballot and the 
bullet, or perhaps both in this case. The army adopted a militaristic approach to the conduct of 
elections, leading to military operations that targeted the opposition. These operations included 
Operation Wavhotera papi? (“Who did you vote for?”), Operation Murambatsvina (Clean up the 
mess) in 2005, Operation Dzikisai Madhishi (Pull down satellite dishes), Operation Chigunwe 
chakatsvuka here? (Is your finger red), Operation Chimumumu (Operation [pretend] you were 
born speechless) in 2010. The military was involved in all the operations. 
Operation Murambatsvina was a government project to forcibly evict potential voters who had been driven 
by poverty from rural areas into urban centres. The reason, ostensibly, was that increasing urban populations 
generated enormous pressure on urban resources and infrastructure leading to anti-social behaviour in the 
densely populated locations. From a moralistic point of view, the move was meant to de-congest urban areas 
which had become havens for illicit deals by the unemployed youths. Sceptics such as Clarke598and  
Musoni599 have queried the timing of this operation which was meant to coincide with hotly contested urban 
elections throughout the country. It was carried out when opposition support in urban areas had risen to greater 
heights. This view is shared by Harris who views Operation Murambatsvina as a symptomatic of various 
governmental anxieties about loss of control of the urban population irrespective of political affiliation.600 
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From the official government position, Operation Murambatsvina was designed to eliminate flea markets that 
had become the havens of illegal foreign currency dealings and to prevent the country from being subjected 
to the economy of accumulation.601 Politically, the operation served to weaken or dilute opposition power 
bases by disenfranchising potential urban voters, first by destroying their shacks and secondly, by demanding 
residence documents as pre-requisite for voting in the 2008 election. Operation ‘Pull Down all Satellite 
Dishes’ followed the defeat of ZANU-PF in the March 2008 elections. It was designed to prevent the 
electorate from accessing news from across the borders, forcing civilians to listen to local news and 
programmes as ZANU-PF planned for a major comeback in the June re-run of the same year. There was wide 
coverage on the political situation in Zimbabwe by various local and foreign media houses and the 
government wanted to shut out all this from the public. Operation ‘Chimumumu’ forced voters to pretend on 
the voting day in June 2008 that they were unable to read so that the election personnel would choose the 
candidate to vote for on their behalf. Operation ‘Is your Finger Red’ being a follow-up to the voters to check 
whether every eligible voter had cast a vote by having his finger dipped in red ink. 
5.6 THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY (GNU), 2009-2013 
Zimbabwe and Britain were deadlocked when the land reform programme was fast-tracked even 
when the Cotonou Agreement that Zimbabwe was part of, provided for a transparent process that 
respected property rights. The FTLRP alienated whites to begin with, in order to give legitimacy 
to the farm dispossessions that subsequently followed. Mugabe and his close lieutenants used land 
as their main campaign theme, but the massive farm invasions and organised violence that went 
with them were a direct consequence of the 2000 referendum.602 According to Cawthra603 that was 
when Mugabe followed hard on the formation of the newly-formed MDC alliance. The path to a 
violent land redistribution programme was set by Chenjerai ‘Hitler’ Hunzvi who led war veterans 
and ZANU-PF youth, backed by party militias and CIO to administer selective violence on white 
farmers, farm workers, MDC activists, rural teachers, and rural nurses suspected of belonging to 
the opposition.604 Such violence became the trademark for ZANU-PF land campaigns as the Third 
Chimurenga intensely unfolded after 2000.  
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The SADC position on the crisis unfolding in the country was ambivalent. It concurred with 
Mugabe that the crisis was principally over land, and once the land question was resolved, the 
crisis would be resolved. That stance was exhibited when at a SADC summit congratulated 
Zimbabwe on the successful land redistribution, yet it remained silent on the human rights 
abuses605 which impacted directly on these countries as it led to the diaspora phenomenon by 
Zimbabwean citizens into neighbouring South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique and even 
abroad. In the 2000 and 2002 elections, repression, violence against civilians, harassment and 
intimidation of media personnel went far above that in all other countries in the SADC region, and 
scored higher than even Angola and DRC, two countries in the region with a reputation for such 
abuses.606 The 2005 elections were also declared free and fair by SADC based on reports from its 
observers.607 It is, therefore, important to highlight the mandate of SADC to show the extent of its 
effectiveness or lack thereof, when member states made breaches of its protocols. Zimbabwe is a 
case in point that can be used to measure SADC’s responses to the impunity with which the 
governing elite in ZANU-PF had used state resources and institutions to encourage lawlessness.608  
When the standoff between ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC reached peak levels after the 2005 
elections, in 2007, SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki to become the principal mediator at an 
emergency summit held in Dar es Salaam although the MDC doubted his impartiality.609 Of 
interest was the June 2008 run-off from which the MDC withdrew citing violence. Botswana and 
Zambia broke ranks with Zimbabwe as a result and for that reason, SADC was widely criticised 
for intentionally condoning human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law and repression 
particularly when, in 2009, Zimbabwe was not on the official agenda of the SADC 2009 meeting, 
despite its continued gross violations of human rights.610 Mugabe threatened the organisation that 
if it tried to do ‘silly things’, Zimbabwe would pull out of SADC.611  It can be said with 
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reasonableness that SADC remained essentially a conservation organisation which relied for its 
survival on the goodwill and consensus of its members. It can also be argued that Mbeki had to 
settle on ‘Quiet Diplomacy’ as the only viable approach to deal with Mugabe since Britain and 
USA failed to create in Mugabe the person they wanted him to be. The overall framework of quiet 
diplomacy was predicated on the use of diplomacy, not sanctions or military action against 
Zimbabwe. With time, such diplomacy was construed to mean silent approval of what Mugabe 
was doing.612 Implementation of the policy by Mbeki was evident in the manner that both South 
Africa and SADC continued to defend Zimbabwe in international institutions such as the UN, 
Commonwealth, and the Africa-Caribbean Partnership (ACP) against western sanctions (ibid.).613 
It can be argued that Mbeki, referred to as ‘the point person’ by then US president George Bush 
when both UK and USA had failed to deal with Mugabe following an altercation between Mugabe 
and Tony Blair,614 played into Mugabe’s hands by supporting the nationalist rhetoric on land, 
which critics saw as having a corrupt element to it.  
The Cotonou Agreement that Zimbabwe was signatory to proclaimed that political and economic 
governance conditions were pre-requisite for development aid and free trade privileges.615 The 
good governance approach meant that the government of Zimbabwe was expected to deal with the 
land issue in a manner that was mutually inclusive and fair to all parties involved. Zimbabwe failed 
the test on this approach resulting in smart sanctions (which included travel bans and freezing of 
overseas assets) targeted at the inner circle of the Mugabe regime.616 In response, Mugabe 
announced that Zimbabwe was pulling out of the Commonwealth to which it was a member by 
virtue of it being a former colony of Britain. Mbeki adopted a new policy of “containment” to deal 
with the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe because it negatively affected the 
economies of SADC member states. Zimbabwe was put on the SADC agenda and Namibia, 
Angola, South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique were tasked to deal with the problem of the 
breakdown of the rule of law resulting from ‘farm invasions’.617 This line of thinking is alleged to 
have influenced the results of the 2002 Presidential poll that was characterised by violence and 
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vote rigging, yet South Africa and many other African countries declared them legitimate, but not 
free and fair.618  
The transformation from Southern Africa Development and Coordination Committee (SADCC), 
which was formed to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, to SADC in 1992, 
led to the transfer of sovereign rights of individual states to the regional level.619 Its focus shifted 
from regional cooperation to regional integration with priority being given to the politics of 
resistance to apartheid and colonialism.620 One of the weaknesses of SADC lay in its constitutional 
provision about elections within the member states. Each member state has veto power which it 
can exercise to defend what it considers as its sovereign rights and interests within SADC. The 
constitution gives national interests precedence over regional interests and priorities.621 SADC 
guidelines commit members states to follow agreed election practices, but these guidelines call for 
the resolution of election-related disputes such as those in Lesotho in 2007 and in Zimbabwe in 
2008 in accordance with their own national laws.622 In line with the SADC guidelines, the election 
crisis in Zimbabwe was a domestic issue which did not call for SADC intervention. The violence, 
torture, rape and other vices that were election-related could not be discussed at a SADC caucus 
because that would be a breach of the SADC guidelines. The fact that SADC was hamstrung in 
this regard meant that the democratic deficit remained a far cry for the people of Zimbabwe as 
SADC was powerless to influence the democratisation processes affecting one of its member 
states. Given the above debates, SADC’s record in dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe has been 
questionable. 
It has been argued that South Africa was complicit in the unraveling of Zimbabwe and that the 
crisis may have been averted in Zimbabwe if South Africa had acted swiftly to contain Mugabe.623 
It has also been argued that it was South Africa that prevented other member states within the 
organisation – Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana – from seeking a peaceful settlement of the 
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Zimbabwean crisis (ibid.). They wanted the mediation team to be enlarged and that way, its 
decisions would be collectively made in a much more transparent manner than having Mbeki to 
deal with Mugabe alone. If both South Africa and SADC had opposed Mugabe at an early stage, 
several interviewees conjectured he may have listened. 
The Global Political Agreement that came into existence in 2008 was brokered by Mbeki. It 
proposed the sharing of power between ZANU-PF and the opposition MDC, which had split into 
MDC-T and MDC-M in 2005. Tsvangirai became the PM, and was deputized by Arthur 
Mutambara, the leader of the other faction, MDC-M. Tsvangirai would chair the Council of 
Ministers and Mugabe, who retained the post of President, chaired the cabinet. There was fierce 
contestation for ministerial posts and ZANU-PF made sure it retained control of key ministries 
such as Defence and Security. Without going into the details of the GNU, what is important is to 
understand is that ZANU-PF retained power in the new dispensation, and the opposition was given 
ministries that were meant to clear up the mess that ZANU-PF had created, such as Finance and 
Local Government.  
Some issues remained contentious and unresolved, which led to growing suspicion within the 
uneasy coalition. The MDC demanded the replacement of the Attorney General (AG), who, in its 
view, had been responsible for the persecution of opposition members and their supporters in 
different parts of the country. To the MDC formations, the AG was a symbol of ZANU-PF 
impunity and brutality that had characterised the 2008 June run-off election which consequently 
led to Tsvangirai’s pulling out. The battle continued until and MDC gave up altogether. Another 
area of disagreement was the replacement of Security Service Chief by others who could be 
amenable to all parties to the coalition deal. As highlighted earlier, they were responsible for the 
militarisation of politics resulting in mayhem and despondency in the country. What incensed the 
opposition was that some of their key members who had played part in the formation of the MDC 
in 1999 had died under gruesome political circumstances and some had become disabled due to 
torture at the hands of state security agents. Again, this matter remained unresolved together with 
issue of the replacement of the Reserve Bank Governor, Gedion Gono. Roy Bennet, who had been 
arrested on treason charges for having been allegedly found in possession of illegal firearms before 
the Global Political Agreement (GPA), could not be released to participate as a free man in the 
GNU. The MDC had chosen him as their Agriculture Minister in the GNU which was another 
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Ministry that was allocated to the opposition. The decision not to release him defied the good 
working spirit that the GPA was supposed to generate. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the Third Chimurenga around which issues of democracy and political 
pluralism revolved. It analysed factors that made ZANU-PF reluctant to budge on the land issue 
and how policies such as indigenisation and empowerment were closely linked to the land issue. 
The Third Chimurenga was portrayed as a continuation of the colonial struggle for independence 
which would move Zimbabwe from its neo-colonial status to the achievement of full economic 
liberation for black Zimbabweans. The Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 was used as 
background to the political and economic crisis that affected Zimbabwe when President Mugabe 
used his Presidential powers to redistribute white -owned farms after the government suffered its 
first ever defeat in the 2000 plebiscite. The events between 2000 and 2008 were characteristic of 
a country in a “civil war” when it had become clear to ZANU-PF that its political support had 
diminished, and that the urban electorate had transferred its allegiance to the opposition MDC 
party that was formed in 1999. 
ZANU-PF narratives to do with land, the liberation war, and the threat of neo-colonialism 
masquerading as the opposition MDC party were disseminated through various media, both 
electronic and print. That involved the removal of whites from the definition of ‘citizens’ to 
‘enemies’. Public media became the channel to castigate the opposition in all the election 
campaigns that took place periodically in the country up to 2013. The opposition counter-
narratives appealed to the urban populace but failed to make real inroads into rural constituencies 
which had become no-go areas for opposition political parties. In fact, ZANU-PF supporters felt 
that they could act with impunity against opponents since no penalties were imposed on them if 
the victims were regarded as being from the opposition. The defeat of ZANU-PF in the harmonised 
2008 March elections led to the results of the presidential elections being withheld for five weeks. 
The people had spoken, but ZANU-PF, through the influence of the military, accepted the results 
as long as they did not give the opposition the electoral mandate to rule the country. The military 
establishment ensured that the re-run scheduled for June 2008 would not produce a repeat scenario 
by threatening the electorate with a resumption of war if they did not vote ‘correctly’ in the second 
round. The violence and intimidation of the voters and the opposition supporters led to a one-man 
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race after Tsvangirai withdrew. An analysis of how the state subverted the will of the people by 
means of coercion and repression, and how the government became an institution for the 
dispensation of selective justice on its enemies attracted world focus on Zimbabwe. That 
confirmed the view that elections in Zimbabwe are window-dressing national events for what is 
essentially a one-party state. It is noted that the post-independence electoral system reflected 
orientation towards one-party hegemony.  
The 2008 re-run internationalised the Zimbabwean conflict leading to the intervention of SADC, 
with Mbeki, the South African president, as mediator. The GPA was reached despite allegations 
that Mbeki and SADC openly supported the land redistribution that ZANU-PF was undertaking. 
The GNU that was formed in 2008 continued to be deadlocked in the distribution of posts, with 
ZANU-PF refusing to let go those ministries that represented power such as Defence among others. 
The alliance was not holy as ZANU-PF sought to create parallel structures outside the GNU and 
that stifled the operational and organisational capacity of the opposition. It was a chess-football or 
‘black-white’ anecdote, with ZANU-PF playing the more complicated chess while the opposition 
played football, a simpler sport.  The debates by the respondents also helped to shape some of the 
arguments pertaining to democracy and multiparty politics in Zimbabwe. From the archival and 
oral materials consulted in compiling this chapter, the legacy of violence, impunity, intimidation 
and repression is likely to live on post the Mugabe era as it has become deeply entrenched, and it 
will be challenging to create an environment conducive to free and fair elections and the 
development of robust multiparty democratic traditions.  
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CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DEMOCRATIC 
FORMATIONS WITHIN ZANU-PF (1980-2015) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
ZANU-PF’s hegemonic control of the state since independence in 1980 gives the impression that 
there was little real opposition to its rule. Subsequent elections in 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996 were 
contested by different parties and the results confirmed ZANU-PF’s electoral hegemony. 
Historical literature on multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe since 1980 has been submerged by the 
emergence of the post-liberation MDC party in 1999. The only serious challenge to the ruling 
ZANU-PF party in first decade after independence was PF-ZAPU which by 1987, ceased to exist 
after its co-optation into a broader ZANU-PF under the Unity Accord that was brokered by Canaan 
Banana.  
Fissures in the original ZANU, which were based on ethnic lines, were revealed in 1974 in Zambia 
when a group of disgruntled guerillas led by Dakarai Badza and Thomas Nhari plotted against 
their commander, Josiah Tongogara. The conspiracy was timed to coincide with the absence of 
Tongogara, the war commander, and Herbert Chitepo, the Chairman of the party at the time, who 
were in Romania, and when other members of the Dare (Supreme Revolutionary Council) such as 
Kumbirai Kangai, Rugare Gumbo and Rex Nhongo were also away, in China. Two ZANLA 
commanders, Lovemore Chikadaya and Peter Ngwenya were buried alive at Chifombo, the rebels 
base, for refusing to take part in the rebellion. Tongogara described the Nhari-Badza rebellion as 
an attempt to destroy the armed struggle. The conspiracy was aborted with the arrest and execution 
of Badza, Mataruse, Chemist Ncube, Cuthbert Chimedza, Nhari, Tichatonga and Matthew Ndanga 
at their new rebel base at Chifombo near Mozambique under an operation code-named 
‘Gukurahundi’, involving Tongogara with 250 newly trained cadres on Christmas Day.624 Tekere 
argues in his book that neither Mugabe nor Muzenda intervened to stop the executions until he 
[Tekere] addressed the people gathered at the trial saying: 
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May I implore you not to carry out this judgement. Let us agree now that we stop this 
execution and any other attempt to kill each other. The spirits which guide us in this war 
do not agree with these killings. Please let’s stop.625  
Chung suggests that Tongogara, from the Karanga group did not trust Chitepo, a Manyika, whom 
he accused of siding with the rebels, and the brewing tension culminated in the horrid 
circumstances under which Chitepo was killed in 1975 when a bomb planted in his car exploded. 
Kaunda arrested all key members of ZANU such as Earnest Kadungure, Josiah Tongogara and 
Kumbirai Kangai among others, having been convinced that the death of Chitepo was an ‘inside’ 
matter. Chitepo’s death is said to have disrupted the war effort for close to a year. 
The rebellion, according to Simbi Mubako, Law lecturer in Zambia at the time, was the result of a 
sudden expansion in recruitment from 300 to 5000 cadres. Administrative deficiencies 
compounded this recruitment drive as well as infiltrations by the Rhodesian enemy, the existence 
of disgruntled politicians and failure by the OAU Liberation Committee to respond swiftly to the 
demands of an expanding war.626 He further indicated that the disgruntlement was over the 
luxurious lifestyle that the leadership enjoyed when all other fighters, because of the massive 
recruitment drive, were languishing in poverty with nothing to eat. In Zambia, the death of Herbert 
Chitepo, the Chairman of ZANU and the first black lawyer in Rhodesia, which ZANU blamed on 
the Rhodesian espionage campaigns, reflected the cleavages within the party.627  
The death of Chitepo led to the formation of the ZIPA and heralded an era where the party followed 
the gun,628 implying that it was the army thence that directed all operations, thus subordinating the 
party to military interests and priorities. Mugabe’s ‘clean up the rot’ campaign in Mozambique in 
1977, which was meant to eliminate military cadres in ZIPA suspected of undermining his 
leadership of both the party and High Command, is said to have almost led to a coup, thanks to the 
intervention of the military who stood solidly behind him. Mugabe’s words to celebrate the 
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destruction of ZIPA in 1977 “We warned any person with a tendency to revolt that the ZANU axe 
would fall on their necks”629 This background is useful and important to the study of ZANU-PF 
and its application of violence with military backing against opposition to its rule after 
independence. It illuminates Mugabe’s heavy reliance on the military to buttress his regime and to 
impose an uncritical acceptance of ZANU-PF policies. 
Chung points out that the Zambian government led by Kenneth Kaunda supported Joshua Nkomo’s 
ZAPU and not ZANU and did not want divisions.630 That was the reason a flabbergasted Zambian 
government, when ZIPRA fighters captured the ZAPU vice president, James Chikerema and 
threatened him, forced them to acknowledge his leadership at a time when Nkomo was in prison. 
Apart from having renounced the use of violence, Chung also intimates that Ndabaningi Sithole 
had rejected Josiah Tongogara as ZANLA High Commander when ZANU bases were relocated to 
Mozambique following FRELIMO’s victory over the Portuguese military machine in 1975.631 The 
rejection was based on the fact that Tongogara was murderer and a Karanga. In a bid to secure his 
release from prison, Sithole refused to support the continuation of war, preferring negotiations as 
a possible solution to the Rhodesian political crisis. Chung, who was in Tanzania when Sithole’s 
renunciation of violence against the Rhodesian system was made public, relates how one ZANU 
leader in Dar es Salaam literally wept: “Why did I do so much for Ndabaningi Sithole when he has 
rejected the whole liberation struggle for which many people are dying….”632 Traditional ZANU 
nationalists were educated, and, as Chung puts it, Samson Mutambanengwe had several university 
degrees and Nathan Shamuyarira had a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), which became reason for 
them to show concern over the election and elevation of people they regarded as semi-illiterates, 
such as Tongogara, into important posts.633 Tongogara, who participated in the Lancaster 
Conference, was killed in a car crash in Mozambique on the eve of Christmas in 1979 when 
ZANU-PF was preparing to launch its election campaigns inside the country in preparation for the 
first multiparty elections scheduled for 1980. 
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Like most nationalist parties in Africa that fought for political independence against their former 
colonisers, ZANU members were united in their fight for freedom, being guided by a false sense 
of unity of purpose. The background about ZANU, which became ZANU-PF after the Lancaster 
Conference, is marred by many ethnically-motivated factional fights that history has played down. 
Elite cohesion in ZANU-PF before and after independence was driven by the need to win the 
historic 1980 elections, the lack of trust that it had over the intentions of the white political elite 
and their African allies, and most importantly, the political threat coming from its traditional 
political opponent, PF-ZAPU.634 The 1980 elections were ethnic in the sense that Nkomo’s party 
won  20 National Assembly seats in Matabeleland but lost one Bulawayo urban seat to ZANU-PF. 
That urban seat was won by the then ZANU-PF Political Commissar, Doctor Herbert Sylvester 
Masiyiwa Ushewokunze (Mangurenje). Despite being from the Shona ethnic group, Ushewokunze 
was quite popular in Bulawayo because he had operated some surgeries in the city before joining 
the ZANLA forces in Mozambique in 1975 after the ill-fated Geneva Conference. The ethnic factor 
remained salient in the politics of the enlarged ZANU-PF and played a key role in the splits that 
took centre stage after 1987 when Tekere was sacked from ZANU-PF and decided to form ZUM. 
Coupled with the 20 seats that were constitutionally reserved for whites, it meant that the combined 
votes of the two groups, PF-ZAPU and the whites, could block ZANU-PF decisions in parliament. 
A one-party state looked very likely after the Unity Accord and, if it succeeded, that would have 
meant the death knell to multiparty politics in the country. 
This chapter is grounded on empirical qualitative research based, to a greater extent, on interviews 
as well as parliamentary debates for both the Legislative Assembly and the Senate in the Hansard. 
It shifts focus from analysing the opposition such as the MDC that was a social movement, to 
opposition formations that originated from within ZANU-PF itself. Intra-party opposition 
historiography that traces the growth and development of opposition parties in the ruling ZANU-
PF party is rarely articulated in a continuous narrative. The impression that people get as a result, 
is that ZANU-PF has always been intact as a party, characterised by cohesion and guided by the 
socialist ideology. This chapter addresses challenges ZANU-PF has had to its rule, and how in a 
characteristic demonstration of its power, the party succeeded in dealing decisively with opposition 
that emanated from within. 
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6.2 INITIAL POST-INDEPENDENCE CHALLENGES TO ZANU-PF CONTROL OF 
THE STATE FROM WITHIN (1980-1990) 
When PF-ZAPU clinched twenty seats in Matabeleland in 1980, it was a political imperative for 
the ZANU-PF government to allocate to it, posts commensurate with its runner’s-up position in 
the electoral contest. The government that was formed after independence in 1980 was a de facto 
coalition comprising ZANU-PF, PF-ZAPU and the former white Rhodesians who had reorganised 
themselves to form the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe. Nkomo was made Minister of Home 
Affairs and key members of his party such as Josiah Chinamano and Joseph Musika among others, 
were offered governmental responsibilities. Skirmishes occurred in Chitungwiza and Entumbane 
in 1982, involving shoot-outs by former ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrilla fighters barely two years 
after independence. The discovery of arms cache on a PF-ZAPU farm in Matabeleland coincided 
with an upsurge of violent killings by dissidents in Matabeleland and the Midlands Provinces. 
These developments confirmed the ruling party’s fears about Nkomo’s intentions. The ferocity 
with which the government deployed a North-Korean-trained Fifth Brigade that was 
predominantly Shona-speaking to execute Gukurahundi in PF-ZAPU strongholds became a 
justificatory myth to destroy the opposition PF-ZAPU’s military power. A series of demotions 
ensued, with Nkomo first becoming a Minister without Portfolio before his elimination from the 
cabinet on 17 February 1982.635 This was followed by a crackdown on former ZIPRA leaders such 
as Dumiso Dabengwa, Lookout Masuku, Nicholas Nkomo and Tshaka Moyo.636 
The government decided to suspend all development projects in Matabeleland for security and 
political reasons637 Despite the crackdown on PF-ZAPU, the ruling party failed to make inroads in 
Matabeleland in the 1985 elections, which reinforced the notion that ZANU-PF was not wanted in 
the Ndebele-dominated provinces. It was for that reason that ZANU-PF viewed elections as 
‘battles’ and opponents as ‘enemies’ to be annihilated rather than as competitors through the use 
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of the Gukurahundi strategy.638 Taken to extremes, Gatsheni-Ndlovu639  describes the strategy as 
a Shona crusade against the Ndebele.  
In 1984, following the discovery of arms cache in PF-ZAPU owned farms, Joshua Nkomo fled 
into exile in England.640 It was under these circumstances that Nkomo had to concede to a Unity 
Accord. The Unity Accord signed in 1987 between the two revolutionary parties, PF-ZAPU and 
ZANU-PF, eliminated opposition to ZANU-PF’s determination to be the sole rulers of the state. 
Even if the 1987 Unity Accord ended the period of military conflict in the country, the 
development created a de facto one-party state.641 Chisi argues that the major focus of the ruling 
ZANU-PF party after independence was to consolidate its power and do away with opposition 
politics. He further intimates that Gukurahundi was a government-orchestrated campaign with 
ethnic overtones to ensure that there was a one-party framework in post-independence Zimbabwe 
by wiping out the Ndebele people who were alleged to be supportive of dissident destabilisation 
activities in the Matabeleland regions as well as parts of the Midlands Province. Despite having 
served as co-Vice President, Joshua Nkomo was only acknowledged in the state media as ‘Father 
Zimbabwe’ in honour of his contributions to the liberation of the country after his death in 
1999.642    
The Conservative government in Britain led by Margaret Thatcher did not react to the massacres 
in Matabeleland and the Commonwealth also remained silent643 as if to give legitimacy to 
government’s military manoeuvres in that part if the country. However, the British government 
did not cut aid destined for Zimbabwe, but actually increased it by ten million pounds around the 
time of the massacre.644 If both the British government and the Commonwealth had reacted swiftly 
against the terror campaigns, or if they had tried to oppose the Zimbabwean government by a token 
show of military force, Mugabe might have been checked earlier in his policies of ethnic 
aggression which, as time went on, was one of the trademarks of the ruling party. In any case, 
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having cut aid would have endangered the spirit of reconciliation that clouded black and white 
relations in postcolonial reconstruction. As Du Toit645  puts it, the disturbances in Matabeleland 
became prototypical of state policy in dealing with any form of opposition to its rule, and ruling 
party dissidents were treated on the same basis as opposition members.646  
Chisi647 describes Nkomo’s nickname ‘Chibwechitedza’ (‘Strong and solid rock’) as not being 
Ndebele but Shona, whereas Ndlovu648 refers the nickname to the softness and slipperiness of a 
stone which makes it hard to hold in one’s hand. The nickname exhibited not only the extent of 
his influence across the country during the heydays of the nationalist struggle, but also his patriotic 
zeal, power and commitment to fight and eliminate colonialism in the whole country. Chisi649 also 
argues that ZAPU was national but ZANU-PF created a narrative that was calculated to portray 
Nkomo’s party as Ndebele and only confined to Ngezi, his home area. Chisi takes the debate 
further by arguing that the Gukurahundi campaigns orchestrated by the ZANU-PF government did 
not spare known Shona people in Matabeleland from the ongoing massacres and that was proof to 
show that ZAPU was not tribal but cut across all ethnicities in the country. Shona-speaking people 
in Matabeleland, or in regions affected by Gukurahundi, were also killed once it was suspected 
that they supported dissidents. Mashakada supports this line of thinking and holds   that beyond 
1980, the nationalist movement [ZANU-PF] did not have an economic or a government 
programme to roll out the promise of the liberation struggle. He points out that one area of deficit 
was governance which manifested itself in Gukurahundi to exterminate the Ndebeles as evidenced 
by multiple abductions and disappearances which were carried out with impunity. The 
Gukurahundi campaigns in Matabeleland must be understood in the context not only of ZANU-
PF destroying dissidents’ support base, but also of eliminating PF-ZAPU as a power factor. The 
ruthlessness with which the Gukurahundi campaigns were executed was predicated on ZANU-
PF’s full knowledge that dealing with ZIPRA forces required a great deal of military precision 
because it was a sophisticated military outfit equipped with conventional strategies of military 
engagement. Joshua Nkomo, between 1983 and 1987, was affected by the Gukurahundi campaign 
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as large numbers of PF-ZAPU supporters were killed in that part of Zimbabwe. PF-ZAPU, under 
immense pressure from the ruling ZANU-PF party, and in a desperate bid for its continued survival 
within the unity framework, practically signed itself out of existence and only had nominal 
presence in another coalition government that emerged after the Unity Accord of 1987.  
There has been criticism of the Accord by some ZAPU supporters, given that ZAPU was forced 
into it as a condition for its members to be allocated posts in the government.650 These critics, such 
as Masipula Sithole (1993) in ‘Is Zimbabwe poised for a liberal path….?’ Terence Mashingaidze 
(2005) in his article entitled ‘…..a case of peace without reconciliation’, and Edgar Tekere who 
formed ZUM in 1989 as a protest against the possibility of a one-party state political strategy being 
declared because of the absence of an opposition party after the signing of the Unity Accord.651 
These critics believed that key members of PF-ZAPU sold out when they participated in the deal 
that resulted in the party signing its ‘death certificate’ because supporters of the party were not 
consulted. It was an accord between ZANU-PF and the PF-ZAPU leadership, the latter of which 
was compelled to appreciate the futility of escalating a power struggle. The argument is that the 
new name for the party should have reflected the reality of two parties that had come together to 
become one, and that it should not have remained as ZANU-PF. The former ZAPU Chief of 
intelligence652 argues: 
Gukurahundi was never put to an end by the signing of the Unity Accord. It simply mutated 
from being direct violence into structural and systematic violence underpinned by glossily 
centralized system of governance that is grotesquely corrupt and self-serving, characterised 
by gross marginalization of the same communities that were affected by Gukurahundi. … 
Dabengwa further intimates that the Accord created the sad era of a one-party state that 
benefited Mugabe and ZANU at the expense of democracy. 
It must be noted that the armed disturbances by dissidents in Matabeleland and the Midlands 
provinces, from the ZANU-PF perspective, were being planned by ZAPU. Chung highlights 
ZANU-PF suspicions over huge arms caches that ZAPU had husbanded to execute a conventional 
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war which it was good at, with the ruling party. The 20 seats reserved for whites were removed in 
1987, subsequent to the signing of the 1987 Unity Accord which implied that Zimbabwe was to 
all intents and purposes a “de facto one-party-state” thus, obstacles in the way of the one-party 
state were removed as it became apparent that Zimbabwe was on the verge of being ruled 
singlehandedly by the ‘liberation party’.653  
In 1988, there was what is considered the worst corruption scandal since independence at 
Willowvalle Motor Industries in Bulawayo.654 The scandal chronicled the triumph of investigative 
journalism as it forced two of the most senior ministers in Mugabe’s cabinet and four other 
powerful politicians to resign.655 The Chronicle newspaper in Bulawayo with editor Geoffrey 
Nyarota fearlessly reported this high-profile corruption even though it was state-owned. President 
Mugabe pardoned those implicated in this scandal despite revelations of massive corruption by the 
Sandura Commission that was tasked by government to investigate the matter. Cabinet Ministers 
were summoned to give open testimonies of extralegal practices that they had used to gain wealth, 
but that was as far as democracy could go. The Minister of Education, Sports and Culture, Dzingai 
Mtumbuka, who retorted ‘one fool at a time’656 when the public audience simultaneously made 
interjections following his inconsistent testimony, exhibited the arrogance that most implicated 
ministers had at the public hearings. Of interest to note is that being ZANU-PF did not necessarily 
entail every member was for a one-party state and therefore a socialist. One case in point is when 
the Investment Code came into existence 1989 to liberalise conditions under which foreign 
investors could be accommodated in a characteristic dismissal of the socialist path to economic 
development.657 Tekere challenged ZANU-PF’s deviation from the socialist principles and from 
the party’s leadership code. In his book, Tekere caricatures Mugabe whom he orders to leave 
office, as a coward only taught by him how to handle a gun towards the end of the liberation 
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struggle; yet after independence, Mugabe personalised the liberation struggle.658 Tekere659 further 
criticises Mugabe:  
[for] humiliating our women and children. He has humiliated trade unionists and ululated 
about this…. I am calling Mugabe to go and go quickly. We have to reconstruct this 
country, but without Mugabe. 
This criticism of Mugabe was by one of his closest allies, a man with whom he had spent eleven 
years in a Rhodesian prison and escaped together into Mozambique. Tekere’s memoirs highlight 
his contribution to creating the Mugabe phenomenon when he and others in Mozambique 
nominated him as the party’s president ahead of Ndabaningi Sithole. He blamed Mugabe for 
building a nation that lived in constant fear of its own government which is a negation of the 
principles of democracy that were the cornerstone of the revolutionary war. Tekere is not a neutral 
observer in this story. He started as ally of Mugabe and eventually became his fiercest critic, as 
we discuss below.  
The broadcaster who conducted an interview with a UZ lecturer on the Willowvale scandal was 
suspended and summarily detained for putting the interview on air. A ZANU-PF MP660 who 
sympathised with the detained broadcaster, argued:  
…take this view that my own liberties and freedom are safe as long as my neighbours. We 
are our brothers’ keepers just as much as our brothers are also keepers in issues of our 
liberties, freedom of the press, right to inform and right to be informed, and the right of 
speech. Individuals should not be detained at the whim of an individual person.  
Those implicated and pardoned by Mugabe remained indebted to him661 and those who were a 
threat, such as Maurice Nyagumbo, were eliminated allegedly by death under the guise that he 
committed suicide. Mugabe used the scandal to consolidate his power within his party and by 
extension within the country, by creating patrimonial connections with corrupt leaders within the 
ruling party. This occurred at a time when the thrust of the party was towards creating a one-party 
state. Tekere, who was an outstanding critic of the party’s policies, strongly opposed the move. He 
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fearlessly challenged the party to adhere to the revolutionary principles and attacked the leadership 
for the web of corruption involving many politicians, Asian businessmen, multinational and local 
companies, white individuals and state institutions resulting in the resignation of five Cabinet 
ministers.662  
The Leadership Code put in place in 1984 was an instrument to limit wealth acquisition through 
corrupt deals by the ruling elite663 and its promulgation pointed to the predatory behaviour of the 
new rulers. Tekere overtly opposed the one-state strategy idea and gained support from university 
students whose demonstration in 1988 was crushed by the government. For openly expressing his 
views, Tekere was expelled from ZANU-PF and he formed the ZUM in 1989. After the 1990 
elections, in which his party only won two seats in the National Assembly, it was Mugabe who 
blocked Tekere’s bid for re-admission into ZANU-PF to run as its candidate in the 2005 Senate 
elections.664 That explained why Tekere joined Mavambo Kusile Dawn and supported Simba 
Makoni’s presidential candidature in the March 2008 elections. 
According to Coltart, 665 opposition parties have been their own worst enemies whether they are 
formed from the ruling party as breakaway organisations or are political formations with no links 
with the ruling party. Kori supported this observation666 and  also intimated that ZUM did not do 
much in terms of taking itself to the people, and he regards this as a crisis of all opposition political 
parties in the country. It became a party based in urban areas because rural constituencies were 
sealed off by the ruling ZANU-PF party. That means rural people were not consulted about ZUM’s 
policies. Maziriri contends that ZUM, among other parties that formed after it, was geographically 
set in Manicaland, Tekere’s home province, and this made it less national in character. ZUM was 
formed at the height of student politics at the UZ and the government was quick to associate their 
activities with Tekere’s party. Mashakada,667  who was a university student at that time, relates 
how students were muzzled, beaten and brutalised for voicing their concern over the crippling 
dictatorship. Tekere capitalised on the failed promises that ZANU-PF made during the war, 
particularly, government’s abandonment of the revolutionary ideals. One of the ideals of the 
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struggle was democracy, and the government’s commitment to declaring a one-party state was 
antithetical to the realisation of democracy. That was the reason Tekere had support from 
university students who were enlightened and could quickly lend their support to any party that 
served to protect their own democratic freedom as students. 
One of the challenges that awaited ZUM was that it was not a project rooted in a social movement, 
according to Mashakada. That means that ZUM did not have grassroots support, nor did it have 
the support of civil society and religious groups because it was formed out of emotions. “ZUM 
was a grievances outfit so they failed to dislodge Mugabe in their quest to bring democracy”.668 
ZUM won two out of 106 parliamentary seats amidst state brutality, partiality, discriminatory 
procedures, harassment, censorship and government’s system of monopoly, all of which closed 
the democratic space. It is also argued that ZUM did not have a coherent ideology nor a clear 
political programme.669 This perspective is supported by Chisi670 who posits that except for the 
MDC, all other parties that were formed to oppose ZANU-PF were reactionary because they were 
formed by politicians who had been chased away from ZANU-PF and did not have a clear 
ideological thrust to take on the country’s economic agenda. They were also amateurish in 
statecraft and on the alliances that needed to be built to defeat ZANU-PF in an election. Mashakada 
also alluded to the opposition parties’ lack of political experience and acumen by referring to the 
them as people ‘trying to play football with ZANU-PF that was playing chess’.  
ZANU-PF won the 1990 presidential elections by 83% against ZUM’s 18%. Patrick Kombayi, a 
former ZANU-PF loyalist who defected together with Tekere, was shot and seriously wounded for 
challenging the Vice President, Simon Muzenda, in the 1990 electoral contest for the Gweru urban 
seat. 671 He sustained serious injuries from the shots fired by the ZANU-PF MP for Chiundura, 
Kizito Chivamba, and had to seek medical treatment in Britain.672 In 1987, Eddison Zvobgo as 
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Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs had drafted a constitution that he argued was meant 
to re-democratise the Zimbabwean Constitution. Emphasis was on powers to be bestowed on the 
Executive President if the country was to become a one-party state. It was suspected that Zvobgo 
held presidential aspirations when he delivered his speech at an international conference in Harare 
in November 1995. He was injured in a staged car accident and was subsequently demoted to the 
post of Mines Minister while seeking treatment in London in 1996. It is important to underscore 
the fate that befell ZANU-PF members who fell out of favour with the president. Zvobgo, 
Nyagumbo and Tekere are case examples of how attempts were made on their lives. Other critics 
expelled from the ruling party for their negative outspokenness and for being critical of ZANU-
PF included Margret Dongo in 1995 and Lawrence Mudehwe in 1996.673  
ZUM members did not remain united after the electoral defeat of 1990 as Emmanuel Magoche and 
Zembe broke away to form their Democratic Party. The former Chief Justice, Enock 
Dumbutshena, formed the Forum Party after breaking ranks with the ruling party. What emerges 
from these analyses is that early democratic formations that came from ZANU-PF did not 
galvanise the electorate adequately because they did not come up with a new narrative of change. 
One of the weaknesses of these opposition parties was that they were still pitted in the liberation 
mould, and organisationally and ideologically resembled ZANU-PF. Lack of ideological clarity 
among ZUM, Forum Party, Democratic Party and other smaller parties that emerged from ZANU-
PF gave the ruling party the benefit of the doubt. People were still enjoying the euphoria of 
independence and they did not require to think that the regime was a rogue one.  
It can be argued that ZANU-PF allowed disgruntled members to break away and form their own 
opposition political parties as long as they remained small in terms of membership, and when they 
did not threaten the ruling party’s hegemonic control of the state. Part of the debate is the allegation 
by the opposition that ZANU-PF assisted in the creation of certain parties resulting in a pseudo-
multiparty democracy. This argument can be sustained if consideration is given to Shakespeare 
Maya who was a presidential candidate for his party but did not get votes that exceeded the size 
of his family. Chisi speaks critically about Dzinemunhenzva in Wedza constituency, who is a 
presidential candidate in every election, but beyond the people employed in his grinding mill, no 
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one hears about his African National Party.674 Such parties present deceptive outward trappings of 
a democracy, yet meaningful multiparty democracy cannot just be measured by the presence on 
the political scene of a multitude of parties that exist outside ZANU-PF. Instead, democracy is 
measured in terms of the contributions that these parties can make in transforming people’s lives, 
including, of course, the competitiveness of the election campaigns and the actual election itself. 
Parties that were formed on a whim and lacked a coherent ideology to distinguish themselves as 
truly new, remained essentially ZANU-PF in all but name. As argued earlier, competing groups in 
electoral politics in many countries on the continent of Africa do not seem to have substantial 
policy alternatives, and, in the case of Zimbabwe, the proliferation of breakaway parties from 
ZANU-PF in the guise of multiparty democracy before the arrival of the MDC, led to what 
Akinrinade675 called ‘voting without choosing.’ 
Zimbabwe, through the stewardship of ZANU-PF, maintained a modicum of multiparty 
democracy, evidenced by the existence of breakaway parties that formed from it as well as the 
increasing number of independent candidates who had severed links with the mainstream parties. 
In trying to expose the inherent weaknesses that accompanied the hurried globalisation of 
democracy as defined in western terminology, Africanist historians writing from the perspective 
of Africans, argue that given the unique situation that the continent presents, democracy has been 
reduced to the crude simplicity of multiparty elections to the benefit of some of the world’s most 
notorious autocrats who were able to parade democratic credentials without reforming their 
repressive regimes.676 Africanist historians also argue that democracy is in theory and practice a 
European phenomenon that grew out of European history and is built on European social ideals 
and political movements.677  
In support of the above perspective, Clark678 addresses how the forward march of democracy in 
Africa is often halted by the ruling elite who rely on the abuse of public resources, bureaucratic 
manipulation and a biased state-owned media to deliver the results they want. Using this premise, 
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it can be argued that globalising democracy defined in western terms became a constraint to the 
true exercise of multiparty practice in Africa in general, including Zimbabwe. The United States 
Secretary of State in 2011, Hilary Clinton, defined liberal democracy not as a matter of only 
holding elections, but she also spelt out the need for free, fair and transparent elections, a free 
media, independent judiciary, the protection of minorities, delivery of results for people by 
providing economic opportunities, jobs and a rise in living standards.679 The criteria above need 
to be measured against Zimbabwe’s performance in democracy, a concept which simply describes 
multiparty electoral competition in behavioural terms. 
6.3 THE DEMOCRATIC STRUGGLE FROM WITHIN ZANU-PF (1990-2000) 
After the 1990 elections, ZUM ceased to exist as a party. The Democratic Party and the Forum 
Party emerged as offshoots from ZUM in readiness for the 1995 elections. Like ZUM, the Forum 
party had urban subscribers and was little known in rural areas where the majority of voters 
resided. According to Coltart,680 the Forum Party received substantial financial support from 
foreign entities and private organisations. The legal framework of the 1995 elections severely 
limited the operational capacity of opposition parties in the following respects. First, opposition 
parties were not granted equality with ZANU-PF in that mail voting by ZANU-PF personnel on 
foreign diplomatic missions as well as the army posted on peace-keeping missions throughout the 
world was permitted, but no one else living or working abroad was given the same permission. 
Second, the Political Parties Finance Act of 1992 provided that the government would give funds 
to registered political parties with at least 15 seats in Parliament, and the irony of it all was that 
ZANU-PF with 117 out of 120 seats was the only party to be legally funded by the national 
treasury.681 Third, the Broadcasting Services Act guaranteed government monopoly on national 
media platforms in the country whereas the LOMA, which changed to Public Order and Security 
Act (POSA) in 2002, was transplanted from the colonial system682 and it proscribed public 
meetings unless they were sanctioned by the police.  
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Five opposition parties boycotted these elections on allegations that the political playfield was not 
even, including the Democratic Party under Magoche and United Parties led by Muzorewa. The 
parties that participated were ZANU Ndonga with two seats in Chipinge, Ndabaningi Sithole’s 
rural home area, and the Forum Party under Dumbutshena which received 6% of the votes whereas 
ZANU-PF garnered 82%.683 One of the candidates who stood as an Independent was Margret 
Dongo. She effectively was expelled from ZANU-PF, but when a by-election was conducted in 
Harare South constituency, she won and became the third opposition MP in parliament.684 Her 
influence was circumscribed within the high-density locations of Sunningdale, not far away from 
the Central Business District of Harare. After breaking away from ZANU-PF over irregularities in 
the primaries, 27 independent candidates participated.685 The increase in the number of 
Independents in parliament from seven in 1990 to 41 in 1995686 was exceptional and this must 
have sent shock waves to the ZANU-PF hierarchy that internally, party cohesion was in jeopardy 
and that its parliamentary hegemony was diminishing. 
The struggle for democracy after 1990 coincided with the era of ESAP introduced by government 
in 1991. According to Chung,687 democracy, the economy and education are inseparable and 
people cannot talk of democracy when 90% of a country’s population is starving and the majority 
of people do not have houses and jobs. Chung describes democracy from many angles, arguing 
that ESAP made the rich get richer, which is part of the philosophy of structural adjustment. It 
must be noted that ESAP, with its emphasis on liberalising the political environment, opened the 
floodgates of criticism of ZANU-PF dominance and promoted more open attacks on the 
government by members in the ruling party during parliamentary sessions. Tendai Biti, the 
opposition MDC Secretary-General and later Finance Minister in the 2009-2013 GNU, refers to 
the year 1996 as one of record strikes by the junior doctors in the country’s major hospitals such 
as Parirenyatwa, Mpilo and Harare Hospitals on 20 August, three days after President Mugabe had 
celebrated his second wedding. Apart from presenting opposition views on the declining living 
and working conditions of urban workers, Biti’s speech in parliament drew the attention of 
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parliament to the worsening economic conditions in the country. Biti also referred to five parties 
that pulled out of the 1995 elections citing a Zanunised political playfield, and the lavish spending 
by the president on hosting a colourful wedding dubbed the ‘Wedding of the Century’ in 
Zimbabwe, an extravagant Catholic affair688 when the doctors’ salary demands needed government 
attention, and when the nation in general was suffering due to the economic meltdown. Chung 
argues that the multiparty system that obtains in the country is inadequate to classify Zimbabwe 
as being democratic because democracy is much more than just going to elections once every five 
years. The 1995 elections suffice to illustrate Chung’s analysis of the Zimbabwean elections. Low 
voter turnout in the 1995 elections, discussed in chapter 2, showed high voter apathy which was 
indicative of the fatigue and frustration among voters due to the continuous and systematic 
repression of any political dissent in the country.689 The absent majority was perhaps an instance 
of voting without choosing.  
Thousands of ZIPRA cadres who had been trained in Botswana and Zambia were supposedly 
inadvertently excluded from the vetting exercise that took place in 1997. Indeed, their exclusion 
could not have been incidental, but a ploy premised on destroying and discrediting PF-ZAPU’s 
military capacity to organise war and take revenge. That means that there was a progressive 
civilianisation of all ZIPRA combatants who failed to timeously register on the war veterans’ list. 
6.4 THE TSHOLOTSHO DECLARATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTRA-PARTY 
DEMOCRACY 
In keeping with the spirit of unity engendered by the 1987 Unity Accord between ZANU-PF and 
PF-ZAPU, the constitution was amended to entrench a proviso for two vice presidents. This led 
to the elevation of Joshua Nkomo to partner Simon Muzenda as the two vice presidents 
representing not only ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, but also the Shona and the Ndebele as the two 
major ethnic groups in the country. Nkomo died in 1999 and was succeeded by Joseph Msika who 
was a member of PF-ZAPU before its cooptation into ZANU-PF. When Muzenda died in 2004, 
his replacement was not as smooth as had happened in PF-ZAPU. It is important to highlight that 
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tension within ZANU-PF was brewing and factional camps evolved which, to a large measure, 
appeared to challenge the legitimacy of Mugabe as president of the country. The succession crisis 
for a replacement to fill the void created by the death of Muzenda culminated in what became 
known as the Tsholotsho Declaration in 2004 led by the Mnangagwa loyalists against the Mujuru 
faction. Tsholotsho is Jonathan Moyo’s home area. Six ZANU-PF provincial chairmen and 
members of the Politburo, Central Committee, and members of parliament met at Dinyane 
Secondary school to install Mnangagwa in the Presidium ahead of the ZANU-PF Congress due to 
be held in 2004. Key participants included Jonathan Moyo, Jacob Mudenda, Mabel Chinomona, 
Mike Madiro, Daniel Shumba and July Moyo, among many others. 
The Tsholotsho Declaration was made up of four principles. The first reiterated that the presidium 
ought to be representative of the four ethnic categories in the country. The second stated that the 
position of the president should not be monopolised by one ethnic group, but should be on a 
rotational basis, taking into cognizance the Shona, Ndebele, Karanga and Manyika. Thirdly, it 
made a position that the filling in of presidium vacancies should be done through democratic 
procedures involving secret ballot, as opposed to having them imposed by the party hierarchy. 
Lastly, any position that arose in the presidium was to be occupied in terms of the party’s 
constitutional provisions. The principles are said to have received the support of six out of the ten 
provinces in the country, with Mugabe, a Zezuru, as president, and Mnangagwa, a Karanga, as 
Vice President, together with a Ndebele co-Vice president Joseph Msika, and Patrick Chinamasa, 
a Manyika, assuming the role of the party chair. The ethnic permutation focusing on the presidium 
explains the importance of maintaining an ethnic balance within the presidency. That can be 
interpreted as an attempt by the bigger faction of ZANU-PF to bring into existence some 
democratic tenets which were conspicuously absent as evidenced by the principles set down as 
framework for representativeness in the presidency.  
Like other parties that formed outside ZANU-PF, the Tsholotsho Declaration was construed or 
misconstrued as undermining Mugabe’s authority as the state president because the procedures it 
proposed for selection, and the quest for ethnic representation in the presidium that it advocated, 
were some of the shortcomings in the nature and functions of the presidium as constituted. 
Mugabe made the appointments singlehandedly without consulting anyone. Instead of giving 
recognition to the principles enunciated at Tsholotsho, participants were suspended from the party 
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with the exception of Mnangagwa who was appointed Minister of Rural Housing and Social 
Amenities while his party portfolio as Secretary for Administration was given to Didymus Mutasa. 
The party constitution was amended to accommodate the demand of the Women’s League to have 
a female as Mugabe embraced one of the two vice presidents. A series of demotions and 
suspensions followed the annulment of the Tsholotsho Declaration, or conspiracy as seen in 
official circles. Jabulani Sibanda, a former ZIPRA war veteran and participant in the illegal 
meeting, together with Jonathan Moyo, who was a member of the party’s Politburo and Minister 
of Information, were expelled from ZANU-PF.  
Mugabe expressed his suspicion and a growing sense of mistrust of key members of the party 
when he commented: “There is everything wrong when chairpersons of the party go and meet 
secretly without the knowledge of the leadership of the party and worse still, what would they be 
discussing there?”690 The developments in Tsholotsho in 2004 continue to have reverberatory 
effects on the ZANU-PF succession matrix, resulting in the mysterious death of Solomon Mujuru 
in 2011 in an inferno that was not properly investigated. Leadership battles along ethnic fault lines 
were characteristic of the post-Tsholotsho saga era as ZANU-PF increasingly became more 
authoritarian in dealing with internal dissensions, and as Mugabe acquired the title of ‘Godfather 
of the African revolution’, was deemed infallible and equated with the biblical Jesus. The former 
Deputy Minister of Local Housing, Tony Gara, made the statement in the National Assembly that 
President Mugabe is another son of God hence the song: 
I will never cry (Handimbochemi) 
When Mugabe is there (Kana VaMugabe varipo) 
To cry is cowardice (Kuchema utera).691  
Nolbert Kunonga of the Anglican Church hailed and likened President Mugabe to Jesus the 
Messiah and overtly supported the chaos and violence that characterised the land reform 
programme in 2000.692 He was a generalisable case example of a church leader who, after having 
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been allocated a farm under the land distribution exercise, preached in his church in favour of 
Mugabe, whereas Bishop Pius Ncube of the Roman Catholic Church was viewed as a tribalist and 
‘enemy’ of the state for disagreeing with the government’s land distribution programme.693 
Apostolic churches in the country, together with the indigenised factions of mainstream churches 
such as Kunonga’s Anglican Church were used at the height of serious political contestations to 
buttress the incumbent ZANU-PF regime. They became an indispensable social base for support 
mobilisation for ZANU-PF to the exclusion of opposition parties. 
6.5 REGIME CHANGE NARRATIVES WITHIN ZANU-PF SINCE 2000 
Protagonists of the nativist or Afrocentric school of thought present an argument on the uselessness 
of a western neo-liberal political tradition which prioritises the multiplication of political parties 
as the only indicator of democracy. Rather, they intimate that democracy serves to maintain the 
political status quo in any given African country. Such a view holds sway in Zimbabwe as more 
parties that were legally permitted to register and participate in national elections, be they from 
outside ZANU-PF or from within it, contributed to sustaining the ZANU-PF hegemony by splitting 
the opposition vote.  
The intensification of farm invasions after the 2002 disputed presidential elections marred by 
violence and selective justice meted out to opposition activists and party supporters, brought 
SADC into the orbit of Zimbabwean politics, particularly when Britain and the USA abandoned 
their original plan to remove Mugabe’s ZANU-PF regime from power militarily, citing the 
negative consequences that could accompany such a move. Tony Blair’s plans for a military 
strategy on Zimbabwe to rid of the Mugabe phenomenon are said to have been exposed by Field 
Marshall Guthrie in John Kampfner’s book entitled Blair’s Wars.694 It was realised that the move 
would be disastrous because, firstly, due to Zimbabwe’s landlocked geography, it would pose 
problems in bringing in or replenishing military and other supplies. Another reason was that 
isolated white farmers scattered all over the country would be killed once the war was declared; 
and it was unlikely, given Mugabe’s reputation on the continent as the ‘Godfather of the anti-
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imperialist struggle’ that was assumed to have taken new forms and dimensions, that African 
countries would approve of such an operation against Zimbabwe.695  
Revelations of an aborted alleged military plan on a sovereign state by a former colonial power 
hardened the government’s stance against Britain and consequently led to persecution of 
opposition members and limitations on their freedom because they were deemed to be conspiring 
with the British. The revelations enable us to understand the emergence of the instrumental 
demonisation discourses that pitted Mugabe and the British government against one another, 
especially during the era of Tony Blair’s Labour government, and why multiparty democracy, 
where people would freely belong to parties of their choice, became a façade in subsequent 
elections since 2002. Mugabe is said to have mentioned Blair’s name at least 43 times at 
presidential campaign rallies in 2002.696 Instrumentalism worked to foster the idea that the ‘evil’ 
British government was sponsoring the MDC in delegitimising domestic opposition and that sealed 
off Mbeki’s attempts to mediate constructive negotiation between ZANU-PF and MDC about the 
formation of a power-sharing government.697 Such a position explains why Mbeki repeatedly 
declared his support for Mugabe by reducing the Zimbabwean crisis to the nationalist discourse of 
land reform.698 The position also explains Tsvangirai’s loss of  trust in Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” 
and his doubts over Mbeki’s impartiality in mediating in the Zimbabwean crisis;699 and why Mbeki 
at times echoed Mugabe’s sentiments in lambasting Britain and the west as the root cause of the 
social, economic and political challenges facing the country.700 Lord Douglas Hurd, the Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1989–95), described Mugabe thus: 
He is one of those people the British Empire created who specialized in knowing how to 
twist the British government’s tail. He was well trained in the art of annoying the British if 
he needed to. He knew our ways. He understood British domestic policy very well, so could 
press the right buttons if he wanted a reaction.701  
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From the statement above, it appears that the British were unsure about how to deal with Mugabe, 
and that the uncertainties that influenced them to deal with the crisis with equivocation exhibited 
failure of British foreign policy with regard to Zimbabwe. It was for that reason that Cawthra702 
argues that both Britain and the USA faced a blank wall and then decided to pass the button to 
Mbeki whom George Bush referred to as ‘the point person.’ It can also be argued that the decision 
to have Mbeki as principal mediator in the Zimbabwean political crisis that rested on the state war 
on citizens as highlighted by Sachikonye’s703 book title could not have been the brainchild of 
SADC. Britain and USA might firmly have believed that the supposed strength of South Africa in 
the region could help resolve the impasse. Lord Hurd’s statement is an admission that Mugabe’s 
instrumental demonisation of Tony Blair won the support of Africa and other countries in the 
world that were not well disposed towards Britain and the USA. This was around the time of the 
9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the subsequent “War on Terror”, which included the invasion 
of Afghanistan and Iraq by a western coalition led by the USA, and there was general anger against 
Blair and Bush who were portrayed as war criminals in many parts of the world.704 
Mugabe also took advantage of the presence of gay politicians in Blair’s cabinet to aggressively 
attack the homosexual practice as un-African. For example, he skillfully branded Blair’s cabinet 
as morally decadent because it included Peter Mandelson, Chris Smith and Nick Brown, who were 
gay.705 On the other hand, news headlines like ‘Evil Mugabe stole our farms’ and ‘Death knell for 
a despot’ made diplomatic engagements between Zimbabwe and Britain difficult and 
inconceivable and, as Tendi706 posits, [mutually] aggressive measures became the only alternative 
form of relations. Under these prevailing circumstances, after Mugabe had forced an electoral 
victory for president, Emerson Mnangagwa was allegedly secretly invited to represent ZANU-PF 
at an ANC Congress in Stellenbosch in 2002 with a view to negotiating Mugabe’s exit scheme in 
2003, brokered by the retired Colonel Lionel Dyck and supported by the USA and the UK. 707  
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Mnangagwa was complicit in a plot that promised to grant Mugabe immunity or asylum in 
Malaysia, that provided for the formation of the government of national unity, reminiscent of the 
GNU that was formed later in 2009, and that also provided for the British resuscitation and 
financing of a legal land reform programme. When the plan leaked, Mnangagwa was spared the 
wrath of president Mugabe, ostensibly because he was the pillar of ZANU-PF strength,708 and 
therefore indispensable in the fight against a supposedly ‘neo-colonial’ MDC opposition challenge 
that had to be contained, if not eliminated. It is therefore not surprising that in 2004, at the 
Tsholotsho Declaration, six out of ten provinces in the country put their weight behind Mnangagwa 
as possible co-vice president after the death of Muzenda. Although the ZANU-PF Congress in 
2004 elected Joice Mujuru, allegedly through constitutional manipulation709 to grant the post to a 
woman, Mnangagwa still harboured presidential ambitions and that became a reality when he 
succeeded Joice Mujuru in 2014 after her expulsion from the party. One of the weaknesses inherent 
in the ruling party was that the bigwigs were afraid to come out openly to challenge Mugabe for 
the post of president. What they succeeded in doing was forming factional alliances and/or 
contesting elections as Independents and taking the risk of expulsion from the party. 
Simba Makoni’s breakaway from ZANU-PF on ‘Super Tuesday’ is a case in point. He was one of 
the youngest ministers in Mugabe’s first Cabinet after independence in 1980, having served as 
SADC Secretary-General from 1983 to 1993 before he became the Minister of Finance. Makoni’s 
personality which was admired by many politicians from the two opposition parties – Tsvangirai’s 
MDC-T and Arthur Mutambara’s MDC-M formations – as well as ZANU-PF, had effects on the 
March 2008 harmonised election outcomes. Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s righthand man 
since the hey days of the liberation struggle, pointed out that Makoni had expelled himself from 
the ZANU-PF party on 6 February 2008 whereas Mugabe lambasted him as a [political] 
prostitute.710 ZANU-PF denounced Makoni as a pawn of the British whose presidential 
candidature was viewed as an attempt to split the party to pave way for an MDC victory.711 Such 
fears were confirmed when Dumiso Dabengwa, a former Minister of Home Affairs from the PF-
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ZAPU side who had left ZANU-PF to revive the old ZAPU, as well as Cyril Ndebele, were present 
at the launch of the Mavambo Party, and endorsed Makoni’s presidential candidature and when 
Mutambara also chose not to run for president but would support Makoni. Makoni became the 
Minister of Finance in 2000, when Mugabe had trust in his handling of the state’s finances after 
the 2000 parliamentary elections which unsettled ZANU-PF. It can be intimated that the Minister 
of Finance was expected to ensure adequate funding for ZANU-PF activities ahead of the 
presidential elections in 2002 to ensure Mugabe’s return to power. Tekere declared his support for 
Simba Makoni, who participated as an Independent in the 2008 presidential race.712 
The formation of Mavambo Kusile / Dawn (MKD) in 2008, and its participation in the harmonised 
elections, attested to the existence of democratic space for political opposition. However, the mere 
existence of Mavambo as a party created confusion among the electorate from both the ZANU-PF 
and MDC camps. MDC-T suspected that the party was the brainchild of ZANU-PF in order to 
split MDC-T votes. ZANU-PF, on the other hand, suspected the British of having played a part in 
creating the party to split ZANU-PF votes and give an easy win to the opposition. Literature on 
Mavambo suggests that its presence further weakened a divided opposition which had split into 
MDC-T and MDC-M in 2005. Like other opposition parties before it, Mavambo remained little 
known outside the realm of urban constituencies as evidenced by the 8.2 % vote it received in the 
March 2008 elections.713 The party’s lack of nationwide visibility was blamed on a deliberate 
media blackout by state-controlled media and because of the fact that the party lacked resources 
because it did not have diamonds to loot, as was happening with the ruling ZANU-PF party.714 Its 
major financial support to procure party vehicles and sustain its operations came from Europe, 
especially from the Scandinavian countries.715 One of the challenges that confronted Mavambo 
was its characterisation as an urban party with no grassroots support. Efforts were made to de-
brand the party so that it remained obscure and less of a threat to ZANU-PF.  
One of the talking points in the history of ZANU-PF was the death of the retired Zimbabwean 
Army Commander, Solomon Mujuru, on 15 August 2011 in a mysterious fire accident at his home 
                                                 
712 NewsDay, 15 June 2011. 
713 K. Vollan, (2008). Zimbabwe: The elections on 29 March and the later runoff event and by-elections on 27 June, 
The Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, Oslo, p. 25. 
714 Bulawayo 24News, Mavambo is a poor party, 16 June 2013. 
715 Interview with McLaughlin. 
196 
 
in Beatrice, about 60 kilometres from Harare along the Harare-Beit Bridge highway. The former 
Cabinet Minister, Didymus Mutasa, argued that the death of Solomom Mujuru, husband of the 
former Vice President Joice Mujuru suggested that there was more to the death than the official 
[ZANU-PF] version indicated, and that the government officials responsible for security, such as 
the CIO should tell what happened to him to all Zimbabweans.716 At his funeral, MDC-T 
supporters are said to have made up a sizeable group of mourners and this confirmed ZANU-PF 
fears of the existence of an electoral pact reached between Solomon Mujuru and Tsvangirai which 
was a culmination of several encounters.717 Nathaniel Manheru, the state media columnist wrote:  
“The Herald has it on good authority that the late General had several meetings with the MDC-T 
leader and agreed on a scheme of taking over and a power-sharing formula that would incorporate 
the General’s interests”.718 It is argued that a scheme of taking over power and a power-sharing 
formula between Tsvangirai and Solomon Mujuru ahead of the 2013 harmonised elections was 
designed to accommodate the General’s political ambitions to rule the country.   
Stephen Jakes reported revelations surrounding the death of General Mujuru that he 
oversaw running the country when Mugabe became scared and unstable after his legitimacy 
as president of the state was seriously challenged by the opposition MDC-T faction.719 . 
Cephas Msipa who was also ZANU-PF Politburo member revealed that a day before his 
death, General Mujuru’ traveled to the Midlands Province to meet Makombe, the Provincial 
governor, and informed him that some ZANU-PF ‘vultures’ were plotting to oust his wife 
from the vice presidency. It is alleged that General Mujuru had direct influence on his wife 
which then raised ZANU-PF scepticism about his political interests to run the country.720 
It should also be noted that General Mujuru as former army commander was revered by the military 
and so his taking over power from Mugabe by coercive means was a high probability. He had 
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become a threat to the party to which he belonged. The brewing tension between General Mujuru 
and his wife on the one hand, and Mugabe on the other, is said to have led to his death which left 
many questions unanswered and, according to Maxwell Saungweme, the nation deserves to be told 
the truth about his death.721 
Allegations that there were plans to oust Joice Mujuru from the post of vice president had a weak 
basis around 2011 when her husband died, but she was officially expelled from the government 
and party three years later in 2014. Allegations for the expulsion were that she was “mischievous” 
and “insubordinate” to president Mugabe for the decade she had been vice president. If that is the 
case, the reason ZANU-PF kept her for so long is hard to fathom. Jakes722  intimates that that was 
Mugabe’s modus operandi as he states: “Mugabe is like a lion after its prey. It watches. It waits. 
Sometimes the lion even looks as if it is not interested in the prey until it feels it is the right moment 
and it pounces and catches its prey”.  
In the 2013 harmonised elections, a discernible and consistent pattern in the results compared to 
2008, was the implied growth in support of ZANU-PF in what were formerly opposition urban 
constituencies.723 The exit of Vice President Joice Mujuru from ZANU-PF led to tribal meetings, 
and speculation was that, since she was from the Zezuru tribe, a Karanga should take over that 
post to ensure the post rotated along tribal considerations.724 By this, it can be inferred that Maziriri 
was making an analogue of the other Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a Karanga, vying 
for the presidential seat after Mugabe’s retirement because of his advanced age. The ZANU-PF 
National Disciplinary Committee gave reasons for Vice president Mujuru’s expulsion as stemming 
from collaborating with her husband General Mujuru against the interests of the party since her 
election to the post at a ZANU-PF Congress in 2004. There was some unease at having Rex 
Nhongo Mujuru, a powerful husband to Joice Mujuru, in the background.725 Mujuru was expelled 
on allegations that she had formed parallel structures to challenge Mugabe for the presidency of 
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ZANU-PF and she was also accused of being corrupt, fanning factionalism and no longer suitable 
to remain in the Presidium.726 This description of Joice Mujuru contradicts earlier accounts of her 
as a courageous woman fighter during the liberation struggle because the state broadcaster stopped 
using the ‘comrade’ honorific and referred to her simply as Mrs. Mujuru.727 She was stripped of 
the recognition she was accorded before ZANU-PF viewed her as a threat. 
Former vice president Mujuru decided to form a political party known as ZPF, which acronym 
almost rhymed with ZANU-PF. In the party were politicians who had worked with and for ZANU-
PF since independence and even before, such as Sylvester Nguni, Arthur Mutambara, Didymus 
Mutasa, Ray Kaukonde, Dzikamai Mavhaire, Brighton Matonga, Rugare Gumbo, Friday Mleya 
and John Mvundura, Kudakwashe Bhasikiti, Colonel Claudius Makova and Henry Muradzikwa 
among others.728 The party was registered with the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in 
2016 and officially entered opposition politics.729 The party proclaimed to be home-grown, 
inclusive and geared towards promoting the wishes and aspirations of Zimbabweans ‘first.’ 
Attempts were made in the constitution of ZPF to make the party democratic and no one would 
hold any portfolio for more than ten years, with a party manifesto: Blueprint to Unlock Investment 
and Leverage for Development (BUILD).730The acronym, taken literally, meant that ZPF was 
dedicating itself to the building of a new Zimbabwe, with priority given to the people first in terms 
of their welfare and economic advancement as opposed to the culture of accumulation espoused 
by individual politicians. It could also be interpreted to mean building and solidifying new relations 
out of the chaos that rocked Matabeleland during the Gukurahundi era, and out of the repression, 
political killings and a culture of intolerance that had become a characteristic feature of 
Zimbabwean elections since 2000. BUILD acknowledged the lack of investment opportunities 
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because of the country’s indigenisation and empowerment policies that inhibited foreign 
investment and promoted black racism.731 
One of the challenges ZPF faced as a party resonated with the constraints that ZUM experienced 
as a party formed from ZANU-PF out of emotions rather than out of a clear ideological standpoint 
to drive the development agenda of the country. The leadership of the party comprised renegades 
from ZANU-PF who had been dismissed, together with former vice president Mujuru for 
conniving to topple Mugabe. They were responsible for challenging the status quo during the many 
years they had been ministers and national leaders. Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo are 
examples of long serving members of ZANU-PF, dating back to the formative years of the 
nationalist struggle. They had been schooled in the ZANU-PF political etiquette, and so could not 
be trusted by many people who saw in ZPF, a replica of ZANU-PF in all but name, to lead the 
country when they had failed to do so since 1980. The background history of the ZPF party 
leadership compromised its legitimacy and had the potential to scare away prospective political 
party supporters given that Gumbo was the ZANU-PF spokesperson who abused the whole media 
platform to denigrate and delegitimise the MDC ahead of the 2013 watershed elections. Mutasa 
had been Mugabe’s closest ally until the 2008 elections when the factional bhora musango 
phenomenon (‘kick the ball into the forest’) when ZANU-PF won the parliamentary elections but 
lost the Presidential elections to the MDC. Solomon Mujuru’s (Rex Nhongo’s) faction orchestrated 
this bhora musango stratagem to try and get rid of Mugabe, whom he appeared to have been fed 
up with. Towards the 2013 harmonised elections, the bhora musango faction was represented by 
Joice Mujuru, Gumbo and Mutasa, among others. The bhora mughedhi faction (kick the ball into 
the net) representing Mugabe’s key allies in the party, was used to distinguish and deal decisively 
with those party members who wanted to see Mugabe lose in the 2013 elections.732  
From the point of view of the interviewed war veteran, Reuben, the bhora musango faction had 
false patriots because the MDC was formed in the house owned by a ZANU-PF member with a 
high-ranking position in the party with a view to using the MDC to take over power.733 This is one 
dimension of the growing internal opposition to Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. By 1999, consequences for 
                                                 
731 Ibid. 
732 Interview with Reuben. 
733 Interview with Reuben. He refused to disclose the name of the ZANU-PF member whose house he alleges to 
have been used  
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ZANU-PF members being identified with the opposition MDC that had just been formed, it was 
feared, would result in elimination from the party and termination of one’s political career. It was 
only after his expulsion from ZANU-PF that Mutasa, commenting on the 2008 March elections in 
which Mugabe was defeated by Tsvangirai, described Mugabe as a nonagenarian who remained 
in power through chicanery and brute force.734 When the MDC lost the 2013 elections, people 
wrote it off as ‘spent and finished’ and when ‘Mai’( Mother) Mujuru joined opposition politics, 
the whole opposition media started writing about her as if she was the Mater dei saviour of 
Zimbabwean politics.735 Her image was portrayed, like that of the Virgin Mary, as a symbol of 
compassion and sanctity.736 Because of her close association with ZANU-PF, and having been a 
woman freedom fighter who survived the Nyadzonia massacre, Mai Mujuru’s entry into opposition 
politics was regarded as a ‘tsunami’ to Zimbabwean politics because it tainted opposition politics. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has made a case against internal cohesion within ZANU-PF since independence in 
1980. The euphoria of the first few years after independence gave a deceptive feeling of unity that 
cloaked deep divisions inherent in the party. ZANU-PF was a broad-based party in terms of its 
membership that cut across the ethnic divide and factional politics within the party. The struggle 
for democracy from within the party was apparent after the Unity Accord in 1987 when PF-ZAPU 
ceased to exist as a party as its key members were drafted into the structures of government. The 
political and structural challenges that had led to the dissident menace between 1982 and 1987 
were not resolved but were transposed into the new dispensation under the enlarged ZANU-PF 
government.  
The former opposition PF-ZAPU members were temporarily silenced, but outright criticism from 
the party came from Tekere who overtly attacked the government for its drive towards a one-party 
state, corruption, dishonouring the revolutionary ideals of democratic governance and its failure 
to equitably distribute land. He launched ZUM, which became the first official opposition against 
ZANU-PF from within the party itself. Tekere’s party was demonised and objectified as a disaster 
                                                 
734 F. Kwaramba, (2017). ZANU-PF wants Tsvangirai dead. https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/03/13/zanu-
pf-wants-tsvangirai-dead Accessed 19 June 2018. 
735 Interview with Sydney Chisi 
736 T. J. Johnson, & B. Ottaviani-Jones, (2014). The Virgin Mary on screen: Mater Dei or just a mother in Guido 
Chiesa’s Io Sono con Te (I Am with You). Journal of Religion & Film, 18(1), p. 2.  
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for the country through state-controlled media propaganda as a party that represented foreign 
interests and drove an external political agenda. The party got little leeway to freely campaign in 
rural areas and so remained little known outside urban constituencies. Grassroots communities 
were vulnerable, and ZUM and other opposition parties that followed it could not penetrate rural 
constituencies, however they tried, because of how receptive they were to pro-government 
information about opposition parties that was being disseminated by the ruling party. After the 
defeat of ZUM in the 1990 presidential elections, there was voter apathy in the 1995 and 
subsequent elections, the electorate possibly feeling that there was little point in voting. There was 
no strong and widely-supported break-away opposition party to demystify ZANU-PF political 
power electorally as labeling, violence, intimidation and institutionalised fear were deployed 
against opposition supporters.  
The PR system used in the 1980 general elections, deemed by many whites as conducive to 
democratic representation in that political representation in government positions was in 
proportion to the number of votes cast for any party, and which logically facilitated a coalition 
government in the 1980-1985 period, was abandoned in 1985 to pave way for the Single Member 
District or ‘First past the post winner-takes-all’ system. If the PR system had been used in the 1990 
elections, Tekere’s ZUM could have gained 20 parliamentary seats.737 Makumbe and Sithole738 
also argue that the ruling party experienced a gradual decline in elite cohesion which resulted in 
electoral challenges by independent candidates from the ruling party itself, and that this 
independent candidate phenomenon could have far-reaching consequences in overcoming the 
weakness of organised opposition to ZANU.  
The sanctions era from 2001 to 2008 impacted negatively on the government and the ruling 
ZANU-PF party. It can be argued that many people in ZANU-PF targeted by the smart sanctions, 
including those not affected by them, were frustrated with being isolated from the rest of the world. 
This dynamic could have heightened factional fights within the party between the hardliners and 
moderates. Other opposition parties that emerged from within the ZANU-PF fold, such as MKD 
under Simba Makoni, Margret Dongo’s ZUD, Dumbutshena’s Forum Party, and other individual 
ZANU-PF members that elected to participate in elections as Independents had their activities 
                                                 
 737 M. Sithole & J. Makumbe, (1997). Elections in Zimbabwe, p 128. 
738 Ibid., p. 123. 
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circumscribed as other parties were compelled to pull out from the electoral competitions because 
the playing field favoured ZANU-PF. The Tsholotsho Declaration of 2004 was a show of dissent. 
It emanated from many key members of the ruling party. Mugabe’s highhandedness in dealing 
with the leadership crisis for the vice President threatened potential party dissidents with expulsion 
from the party while at the same time ‘the cult of personality’, or personalismo,739 made Mugabe 
demonstrate his political acumen in defusing what seemed to be a serious threat to his own position 
as president.740 Jonathan Moyo, who together with others was expelled from the party for the 
conspiracy, was later re-admitted when on two separate occasions he won the Tsholotsho seat as 
an Independent. The proviso that upon rejoining ZANU-PF Jonathan Moyo would take the seat to 
ZANU-PF subverted any meaningful opposition that could be organised in Matabeleland. The 
ousting of Joice Mujuru in 2014 was preceded by the death of her husband, Solomon Mujuru, in 
an inferno in 2011 Joice Mujuru’s expulsion from the ruling party led to the formation of ZPF 
which, like other parties before it, was accordingly lambasted as a party bent on giving the country 
back to whites, and as a party that wanted to remove Mugabe from power by force.  
It can thus be argued that opposition from within ZANU-PF failed to make any political headway 
because the parties were formed out of emotions and anger at their treatment within the party, and 
that they differed little from the mother party that gave rise to them. They have been largely 
criticised for their lack of clear political agendas and philosophical thrusts to drive the country 
forward. They appeared to be mini-versions of ZANU-PF and exhibited continuity traits that made 
the electorate shun away from them because they replicated ZANU-PF ways of political 
engagement and failed to liberate themselves. Above all, ZANU-PF had Mugabe, an intellectual 
and a shrewd politician of international stature who used his eloquence and instrumental 
demonisation of the British to hold onto power amidst internal party dissensions and external 
threats to his quasi-military regime. Further proof that ZANU-PF contains tensions within it is 
that, as I am writing this conclusion, political purges of those suspected of allying with the G40 in 
the army, police, the CIO and government departments continue under the Mnangagwa regime. 
These issues are discussed in the following and final chapter.   
 
                                                 
739 K. K. Prah, (2003). Multi-party democracy and its relevance in Africa, p. 3 
740 Ibid., p. 4. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN ZIMBABWE: CONCLUDING 
ANALYSIS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
A week before the March 2008 harmonised elections,741 Mugabe warned the country that a vote 
for Tsvangirai would be a wasted vote because he would never be allowed to rule the country.742 
Such a statement went far beyond electoral rhetoric and was viewed as a specific threat that the 
state would deploy all means possible to keep Tsvangirai out of power even if he won. Speculation 
was rife that this was the case after the presidential results, in an election that pitted Mugabe, 
Tsvangirai and Simba Makoni against each other, were withheld for over a month as if to confirm 
a manipulated presidential ballot. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) comprising three heads 
of security agencies-Augustine Chihuri (Police Commissioner General), Major General Paradzai 
Zimondi (Commissioner of Prisons) and Commander of the Defence Forces (General Constantino 
Chiwenga), as well as Emmerson Mnangagwa (Chair), Happyton Bonyongwe (representing the 
Central Intelligence Organisation) and Perence Shiri (representing the Airforce) had publicly 
declared on 27 February 2008 their support for Mugabe ahead of the elections.743 They argued that 
Tsvangirai and others in the opposition MDC were ‘mapuruvheya’ (sell-outs) serving the neo-
colonial agenda of the British and Americans.744 General Chiwenga referred to Tsvangirai as a 
psychiatric patient suffering from hallucinations.745 
This concluding chapter summarises the status of multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe after many 
years of ZANU-PF hegemony. It captures critical developments in the history of opposition 
politics in the country and evaluates attempts by the ZANU-PF government to forestall meaningful 
political participation by other parties that differed ideologically with it. Opposition factionalism 
defined in ethnicised criteria of Ndau, Zezuru, Manyika and Ndebele has prevented a strong 
                                                 
741 These were elections in which for the first time, Council, Mayoral, Parliamentary and Presidential elections were 
held together and not separately as before, hence ‘harmonised elections.’ The electorate was subjected to a 
cumbersome voting exercise in which each voter had to come up with four candidates of choice to represent these 
categories and the process was complicated in urban areas where constituencies had been reduced making it difficult 
for others to vote. Note that only urban areas elected mayors and this disenfranchised many potential voters. 
742 K. Vollan, (2008). Zimbabwe: The elections on 29 March and the later runoff event and by-elections on 27 June., 
p. 2.  
743 S Jakes, (2017). Chiwenga declared he will never meet with Tsvangirai, Bulawayo24, 5 December 2017. 
https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-123662.html Accessed 10 December 2017. 
744 Ibid. 
745 Ibid. 
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opposition alliance against the more experienced and tested ZANU-PF. The increasing role of the 
military establishment, which was key to the sustenance of ZANU-PF power through electoral 
manipulation, is discussed to intimate that progress towards democratic change by means of 
elections could be a long way from becoming a reality. Structural challenges that the opposition 
had to grapple with during the GNU era are highlighted with a view to contextualising the 
circumstances that inevitably created a downward political trajectory for the opposition ahead of 
the 2013 harmonised elections.  
Finally, this chapter briefly traces the unprecedented and unexpected developments that took place 
at the time of writing this dissertation. One of these developments is the resignation of Mugabe in 
November 2017 under pressure from the same military leadership upon whom he had relied to 
retain power for 37 years. It analyses the fast-tracking of EmMerson Dambudzo Mnangagwa as 
new president whose cabinet was a military cabinet code-named ‘coupcabinet.’746 He had been 
dismissed by Mugabe in November 2017 from being vice president in a fierce political contest 
with the G40 ‘cabal’ led by Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere, Grace Mugabe and Patrick 
Zhuwawo. The ‘coupcabinet’ comprised the military men who had executed the ‘soft’ coup d’état. 
An analysis of military interventions in ZANU-PF succession issues since 1975, as well as their 
influence on the choice of the country’s president, both of which are inconsistent with ideal 
democratic behaviour, attest to the presence of serious impediments to a democratic transition 
process in Zimbabwe ahead of the 2018 harmonised elections. The dissertation also takes a swipe 
at the increasing role of the army in Zimbabwean politics and argues that multiparty democracy 
cannot be built and sustained on a legacy of militarisation of politics. Giroux views identity politics 
as lying within a broader crisis of political culture and democracy that connects the militarisation 
of public life with the collapse of the welfare state and the attack on civil liberties.747 There cannot 
be feasible multiparty democracy in the absence of strong democratic political parties. 
                                                 
746 Jonathan Moyo’s tweets that he posted after escaping from Zimbabwe criticised the developments in the country 
as a military coup and the Cabinet with a strong military edifice was a Cabinet by the coup plotters. 
747 H. A. Giroux, (2005). The terror of neoliberalism: Rethinking the significance of cultural politics. College 
Literature, 32, p. 3. 
205 
 
7.2 FACTIONS BASED ON ETHNICITY WITHIN THE OPPOSITION 
Ethnic politics did not spare opposition parties, particularly when a split occurred in the MDC 
movement in 2005 over the government’s decision to create a bicameral legislature with the 
traditional Legislative Assembly and the Senate. Tendai Biti from the main MDC-T commented 
in 2008 on the replacement of the ‘old and ailing’ Mugabe and posited that it was time for 
politicians from the Shona dialects to take over power.748 Welshman Ncube’s MDC party was 
criticized as pro-Ndebele because when it broke away from the original labour-oriented MDC 
movement, it had its political support concentrated in Matabeleland. As such, Ncube confined his 
campaigns to rural parts of Matabeleland where he was sure to get support; hence, Tsvangirai 
called him ‘a village politician.’749 Ncube also argued that Tsvangirai paraded himself as a paragon 
of democracy while MDC-T continued to offer token positions to people from Matabeleland.750  
The Ndebele came to view both Mugabe and Tsvangirai as anti-Ndebele. According to the former 
MDC Secretary-General, Moses Mzila Ndlovu, the MDC-T support base had become more Shona-
centred than it had been in 2010 as it got support from the Karanga, Ndau, Zezuru, Manyika.751 
Mzila was later sacked from the MDC led by Welshman Ncube for allegedly plotting to topple the 
party president.752 Mzila equated the party leader Ncube with most leaders in Zimbabwean politics 
who do not brook any opposing views, and was critical of his dictatorial leadership.753 In a separate 
development, Didymus Mutasa and Rugare Gumbo were expelled from Joice Mujuru’s Zimbabwe 
People First on allegations of being ZANU-PF agents with a mission to topple Mujuru from her 
interim position as president.754 This resonated the sacking language in ZANU-PF which Mugabe 
used on different occasions against Edgar Tekere, Ndabaningi Sithole and Abel Muzorewa, 
suggesting continuities of ZANU-PF practices within the opposition parties. Mujuru broke ranks 
with Mutasa and Gumbo and proceeded to form the National People’s Party (NPP) with a 
                                                 
748 M. Phiri, (2013). Ethnic politics on the Zimbawean campaign trail: do voters really care? 19 February 2013. 
http://africanarguments.org/2013/02/19/ethnic-politics-on-the-zimbabwean-campaign-trail-do-voters-really-care-by-
marko-phiri/ Accessed 18 October 2016. 
749 T. Shava, (2016). Deposed Secretary General hits back, accuses Ncube of incompetence, 8 February 2016. 
www.voazimbabwe.com Accessed 19 September 2017. 
750 M. Phiri, (2013). ‘Ethnic politics on the Zimbabwean campaign trail.  
751 Ibid. 
752 T. Shava, (2016). Deposed Secretary General hits back. 
753  Ibid. 
754 F. Kwaramba, Deadly turmoil hits Mujuru, ZPF, DailyNews 9 February 2017. 
https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/02/09/deadly-turmoil-hits-mujuru-zpf  Accessed 27 October 2017. 
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constitution identical to that of ZPF as she continued to face many desertions by Sylvester Nguni, 
Agrippa Mutambara and Ray Kaukonde among others.755  
The Ncube-led MDC was rocked with a spate of resignations such as that of Priscilla 
Misihairambwi, Nhlanhla Dube and national spokesman Joshua Muhambi in 2015.756 These 
developments took place at a time when Zimbabweans were expressing their dissatisfaction with 
opposition parties for their failure to proffer solutions to the socioeconomic and political 
challenges facing the country. It was the failure of opposition parties to unite that led Joice Mujuru, 
leader of the NPP party, to conclude that coalescing of multiparty opposition was not easy since it 
required disciplined engagement of competing ideological thought processes, mature evaluation 
of the intended destination and the need for bona fide reflection and association.757 This weakness 
on the part of the opposition has always given ZANU-PF an advantage in electoral contests.  
7.3 THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN DEMOCRATIC PREFERMENT 
The Zimbabwean story provides a stark reminder that the most dangerous thing that democrats can 
do is to take the military for granted.758 For political change to occur, Williamson759 predicted that 
the door to democracy could be opened if war veterans’ support was won, if the military leadership 
was replaced and if legal and political reforms were made. The Zimbabwean army has a long 
political tradition and the events that took place in November 2017 were a stark reminder to 
opposition parties that ZANU-PF’s philosophical mobilisation mantra emanates from the historical 
interconnectedness of the gun and politics. When ZANU-PF started to build a protective 
hegemonic wall to buttress its control of the state dating back to the 1985 elections, the role of the 
military was clearly visible in Matabeleland and in sections of the Midlands Province. The 
electorate in those provinces either withdrew from electoral politics or involuntarily voted for the 
ruling party out of fear of the consequences of not voting ‘correctly’ for ZANU-PF. 
                                                 
755 M. Tafirenyika, Mujuru launches new party, DailyNews, 4 March 2017.  
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756 T. Shava (2016). Deposed Secretary General hits back. 
757 R. Chidza, (2017). Mujuru rips into Tsvangirai. NewsDay, 3 July 2017. 
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Border Gezi from Mashonaland Central Province became a very powerful figure in ZANU-PF and 
most feared by the opposition politicians and activists for his ruthlessness. In honour of his ability 
to coordinate election violence and intimidation, and as Minister of Gender, Youth and 
Employment, Border Gezi Training camps for ZANU-PF youth militias, popularly known as 
‘Green Bombers’,760 were set up across the country. The first of such institutions set up in Mount 
Darwin, Gezi’s home area and inaugurated by Mugabe in 2001761, provided pioneering work for 
training the country’s youths. By 2008, the training camps had churned out about 80 000 
‘graduates’ ostensibly aimed at instilling fear into the electorate, although Mugabe argued that 
these training camps were ideological schools for instilling discipline, national pride and moral 
uprightness among the youth.762 Instituting a National Youth Service in Zimbabwe, as is the case 
in many countries throughout the world, happened at a time when ZANU-PF support in many rural 
constituencies had declined sharply and that gave credibility to opposition fears that the graduates 
from the Border Gezi camps were the functional equivalent of the Storm Troopers in Germany in 
the 1930s763, that did not baulk at murder when tasked with identifying and silencing opposition 
supporters. Lecturers were mostly retired teachers, retired army personnel, war veterans and others 
with a military background.764 The course content, which covered aspects of African History, 
Health Education, Community Development, International Humanitarian Law and 
Entrepreneurship, was also introduced in Teachers’ Colleges and Polytechnic Colleges, and 
priority in government employment and in securing teacher training places was given to graduates 
from the Border Gezi National Youth Service.765  
Militarisation was the posting by ZANU-PF of military men to state institutions and their 
engagement in partisan politics and networks of accumulation and patronage.766 The first rule of 
                                                 
760 The term was derogatory and was used to vilify the National Youth Service at the Border Gezi training camps as 
a partisan programme meant to promote and protect ZANU-PF against the rising opposition MDC at that time. 
Green bombers are green flies that, if allowed to settle on perishables like meat, make it go bad by laying eggs that 
hatch so quickly into pupae.   
761 The Herald, National Youth Service:16 years down the line, 29 December 2017. 
762 Ibid. 
763 Ibid. 
764  Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 22 August 2007. 
765 Ibid. 
766 J. Alexander & J. McGregor, (2013). Introduction: Politics, patronage and violence in Zimbabwe. Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 39, p. 752. 
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survival for a sitting president [in Africa] according to Chitiyo,767 is to keep the security forces 
happy by paying them. In order to placate the military and make it ZANU-PF’s key support prop, 
Mugabe’s regime always had an inflated military budget, and, during the era of money shortages, 
monthly pay dates for the army came earlier than those for civil servants. The commander of the 
ZDF, Zvinavashe, in 2002 made an infamous straitjacket statement against Morgan Tsvangirai, 
the opposition MDC leader, to the effect that the military would not tolerate him for president even 
if he won an election.768 
In the first round of presidential elections in March 2008, Mugabe is said to have conceded defeat 
and was prepared to relinquish power to Tsvangirai, but the Generals prevented him from 
leaving769 because his departure would have exposed them to prosecution for their crimes of 
international reputation.770 The JOC led by Paradzai Zimondi, Perence Shiri, Happyton 
Bonyongwe and Constantino Chiwenga had monopolistic control over the instruments of political 
violence. Joseph Chinotimba was not a member of the JOC, but he exerted a lot of influence as 
one of the outspoken leaders of the War Veterans Association. Williamson771 focuses on 
Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control which seeks to nurture and establish civil-military 
relations through legal, political and institutional reforms that allow for democracy in the state. 
Politicising the military has not engendered healthy civil-military relations in Zimbabwe. 
The security service, because of its proclaimed entitlement to the liberation legacy, could only 
respect an election outcome that pinpointed ZANU-PF as the winners. Doughlas Mwonzora, the 
opposition MP, reiterated that while events in Mali in 2012 against Amadou Toumani Touré and 
in Ivory Coast in 2017 against president Alassane Ouattara were direct coups, Zimbabwe was 
under a ‘soft’ coup after the disputed 2008 presidential elections when politicians fell under the 
influence of the gun.772 Mwonzora lamented how after the defeat of ZANU-PF in the 2008 
elections, the gun directed Zimbabwean politics, and the Head of State was not one in real terms 
as he was under siege from the military.773 All strategic entities of government such as parastatal 
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15.  
768 D. Moore, (2017). SABC News Interview, 18 November 2017. 
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and strategic ministries were under the direct control of the military. This explains why the road 
to constitutionalism through the writing of a new constitution to allow for free, fair and inclusive 
elections was painstakingly slow and honoured more in the breach than in the observance. 
Madzimure, an opposition MP in the Mbizo constituency of the town of Kwekwe, equated 
Zimbabwe with a police state where opposition members and their supporters were arrested before 
they committed crimes, a practice that is antithetical to a functioning democracy in which the 
police are, instead, the face of justice. Madzimure774  had this complaint to make in the National 
Assembly of the Parliament of Zimbabwe: 
We cannot have a situation where you [ZANU-PF] say we can go for an election, but if we 
lose, we cannot hand over power. Then why do we subject our people to this process? If it 
is not possible for power to be transferred, it must be made clear that in Zimbabwe, there 
is no opposition politics. If you have opposition politics, you must be prepared to hand over 
power.  
Subjecting people to elections whose results they think are premeditated allowed for voter apathy 
to creep in. Lebas’775 contention that in a police state people do not need a party that is democratic, 
but they need a party that is an army is probably an accurate characterisation of ZANU-PF during 
the post 2000 referendum. Mitchell and Booth776 refer to the anti-electoralism fallacy which 
assumes that multiparty elections do not matter for democracy since it is possible to have them 
without democracy, but we cannot have democracy without elections. From this observation, 
multiparty elections do not necessarily lead to democracy, and democracy and elections are 
different concepts in electoral competitions. 
It can be argued that one of the constraints to multiparty democracy in the world is the different 
interpretations that individual states give to Article 2.7 of the International Law. It recognises the 
‘sovereignty’ of states, and dictators and despots have opportunistically utilised the article to 
trample on human rights on the basic premise that other countries cannot intervene since doing so 
                                                 
774 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, (2012). 38 (44). 
775 A. Lebas, (2006). Polarisation as craft: party formation and state violence in Zimbabwe. Comparative Politics, 
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would be construed as interference in the sovereignty of other independent states.777 The 
Zimbabwean political violence ahead of the June 2008 re-run elections, it being essentially a case 
of black against black, was also meted against SADC monitors who were beaten at the Sheraton 
grounds by the Border Gezi-trained militia,778 yet SADC and the AU ignored the violence and 
proceeded to confirm Mugabe’s victory. The period between the re-run presidential elections held 
in June 2008 and the harmonised elections of 2013 after the expiry of the GNU witnessed 
unrelenting violence against opposition supporters in rural areas. In response to a question posed 
in the National Assembly, the Deputy PM Arthur Mutambara remarked: 
Our chiefs… should be above party politics. Chiefs must be non-partisan. They must not 
campaign for one party. Chiefs re a unifying custodian of a community’s tradition and 
culture. It is completely unacceptable for our chiefs to pursue the agenda of one party. Land 
reform was a revolution and revolutions by definition are not pretty: they are untidy. There 
has never been a bloodless revolution in history. 779 
The ideology that political power comes from the barrel of a gun has had its influence on the 
revolutionary armies of ZANLA and ZIPRA. The Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary 
Affairs in 2003, Patrick Chinamasa, referred to the existence of only one party – ZANU-PF – in 
the country, before alluding to the contribution ZAPU that made to the liberation of Zimbabwe 
when he remarked: 
…as a country we have a very unique stage of history where the people who contributed 
to the liberation struggle of this country come from one party. The people who liberated 
this country did so under the banner of ZANU and ZAPU. For quite some time the people 
who will know who did what and where will be coming from ZANU-PF … the party will 
continue to determine who is a hero. If we are to ask who betrayed the revolution … we 
will know where to go. We can ask MDC to form that committee and tell us to what extent 
they betrayed the revolution.780 
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Legal reforms to create democratic space for opposition voices are inadequate even if the National 
Defence Policy published in 1997 through an Act of Parliament stipulated that the military was 
subordinated to civilian authority and that the military personnel were prohibited from active 
participation in politics, but that they could exercise their democratic right to vote and were not 
permitted  to hold office in any political party or political organisation.781 Williamson predicted 
that because of the reluctance of the military to relinquish power, Zimbabwe could only hope for 
a coup within the ranks of the military with outside assistance.782 Conspiracy theorists implicate  
China for complicity in the coup that deposed Mugabe in Zimbabwe in November 2017 because 
the military General Chiwenga met with the Chinese Defence Minister, Chang Wanquan, in 
Beijing at the People’s Liberation Army headquarters to discuss what the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
portrayed as a ‘normal military exchange’ a few days before the army seized power in 
Zimbabwe.783  
7.4 GNU POWER POLITICS AND THE BLAME GAME (2009-2013): STRUCTURAL 
CHALLENGES FOR THE OPPOSITION 
In conflict situations, it is often very hard to force two groups that are in opposition to work 
together and get positive results. Given the demonisation discourses that had characterised the 
period between 2000 and 2008 between ZANU-PF and the opposition, political tension was so 
high to the extent that the AU mandated South Africa to mediate in the political conflict over 
control of the state. The first task for Thabo Mbeki, then South African president and mediator, 
was to bring the three warring parties – ZANU-PF under Mugabe, MDC-T under Tsvangirai and 
MDC-M under Mutambara – to the negotiation table where conciliation could take place. The 
decisions reached by the three principals became known as the GPA which came into existence on 
15 September 2008 as a marriage of convenience784 or inconvenience depending on the political 
perspective of analysts.  
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Power-sharing became the preferred strategy to bring the political impasse to an end and a GNU 
was set up to implement GPA resolutions among which was the drawing up of a new constitution 
to be used in the 2013 elections. The chairman of the NCA, Lovemore Madhuku, castigated the 
constitutional outreach programmes to gather people’s views about what they wanted included in 
the constitution as flawed, chaotic and a waste of time. Politicians fed their respective supporters 
with what to say, and Madhuku questions whether that can suffice as a description of a 
constitution.785 Sharing power in the so-called Inclusive Government786 involved establishing an 
inclusive governance institution that represented a broad range of concerned parties as well as 
providing for bureaucratic posts and new rules regarding the subsequent management of the 
security forces.787 This background is important in that it allows for the problematisation of the 
implementation of the agreement as suspicions ran deep.  
One of the aspects that created deep distrust of ZANU-PF manoeuvres by the opposition resulted 
from the security reform deficit. Mnangagwa, who was the Minister of Defence, avowed that the 
military would not undergo reform while he remained in government.788 Mokhawa,789 in 
discussing the distinctive nature of the Zimbabwean situation and its exclusionary politics that is 
instituted within a military epistemic authority that shaped political militarism, concludes that the 
use of military power to solve political problems, led to the development of officer corps that were 
close to the ruling party. That made it a very vital cog in the ZANU-PF machine when it comes to 
releasing election results. Coltart790 alludes to the opposition’s struggle for democracy and 
critiques the role of the political extremists in ZANU-PF of whom the military is part, in subverting 
Zimbabwe’s chances of realising its potential. The SADC-initiated GPA played well into ZANU-
PF hands as the party recuperated from the doldrums of growing illegitimacy. According to 
Raftopoulos, the GPA was a passive revolution in which a ZANU-PF that was facing political and 
economic crisis, used the space created to reconfigure and re-negotiate the terms of its [renewed] 
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existence with the opposition, civil society and the international community.791 In line with this 
thinking, Kriger792 also states that there was an orchestrated informalisation of political networks 
by ZANU-PF which cohered sufficiently to run a parallel government that effectively sabotaged 
the Inclusive Government.  
Opposition councillors from both rural and urban areas were allegedly deprived of resources, 
mobility and political efficacy that could assist them to discharge their duties during the GNU 
era.793 Many opposition interviewees contend that the ruling ZANU-PF party was not wholly in 
the GNU framework but was mainly concerned with the retention of state power through control 
of key ministries. That was the reason that ministries concerned with social service delivery were 
reserved for the opposition. ZANU-PF’s use of informal networks and parallel structures aligned 
to the party created a different source of power with more influence on the activities of government 
than the GNU itself. Mandiwanzira794 is critical of the opposition’s participation in the GNU, 
arguing that opposition ministers projected themselves as very greedy people who got embroiled 
in looting and acquiring property. To support his view, Mandiwanzira cited the example of Tendai 
Biti, who, before becoming the Finance Minister in the GNU, is said to have threatened to sell all 
Mercedez Benzes owned by ZANU-PF ministers if he got into power but proceeded to buy more 
during the GNU era. He also bemoans the hypocritical tendencies of opposition politicians and 
concludes that many people concluded that they would rather stick to ZANU-PF, a party that they 
were familiar with, and work to improve it from within.  
Competition for corruption by both MDC and ZANU-PF intensified during the GNU era. 
McLaughlin contends that Tsvangirai’s personal life left a lot to be desired, although it is not clear 
to what extent that influenced people’s voting decisions. McLaughlin admitted that she liked the 
former vice President Joice Mujuru personally but regrets her tarnished image after so many years 
with ZANU-PF. MDC-T’s willingness to use violence, which Coltart documents in his book The 
struggle continues: 50 years of tyranny in Zimbabwe, was fatalistic for the entire opposition 
movement in the country as it led to the split in 2005.795  
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In trying to expose Tsvangirai’s social life outside marriage, McLaughlin claimed to know one of 
Tsvangirai’s earlier wives with whom he had two children that he did not support financially or 
emotionally. Tsvangirai was also involved with several girlfriends after the death of his wife Susan 
in a motor vehicle accident when he was at the wheel. McLaughlin also argued that while 
Tsvangirai’s personal life was not admirable that factor may not have influenced many people in 
a negative way, citing as an example Donald Trump’s chequered personal life which, while also 
open to criticism, did not prevent him winning the presidential elections in the USA in 2016.796 
McLaughlin is critical of the opposition party members in the GNU who, she argued, tarnished 
their image by being corrupt, living in big houses and accepting expensive vehicles, thus distancing 
themselves from the ordinary people who were their support base.797  
Interviewees tended to blame the opposition for complacency when they tested power. Maziriri 
was of the view that the opposition became disoriented and lost their trajectory once power in a 
GNU framework got into their hands.798Kori intimates that the opposition was caught in a trap: it 
should not have joined the GNU because opposition ministers were given posts to clean up the 
mess that ZANU-PF had created and resultantly they were exposed in the scandalous allocation of 
residential stands.799 On the other hand, ZANU-PF, during the entire GNU era, was instituting a 
strategy of retaining presidential, military and security sector power, using a policy change around 
issues of [black] empowerment, indigenisation and patriotic nationalism.800   
Based on the election results of the 2013 elections, Lebas concluded that ZANU-PF emerged from 
the power-sharing period strengthened because it found  new means of deploying patronage to the 
military officials and loyalist as well as vulnerable MDC-T voters.801 Booysen802  takes the debate 
further and links opposition decline after the 2013 elections to a weak leadership that subjected 
itself to ZANU-PF during the GNU, poor ethics in local government and the destruction of trade 
union anchors of the opposition MDC-T through de-industrialisation, all of which resulted in a 
                                                 
796 Interview with Janice McLaughlin. 
797 Interview with Janice McLaughlin 
798 Interview with Freedom Maziriri, 23 May 2017. 
799 Interview with Arkmore Kori, 29 May 2017. 
800 S. Booysen, (2014). The decline of Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai: public opinion 
polls posting the writing on the wall. Transformation: Critical Perspectives on Southern Africa, 84, p. 54.  
801 O. Hodzi, (2014). Commodification of elections: the future of elections in Zimbabwe. Modern Africa: politics, 
History and Society, 2, p. 40.  
802 S. Booysen, (2014). ‘The decline of Zimbabwe's Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai, p. 61. 
215 
 
shift in Zimbabwe’s political orientation away from MDC-T. Pro-opposition interviewees 
contended that the two MDC formations joined the GNU and  concentrated on improving the well-
being of the people – education and health – which had deteriorated, while ZANU-PF was putting 
on brakes and concentrating on building political infrastructure which involved establishing pillars 
of support and strengthening the influence of chiefs in the rural electorate.803  
The upward trajectory of the MDC formations suffered on the heels of incessant splits, with the 
first one in 2005 and the most damaging ones after the 2013 elections that saw Tendai Biti and 
Elton Mangoma forming their own parties, after having split from Tsvangirai’s MDC. It can be 
argued that opposition unity during the GNU was destroyed by ZANU-PF that used its networks 
to influence key people in the party to split, hence the breakaways by Tendai Biti and Elton 
Mangoma after 2013.804 Nyamutsungira805 implicated the state machinery in creating cleavages 
within the opposition, arguing that the two were given huge sums of money by ZANU-PPF to 
destroy the opposition MDC, and that they were threatened with arrest if that did not happen. 
From the above discussion, I argue that the opposition did not distinguish itself from ZANU-PF in 
terms of its approaches to doing state business. MDC became as tainted as ZANU-PF as its 
members were systematically bought into upper-class corruption.806 Tsvangirai was not 
outstanding as PM of the GNU aside from chairing the Council of Ministers, and from 
McLaughlin’s point of view, he could have been thwarted by ZANU-PF’s parallel structures if he 
tried to do more.807 Outstanding issues that the opposition wanted addressed fully, and which 
almost wrecked the GNU, remained unresolved. These included demands such as the replacement 
of the Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, whom the MDC accused of releasing state funds to 
sponsor ZANU-PF violence and political killings, and the AG Tomana who was partisan in his 
dispensation of justice, granting ZANU-PF perpetrators of political violence immunity so that they 
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would not face the consequences of their actions, and the removal of the warrant of arrest issued 
to Roy Bennett, the MDC Deputy Minister of Agriculture in the GPA.808  
ZANU-PF and MDC-T viewed the Bennett case differently. He was the MP for Chimanimani 
constituency in Manicaland Province and had just been released from prison for an altercation he 
had had in parliament with Didymus Mutasa and Patrick Chinamasa. In the view of MDC-T, 
Bennett was not allowed to assume office under the new GNU dispensation on allegations from 
ZANU-PF of possessing weapons that he wanted to use to unseat it. For Raftopoulos, the MDC in 
the GPA struggled to position itself in a state whose structure was still largely moulded by the 
imperatives of ZANU-PF’s military economic elite.809 It can be concluded that ZANU-PF refused 
to concede defeat in 2008 and was still reluctant to yield to opposition demands as mutually agreed 
to in the GPA because that could have given the MDC parties more visibility, more respectability 
and an upward political trajectory. 
7.5 THE 2013 HARMONISED ELECTIONS AND THE OPPOSITION’S TRAJECTORY 
The post 2000 referendum period as well as the 2002 parliamentary elections witnessed an upward 
trajectory for the opposition MDC support base when it broke the traditional ZANU-PF 
parliamentary hegemony by gaining 47% of the vote in the 2002 elections. The level of repression 
and violence against civilians in these elections, coupled with unprecedented harassment and 
intimidation of media personnel, ensured a ZANU-PF election victory.810 The 2013 elections gave 
ZANU-PF the two-thirds majority that it needed to form a government wholly controlled by it. 
The MDC-T election manifesto – JUICE – was an acronym for Jobs, Upliftment, Investment, 
Capital, and Environment that it hoped to address upon getting the driving seat after the elections.  
The downward trajectory of the opposition is difficult to measure since 2013 because it was no 
longer in government. Biti complained that there was a 10-15% variance between ZEC figures and 
those collated by the MDC-T agents across the country who covered all the polling stations.811 
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According to Biti, allegations of rigging were confirmed by the fact that ZEC printed 12 million 
ballot papers, twice the number of registered voters, and just a million fewer than the total 
population of Zimbabwe, which was under 13 million based on the 2012 national census.812 
However, what emerges from the elections is that the opposition was beaten and supporters of the 
MDC began to doubt themselves. Political opportunists began to dissociate themselves from the 
MDC-T  to form their own as Biti and Mangoma, indeed, weakened the party by breaking away.813 
Splits and power struggles destroyed the credibility that people had bestowed on the opposition 
and procuring funding for party activities became more difficult. The only source after fundraising 
trips to the United Kingdom, Australia and the USA failed was the government grant for political 
parties in Zimbabwe.814 
Chisi posits that many opposition politicians did not expect to lose in the 2013 elections, and so 
were not focused on an all-out campaign against the ruling establishment which was never going 
to be easily removed overnight. The 47 percent that the MDC had garnered in 2008 was reduced 
to five percent in 2013.815 Chung argues that the opposition betrayed its supporters, whether it is 
the British, Americans, the unemployed or local people who had supported it in its formative days. 
Her argument is premised on the fact that although the land redistribution programme was badly 
done in her view, ZANU-PF delivered land and politicised food as a democratic tool because land 
is democracy as people finally owned it.816 
In 2013, social media were awash with political news disseminated by the fictitious Baba (Father) 
Jukwa. The opposition was misled into believing his message of alleged pandemonium within 
ZANU-PF, which gave it the deceptive feeling of electoral triumph in the forthcoming elections. 
Many posts on cellphones depicted ZANU-PF’s inevitable demise at the hands of the opposition 
MDC, creating in the process, a façade of ZANU-PF’s hopelessness.817 People were assured that 
the prognosis would translate into political reality and no effort was made to identify what Baba 
Jukwa’s real name was. After the defeat of the opposition in the elections, people began to suspect 
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that it could have been a ZANU-PF strategy to create complacency within the opposition ahead of 
the elections as no real campaigning was done to win votes by the MDC on the assumption that 
people were on their side. 
McLaughlin and Komichi make repeated references to an Israeli Company by the name NIKUV, 
that they allege was hired to rig the 2013 elections and to facilitate ZANU-PF’s election victory.818 
The elections were the almost violence-free even though people expected the traditional violent 
campaign that had become the hallmark of ZANU-PF’s political mobilisation techniques. 
According to McLaughlin, South Africa is said to have warned ZANU-PF against using violence 
as it had done in 2008 so it used other ‘electronic things’ from a supportive Israeli company.819 
This is a presumption that Jeremy Cronin, a South African Communist Party member and key 
member of the South African Alliance in 2004, concurs with. He interprets South African foreign 
policy in relation to Zimbabwe, and views the opposition MDC not only as a symptom of 
weaknesses and errors committed by ZANU-PF, but also as a challenge that should be warded off 
and to achieve this, the South African government encouraged ZANU-PF to use a  modernized 
electoral strategy that would avoid violence and allay the danger of regime change through the 
ballot.820 If South African policy towards Zimbabwe was premised on preventing a ZANU-PF 
humiliation at the polls, the mediators, both Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, remain complicit in the 
political crisis and the democratic deficit in Zimbabwe. 
The main MDC-T opposition, ever since its participation in elections in 2000, did not accept the 
results. It argued that results were fraudulent and did not represent the will of the people.  
Allegations of state monopoly over instruments of rigging could be confirmed when, on the eve 
of the 2013 elections, Tsvangirai informed people gathered at an open space adjacent to the ZANU-
PF Headquarters known to the opposition as Freedom Square (now formally called Robert Mugabe 
Square) that the ZEC had still not availed the voters’ roll to MDC-T, nor to any other opposition 
party, two days before the elections.821 It is a matter of electoral procedure that before an election 
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takes place, all parties concerned have copies of voters’ rolls to allow time for inspection and to 
gain knowledge of the location of polling stations. That was in violation of the Electoral Act 
Section 21 (4) which states that within a reasonable period after the calling of an election, ZEC 
shall provide every political party that intends to contest, one copy of every voters’ roll, in print or 
in electronic form.822 With no voters’ roll, parties could not reconcile the number of voters and the 
quantity of ballot papers supplied, which was why Biti regretted the volumes of ballot papers that 
far outstripped the number of registered voters in 2013. Elections dates were called on 13 June, 
but six weeks later there was still no voters’ roll. That meant that there was grossly insufficient 
time to study and make effective use of the voters’ roll. The conclusion by both MDC formations 
that the electoral process was shambolic as it denied many eligible voters the right to vote, much 
to the advantage of ZANU-PF.823  
The opposition MDC-T was prohibited from holding rallies in urban areas where its support was 
strong. The police  broke the huge rally that the MDC-T was supposed to convene in March 2013 
in the Zimbabwe Grounds in the Highfields location was broken up by the police.824 Having the 
final ‘star’ MDC rally very close to ZANU-PF Headquarters a few days before the election was a 
sign of defiance to Mugabe’s rule.825  Chief Police Superintendent, Titus Chagwedera, 
commanding Harare central district, disallowed an MDC-T rally citing inadequate ZRP staff to 
muster enough security deployments for the rally, prompting Biti to  brandish the elections as not 
free nor fair, illegitimate, illegal and immoral.826 It suggests that ZEC did not reveal and had not 
revealed details of polling stations two days before elections.  
Tsvangirai attributed the delay in availing the voters’ roll to his party to ZEC’s complicity in the 
alleged rigging plot, or that ZEC had abdicated that responsibility to other forces.827 Tsvangirai 
went on to make another statement: “Kana vakada kundisunga hameno kuti vanosunga ani nekuti 
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ini ndinenge ndava kutonga ndava President.” (If those in authority [ZANU-PF] want to arrest me, 
it would not work because after elections I will be in power as president).828 He could have been 
provoked into making this statement when he was threatened with arrest by president Mugabe if 
he revealed poll results before the official announcement by ZEC.829 His message to the people 
was predicated on having the electorate to choose between a bleak future and a better future: 
between authoritarianism and democratic governance.830 It was the biggest opposition rally in post-
independence Zimbabwe attended by hundreds of thousands of MDC-T supporters who thought 
they would finally unseat Mugabe through the power of the ballot.831 Pedzisai Ruhanya, Director 
of the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute posits that the rally was unprecedented in terms of its size 
and if all the people present turned out to vote, no amount of technical manipulation of the polls 
would have affected the results.832 This analysis is skewed in favour of the opposition, yet it ignores 
the fact that not all of the people might have been registered to vote, nor were they staunch MDC-
T supporters and that this was just too small a sample upon which to make a bold claim of the 
election results at national level. 
People’s confidence in the opposition began to fade, political despondency and apathy crept in and 
the electorate did not believe elections would change the political landscape because of tactical 
mistakes in the past, such as MDC-T’s willingness to participate in the 2013 elections without a 
voters’ roll.  The government remained steadfast that they would not allow election monitors from 
outside Africa, a decision the opposition believed could allow for a latitude of electoral 
manipulation. Fears were that SADC and the AU which openly declared their solidarity with the 
incumbent ZANU-PF party would, in the spirit of brotherhood, work against opposition parties 
that they viewed as receiving financial and ideological backing from western powers. There were 
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6000 local monitors and 600 foreign monitors drawn from African countries to observe the 
electoral proceedings.833  
The argument by MDC-T supporters was that someone riggable on many occasions, like 
Tsvangirai, was not qualified to lead and that change seemingly might not come through the MDC-
T party. MDC was collapsing under the weight of its own inherent contradictions as a coalition, 
or through the lure of power and wealth as happened in ZAPU in 1987 when it signed a unity 
accord. Roy Bennet, Eddie Cross, David Coltart, Arthur Mutambara, Lovemore Madhuku and 
Tsvangirai were no longer vibrant after the 2013 defeat at the polls. MDC parties refused to sign 
the anti-sanctions petition in 2011 because to them, it was a ZANU-PF project to extricate the 
ruling party members under the targeted sanctions.834 That could have weakened it ahead of the 
2013 elections. After the 2013 elections, an undisclosed colonel was quoted as saying to 
Tsvangirai: “Until when will you want to become president? Just wait and see what we will do to 
you. ZANU-PF disciplines mad people like you. Five years from now you will have become 
useless.”835 The Daily News  stated that the only thing achieved by the MDC in the coalition was 
to further strengthen ZANU-PF’s hold on power as people endorsed the 2013 constitution that was 
a ZANU-PF manifesto.836In terms of the new constitution that guided the 2013 elections, ZANU-
PF dominated parliament, and this further pushed the opposition into political oblivion. There was 
lack of vision and alternatives by the opposition parties837 that appeared only united in wanting 
Mugabe to step down but did not envisage another rallying strategy to win people’s support should 
that fail to happen, as it did.  
7.6 CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
Partisanship, interpreted in this dissertation to mean making decisions based on partisan loyalty, 
or unquestioning obedience to a political party either by individuals or entities as an 
institutionalised strategy for the dispensation of patronage resources using highly selective criteria, 
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has been an ingrained trait in Zimbabwean politics since independence in 1980. The need to create 
non-partisan state institutions is a necessary political imperative that was hampered by the long 
legacy of quasi-one-party state under Robert Mugabe. It is feared that his legacy of Dodaism and 
Mugabeism, defined in terms of the use of violence, intimidation and electoral manipulation by 
ZANU-PF with reckless abandon against opposition leaders and their followers, will live on for 
generations to come unless a new political culture is built around a new set of value systems. That 
would need a radical transformation and orientation of all the institutions that have given safety 
props for three decades to ZANU-PF political hegemony. Electoral accountability has been 
undermined by patronage pressures that border on corruption, thus creating a weak institutional 
base for multiparty democracy. 
ZANU-PF rule can be considered to be a militarised form of electoral authoritarianism built to 
outlast Mugabe’s political career and this is likely to affect the nature of any political transition 
and future prospects for democracy in Zimbabwe.838 Use of state resources by ZANU-PF to dig in 
for power is entrenched in the Zimbabwean electoral system. The challenge of uprooting 
Mugabeism even after his departure is quite real because it has become institutionalised. It is an 
entrenched philosophy that requires the elimination of the whole Mugabe generation, together with 
the institutional safety props upon which the regime was anchored, so that new political and 
economic paradigms can be adopted and implemented for the common good.  
This study underscores the need for a professional judiciary and for mechanisms to manage ethnic 
diversity. Democracy movements in Africa need to place more emphasis on concrete social and 
economic rights as opposed to abstract political rights.839In Zimbabwe, democratic conditions 
seem difficult to sustain given the revolutionary background upon which the ruling ZANU-PF 
leadership is based. Mugabe’s intellectual prowess and his understanding of micro and 
macroeconomics, and his political understanding of Zimbabwe, Africa and the world were all 
crucial to his retaining power.840  
The ‘big brother syndrome’ by SADC dashed all hopes of a peaceful democratic transition in 
Zimbabwe. Together with the AU and UN, SADC acknowledged that Tsvangirai and the MDC 
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won the 2008 presidential elections and were denied victory, yet they did nothing to correct this. 
The ZANU-PF feud between Generation40 (G40) and Team Lacoste (Crocodile) reached 
uncontrollable heights in the last quarter of 2017 when the First Lady, Grace Mugabe, took the 
liberty at the so-called ‘interface rallies’ with the youths led by Kudzanai Chipanga to castigate 
vice president Mnangagwa. Mugabe in support of his wife responded: 
I am getting insulted in the name of Mnangagwa daily. Did I make a mistake to appoint 
Mnangagwa as my deputy? If I made a mistake I can even drop him tomorrow. If he wants 
to form his party with his supporters, he can go ahead. We can't have a party riddled with 
insulting each other daily. We heard this booing [of the First Lady in Bulawayo] was 
organised before we came. Those who want to be under me should behave, and those who 
don't should go. We don't persuade people. It doesn’t matter who.841 
This turmoil led to a military coup ‘to clean up the mess in the party’ with Ignatious Chombo, 
Jonathan Moyo, Saviour Kasukuwere and Grace Mugabe as the usual military list of bad people 
surrounding and ill-advising president Mugabe and who had to be sacked from ZANU-PF. The 
resignation of Mugabe after 37 years in power was negotiated in the context of a military coup. 
Opposition reacted to the ascendancy of Mnangagwa as president, and to the fate of multiparty 
practice in future elections beginning 2018 in different ways. There were those in the opposition 
who hoped to be included in an inclusive transitional government and others who were sceptical 
about participating in state institutions born out of a coup. The army that prevented Tsvangirai 
from assuming office as president after his election victory in March 2008 is the same institution 
that got at the helm of political power after the November 2017 military coup. Can the coup 
government be entrusted with creating a roadmap for democratic transition in the country given 
its straitjacket declaration that Zimbabwe is beholden to the war veterans who brought 
independence in 1980?  
The military seems to be dampening the hope of a free and fair election in future. Having soldiers 
as part of the political architecture cannot help in facilitating a genuine all-inclusive democratic 
transition process given the fact that their raison d’ etre is to perpetuate one-party rule under a 
leader it prefers and to popularise the liberation legacy. The military has sent a clear message to 
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the electorate that it reserves the right to turn down election outcomes it disapproves of and, as 
Hamill notes, it has secured veto powers over the leadership of the ruling ZANU-PF party, and 
even over the political process on a broader spectrum.842 He refers to Mnangagwa’s 
administrations as an effective ‘barracks democracy’843 subjected ideologically to the whims of 
the soldiers and characterised by command-oriented national development policies.  
The historical role of the military in deciding the man (it has always been a man!) at the helm of 
power in ZANU-PF dating back to the era of the liberation struggle, demonstrates that multiparty 
democracy cannot be guaranteed by means of the ballot. The entitlement mentality by the war 
veterans that the country belongs to them by right of the armed struggle and the institutional legacy 
of their military involvement in politics dating back to the liberation days does not augur well for 
electoral democracy in Zimbabwe.844 Military interventions have been known to block electoral 
democracy and the Zimbabwean scenario cannot be excepted. There is a likelihood that the 
military will either fail or succeed entirely with Mnangagwa in the 2018 elections. The military, 
like it has done before, will likely intervene during election campaigns in rural areas and in the 
management of election results should Mnangagwa get beaten in the first round of elections. 
The renewed ZAPU under Dumiso Dabengwa commemorated Gukurahundi on 22 December 
2017, which is a national holiday in Zimbabwe to mark the Unity Accord of 1987 that ended the 
ZANU-PF and PF ZANU hostilities of the first decade of independence. The significance of that 
development was that it reminded the Ndebele that the Unity Accord was fake and that instead of 
celebrating it, they should be kept reminded that justice did not prevail when close to 20 000 people 
were murdered by an army that was instructed to do so by the very people who usurped power in 
November 2017. Commenting on the new political dispensation ushered in by the alliance between 
the military led by Chiwenga and Mnangagwa, Dabengwa remarked in December 2017:  
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We continue to suffer silently. We continue to live in fear and the same crocodiles that 
devoured our people [during Gukurahundi] are still in power…they recently changed faces 
and names… the system and the attitudes only mutated yet they remain the same.845 
Implicit in this statement is the role that both Mnangagwa and Chiwenga played in the killing of 
the Ndebele people in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions during the infamous Gukurahundi 
era of the 1980s. Mnangagwa was Minister of State Security, the overall commander of the ZNA 
then was Solomon Mujuru and Chiwenga was the Brigadier-General of 1 Brigade during the 
Gukurahundi atrocities. By its very nature a crocodile (by which name Mnangagwa is popularly 
known and his official signature resembles a crocodile) attacks its prey ruthlessly. The replacement 
of Mugabe by the so-called ‘crocodiles’ suggests that ZANU-PF is still in power despite changes 
in leadership, and the people still have to grapple with continuities that have only metamorphosed 
without affecting the key aspects that maintain the ZANU-PF machinery. This political fault line 
will likely weaken attempts at reconciliation in future as affected Ndebele people see in the 
country’s leaders, architects of the previous killings who maintain hostile attitudes towards them 
as an ethnic category. The developments that ushered in a military dispensation helped to 
concretize feelings of “Ndebele-ness” and generated secessionist tendencies with the capacity to 
entrench divided loyalties premised on ethnic considerations.    
Vote-buying is another problem that constitutes a potentially serious threat to multiparty 
democracy in Zimbabwe. Political rivals for power are wont to distribute resources in return for 
votes and favours. Admittedly, the practice is rampant in many countries in Africa, where it is 
blatant, but also elsewhere, including in European counties where it may be less conspicuous. 
Zimbabwe represents a unique scenario where a party like ZANU-PF, with so many years of 
uninterrupted rule, enjoys monopoly over the distribution of patronage resources and deployment 
of the coercive apparatus to gain popularity. This has led to the placement of incompetent party 
loyalists in positions of authority because they have been beneficiaries of a longstanding culture 
of accumulation and can dispense with resources to gain votes. One of the sad stories aligned to 
the politics of patronage and clientelism has been the recycling of people nominated into 
ministerial positions since 1980 and this seems to give them a feeling of indispensability. 
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Many people left Zimbabwe due the economic meltdown and political violence dating back to the 
ESAP era of the early 1990s.There is massive disenfranchisement as the government of Zimbabwe 
consistently denies these diasporans the postal ballot facility. Abductions, disappearances and 
displacements of political victims have, since the era of violent politics that started in earnest in 
1999 with the formation of the MDC, negatively affected people who may have wanted to vote as 
they would be forced out of their voting constituencies for them to be able to cast their votes. This 
is exemplified by teachers who register to vote in specific wards but get deployed outside these 
wards to participate in the election exercise in various capacities, making it practically impossible 
for them to vote. 
POSA and AIPPA are pieces of legislation that were put in place to support ZANU-PF state 
structures at the height of opposition MDC ascendancy in 2002. They have been discussed at length 
in one of the chapters and they ought to be legislated out of existence to allow for tolerance, 
freedom of political conviction and association and other rights that are generic to all multiparty 
democratic systems. International credibility, long since lost during the mayhem of the 2000 
elections and the controversial land redistribution programme that targeted white farmers, could 
be restored if international observers and monitors are allowed into the country to oversee the 
conduct of elections at least six months before they take place.  
Although many African leaders have expressed dismay at the fact that they are not called upon to 
do the same in faraway European election processes, they do so cautiously in case they get 
disqualified for financial and other forms of assistance from international institutions. Mugabe has 
been popularly known at the United Nations and other international fora for lambasting the British 
and Americans. He was regarded as an outstanding defender of Pan-Africanism and the sovereign 
rights of the African people using demonisation discourses that made the British and the MDC 
together appear as implacable enemies of the state. Though not officially declared so, I have argued 
in this dissertation that Zimbabwe since 2000 has been in a state of emergency where rules of 
political behaviour were rescinded, where imposed political unanimity, despite the difficulties in 
making it work, was preferred by the ruling ZANU-PF over the politics of compromise and 
plurality, and where one even feared to whisper about the tumultuous tendencies of ZANU-PF’s 
institutions and its functionaries.  
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State-directed violence and intimidation of political opponents impinge on meaningful 
participation of different parties in an election.  Arming the militia and war veterans to frighten 
rural voters into endorsing choices dictated to them under threat of losing their land or facing 
retribution for voting for the opposition candidates is an age-old tactic of political coercion that 
has tainted the country’s human rights record with Amnesty International and other rights 
organisations. The de-Zanufication of national institutions can open avenues for more open 
political dialogue among political contenders, demystify the ownership of the country by one party 
based on a liberationist ethos and create a society in which political stability exists and where 
economic development takes place as a positive consequence of a competent bureaucracy based 
on meritocratic considerations as opposed to nepotistic political appointments.  
  
Ward-based elections and ward-based-counting procedures reminiscent of the old practice where 
voters stood behind their choice, have the effect of intimidating potential voters unless voter 
education is done to ward off misconceptions. Even then, people might still not be convinced that 
nothing happens to them if they vote ‘incorrectly’ for the opposition. Ward specific electoral 
methodologies, though they have the intention of preventing manipulation of sealed ballot boxes 
during their transmission process to the National Command Centre currently headquartered in 
Harare, scare the voters because such a system exposes their political affiliation. Calls in the past 
have been made to periodically update the voters’ roll so that names of those voters who either 
died or emigrated between the two elections are deleted. The Registrar-General, Tobaiwa Mudede, 
was viewed by the opposition as a senior member of the ruling party for his instrumental role in 
facilitating ZANU-PF victories at the polls846as these ‘ghost voters’ names remained on voter’s 
rolls. A transparent system to remove the dead from the rolls must be put in place for credible 
elections and uncontested results to be realised. 
The curtailment of public spheres undermines the development of democratic institutions. Dorman 
notes that when confronted with conditions of political crisis and vulnerability, leaders’ concerns 
with control take precedence over either liberation or democracy leading to increasingly 
authoritarian and exclusivist policies.847 This is a fitting characterisation of the Zimbabwean 
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political history when the country was plunged into political crisis. The government formed by 
ZANU-PF gave priority to its own existence to avoid becoming irrelevant, and it ostensibly 
embarked on a frontal attack on democracy. The signing of the Abuja Agreement (2001)848 by the 
Zimbabwe Government and Britain under the auspice of the Commonwealth meant that  Mugabe’s 
government had voluntarily committed itself to peaceful mechanisms for  land redistribution as if 
to mark the termination of the standoff between Zimbabwe and Britain.849 The Guardian 
newspaper described the Agreement as a remarkable piece of diplomacy whereas Tsvangirai 
commented in a doorstep interview with Jack Straw, the then British Foreign Secretary, that “… 
flowery declarations are made without commitment and when leaders are reminded of what they 
have signed, they retreat into the sovereignty of nations.”850 The country’s leaders must, perforce, 
embrace new governance strategies that lead to the development of democratic institutions.  
ZANU-PF has for a long time relied on its social bases that are fundamental in the mobilisation of 
political support at election time. It also politicised the land reform programme which became 
partisan. It created four social bases which are the youth peasant group, cross-border traders, combi 
(taxi) drivers [mahwindi] and artisanal miners [makorokoza].851 The peasantry group was a social 
base that was maintained through the presidential input scheme, food programmes and farm 
implements. Another social base of artisanal miners could mine freely in return for its electoral 
support to ZANU-PF. The third and fourth social bases are the association of combi drivers and 
cross-border traders. The culture of impunity is deep-rooted and must be confronted boldly so that 
opposition activists and opposition leaders, together with members of the ruling party, are 
uniformly subjected to the rule of law and made answerable to their political actions that are not 
in tandem with the country’s laws. 
Grace Mugabe, who wanted to take over from her husband Robert Mugabe as president and 
thereby create a Mugabe dynasty, was too young to have fought in the liberation war. Political 
analysts and many people following political developments in the country  in 2017 were convinced 
that the removal of Mnangagwa on 7 November 2017 meant that Grace Mugabe would be 
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appointed as vice president at the ZANU-PF Congress to be held in December852 because the 
Women's League that she led was demanding the appointment of a female vice president.853 
ZANU-PF was reduced to a personality cult that revered Mugabe who had become more important 
than state institutions. The November 2017 coup in Zimbabwe reminded some students of history 
of the November Revolution in Russia in 1917 that ushered the era of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and the socialisation of the means of production. It must be noted that with respect to 
the Zimbabwe military’s insatiable appetite for politics, the ‘soft coup’ that ousted Mugabe in 
November 2017 was not the first attempted coup by Zimbabwe’s military in post-independent 
Zimbabwe. Another thwarted coup was attempted on Mugabe’s regime in 2007 and it led to the 
deaths of Brigadier Armstrong Gunda, Fakazi Muleya and Gideon Lifa.854 One would have thought 
that the bloodless military takeover of the state-owned ZBC radio station was a means to that end. 
The new government elite must pass the test of its acceptability lest people continue to view it as 
a continuation of Mugabe’s regime, bent on protecting the prebendal economic interests of the old 
guard in ZANU-PF that was under threat from the young G40 from within the party. At seventy-
five, Munangagwa is less likely to undergo a benign metamorphosis having made public 
pronouncements that he still admires Mugabe for mentoring him, and that had it not been the young 
G40 whom he feels ill-advised Mugabe, the latter would not have fired him. The history of Mugabe 
and Mnangagwa can be linked to tribal politics ordered around Zezuru and Karanga ethnicities 
and probably has little to do with generational perceptions because it is not clear how old 
Mnangagwa is. He could be well over 75, as has been claimed. The current developments are 
meant to provide more efficient dictatorship in Mnangagwa’s military-backed leadership. The 
British PM, Theresa May, for one, was convinced that the resignation of Mugabe provided 
Zimbabwe with an opportunity to forge a new path free of the oppression that characterised his 
rule.855 
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The misfortune of the jubilation that began on 17 November 2017 at the departure of Mugabe after 
serving for 37 years as Head of State, was the misinterpretation that the marchers were all 
supporting Mnangagwa. In any case, the anticipated GNU after the resignation of Mugabe, 
reminiscent of the one that ended in 2013 between ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations, did 
not materialise.  Ibbo Mandaza had proposed a transitional organisation composed of technocrats, 
not politicians, to run the affairs of the state pending elections, whereas SADC initially hoped for 
a transition government pending free and fair elections, but the idea collapsed once the planned 
meeting was called off after Mugabe’s resignation.856 The most unfortunate development was that 
the military reduced the factional feuds to a ZANU-PF affair, making it clear from the beginning 
that they wanted to eliminate political malcontents from within the ruling party who were on a 
national campaign to purge the party of all former liberation fighters leading to the erosion of the 
party’s revolutionary legacy.857 The view that the military overruled the desire by some members 
from the political spectrum in government for a transitional arrangement can hardly be dismissed. 
It can be discerned from the military remarks that the opposition had no role to play in the new 
political dispensation ushered in by the coup, and that instead of a coalition between ZANU-PF 
and the opposition, Mnangagwa’s cabinet was, indeed, a GNU between the6 army and ZANU-
PF.858 
One of the weaknesses in Zimbabwe’s political landscape under ZANU-PF tutelage is to identify 
an elected leader with the liberation struggle. It is a loophole that ZANU-PF will continue to take 
advantage of. It puts closure to the opposition’s call for competitive multiparty democracy and 
makes it difficult for the opposition parties to justify their existence. Worse still, opposition support 
tends to be diluted by the constituency zero sum system where, despite marginal differences in 
vote counts in certain constituencies, the winner takes all. This constituency system that began in 
1985 to replace the PR system, gives advantage to the incumbent that has unfettered access to state 
resources for the dispensation of patronage. There is need for drastic transformation in 
Zimbabwe’s political, security and economic sectors for sustainable democracy to emerge. There 
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is also need for government to bring in policies that promote economic growth and repair and to 
rebrand Zimbabwe’s damaged image especially with western countries, and prioritise political 
tolerance for inculcating and sustaining a liberal democratic tradition in Zimbabwe.  
Mugabe was deemed to be a master of political manipulation when it came to SADC’s mediation 
efforts in the political crisis in Zimbabwe. He responded to SADC pressure on his government by 
promising change which he did not deliver. For example, Mugabe fast-tracked a constitutional 
court ruling to confirm a premature elections date, thus shutting down prospects of reforms that 
the MDC and SADC wanted to see before the 2013 elections.859 The announcement of an election 
date was made when the country was not adequately ready for elections as evidenced by a 
shambolic voters’ roll, an unreformed security service and grossly unbalanced media platforms.860 
The 2017 change of leadership in ZANU-PF might suggest a different role for Zimbabwe within 
SADC. Arthur Mutambara, Deputy PM in the GNU, remarked that Zimbabweans should never 
again allow an individual to hold the country to ransom following the departure of Mugabe from 
the helm of power.861  
The 2013 constitution had its own inherent weaknesses: it was borne out of power politics to the 
exclusion of views from other vital players such as local NGOs and the broader civil society. It 
would appear there was no political will to ensure democracy prevailed as no proper mechanisms 
were put in place to ensure strict adherence to the constitution apart from creating JOMIC that 
comprised members of the three main parties in the GNU-ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M- with 
each team striving within the coalition framework to advance and protect its own political interests. 
The constitution-making process was hijacked by politicians in 2013 as outreach programmes in 
rural constituencies were led by teams of party representatives and the electorate in rural areas had 
been drilled to provide responses to tie in with their party positions on national issues. One of the 
most interesting constitutional matters was that on the terms of the president, where ZANU-PF 
participants during the outreach were trained to say that the president should rule until he died or 
(kusvika madhongi amera nyanga) until donkeys grew horns, the assumption being that the 2013 
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presidential results would be won by Mugabe.862 The Media Monitoring Observer Mission noted 
that the media was dominated by the ‘vote yes’ campaigns instead of focusing on educating the 
electorate on the contents of the new constitution.863 This was the second referendum on a new 
constitution to replace the Lancaster Constitution that had been amended nineteen times,864 after 
the failure of the first one in 2000. 
The events of 17 November outmatch the conceited mantra of the opposition being the sole liberal 
interlocutor for democratising the country.865  What this means is that what the opposition MDC-
T promised about democratic change is being implemented by Mnangagwa’s regime and this has 
seriously affected its credibility and continued existence as a party. The MDC failed to understand 
the philosophical mobilisation gravitas which emanated from the historical interconnectedness of 
the gun and politics.866 Operation Restore Legacy (ORL) and the people’s triumph pushed the 
opposition against the wall. ORL was described by the military as embodying their informed 
nationalist defence of collective African interests in global dialogue and policy-making.867 
Mashakada noted that people in Zimbabwe are tired of elections because ZANU-PF ‘steals’ 
elections and posits that as opposition, they could have toppled the Mugabe government long ago 
if they had preferred non-constitutional means.868  It is apparent that the democratic path to regime 
change will be difficult in Zimbabwe, especially when the opposition is fighting a revolutionary 
party like ZANU-PF, and when SADC and other African governments are complicit in the 
maintenance of the political status quo in Zimbabwe. 
In the first chapter, this dissertation proposed in this qualitative research to formulate a theory 
based on the findings of this study. This study suggests that the longer an opposition party remains 
in opposition, the less likely it is to remain relevant to the people, and the more susceptible are the 
political behaviours of opposition politicians to the political tendencies of the party they oppose. 
The framework to enable me to relate research results, or my conclusion, to existing knowledge, 
is predicated on the military choice theory. It is applicable in the analysis of military involvement 
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in politics dating back to the formative years of the nationalist struggle in the 1960s. The decisions 
of the army leadership in ZIPRA and ZANLA as military wings of ZAPU and ZANU respectively 
have had influence on the choice of the party president. Elections in Zimbabwe from 1985 up to 
2013 witnessed military intervention in varying forms of intimidation and coercion to influence 
election outcomes in favour of ZANU-PF candidates. The ascendancy of Mugabe to position of 
party president in 1975 in Mozambique was a military coup de grace that terminated Ndabaningi 
Sithole’s leadership of ZANU. Those ‘comrades’ who disapproved of the decision were eliminated 
by execution in a ‘clean-up’ campaign of ZIPA in 1977.  
The securocrats overturned election results and prolonged Mugabe’s terms of office by purportedly 
rigging the vote each time presidential elections were held, according to CCJP and Amnesty 
International reports. The 2002 Presidential elections were authored by the security services 
involving the army, police and prison service and results were preordained when they threatened 
the nation with war if Mugabe lost. The 2008 March elections results were annulled on a flimsy 
reason that there was no outright winner in order to pave way for a re-run in June in the same year 
whose pro-ZANU-PF election results were dubbed ‘a military coup by stealth’.869 The security 
forces also bestowed upon themselves the unconstitutional prerogative of ‘kingmaker’, making 
impunity a culture ingrained in the politics of the ruling ZANU-PF party. The 2017 ‘soft coup’ by 
the military in November was bloodless, hence the use of the word ‘soft’. It enthroned Mnangagwa 
as Zimbabwe’s president and made him beholden to the military as his source of legitimacy and 
power to rule the country until elections could take place on a date to be determined by the 
president. However, Andy Cross’s interview with a radio broadcaster, Star FM, was opposed to 
having Constantino Chiwenga, a lifetime soldier, to lead the country and intimates that the so-
called ‘new dispensation’, viewed as a departure from Mugabeism, should focus, instead, on 
having a new generation of leaders.870  
Violence clearly undermines foundational rights which must be defended. From a maximalist 
definition of violence, Schwarzmantel discusses what he calls systemic violence which is seen as 
inherent in the working of a social or political system.871. The military choice theory is, therefore, 
                                                 
869 E. Masunungure, (2009). A militarised election, p. 85.  
870 Bulawayo24. News, (2017b). MDC disorganised, not prepared for 2018 elections, says Eddie Cross 
https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-125056.html Accessed 12 March 2018 
871 J. Schwarzmantel, (2010). Democracy and violence: a theoretical overview. Democratization, 17(2), p. 218. 
234 
 
a theory that studies the decision-making behaviour of securocrats, and traces the political 
economy of militarism in which politicians are indebted to military interests for their own survival. 
It is the military that masterminded democide872 during elections to pursue a minoritisation agenda 
characterised by the disenfranchisement of the current diasporans, the curtailment of opposition 
voting and the doctoring of results at the National Command Centre to satisfy the interests of a 
few individuals in the army.  
Linked to this military choice theory is the democracy perversion theory. Democracy has been 
caricatured in Zimbabwe in a way to create a false impression about the political impartiality of 
the security services in the country, yet they overtly paraded their partisanship as ZANU-PF 
loyalists. This theory seeks to broaden the parameters on democracy so that lack of food, shelter, 
jobs, meaningful participation, and other basic human needs are viewed as limitations on the 
exercise of genuine democracy.  
The conflict in Zimbabwe has been portrayed mostly in terms of ethnic conflict. This dissertation 
would argue that such conflict is not inevitable. Despite decades of virtual anarchy, the 
Zimbabwean state has managed to hold, and there is every likelihood that if the old pre-
independence revolutionaries around provided policies that are just and equitable, it can forge a 
nation state that may just hold. What is key would be to have the current leadership out of the way, 
including the present military leaders, and replace it with more responsible and equitable 
leadership capable of turning this decades-old rivalry into an inclusive political arrangement for 
economic and social justice. Of course, it is accepted that central to the democratic political process 
is competition, but in fragile states such as Zimbabwe, balance must be found. Calls for electoral 
reforms are always there simply because the political field is never a constant terrain. Opposition 
parties in Zimbabwe ought to realise that these electoral reforms cannot be tailored to handhold 
opposition parties into power and this explains the reluctance by the government to implement in 
full some of the contentious provisions of the 2013 constitution with regard to the devolution of 
power. The example of South Africa in 1994, where the ruling white minority National Party 
government and the liberation movement, the ANC, formed a government of national unity, is an 
example of the importance of inclusion until the political process is more robust. A situation where 
                                                 
872 The word refers to government insinuated murders and the military has always been an essential cog in the 
ZANU-PF machine. 
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only the victor has access to the ‘spoils of war’ will lead likely result in conflict and instability, 
especially where parties are clearly divided along ethnic lines. The right balance must be found 
between competition and inclusion so as not to stifle the democratic process, although this balance 
will vary from country to country, depending on such factors as history, economic strength, 
demography, ethnic relations and other criteria. 
The author argues that multipartyism politics is not the only gateway to democracy in the context 
of African governance systems. There could be other avenues through which African governance 
realms can be investigated and evaluated outside of western conceptions of democracy with their 
narrowed focus on multipartyism as a sufficient condition. One of the ideas that political scientists 
have put forth is ‘consociational’ democracy. 873  The idea underlying this from Cheeseman’s 
explanation, is that ‘political systems are more likely to be seen to be legitimate, and hence stable, 
if different communities feel they are included in government and their core interests are protected 
by the status quo’. Cheeseman, drawing on the political scientist, Arendt Lijphart, whose own 
work is based on the example of the Netherlands, Belgium and Lebanon, points to four ways to 
facilitate inclusion. These are: a power-sharing cabinet in which all of the main political parties 
can experience a taste of executive power; the extension of this principle of accommodation 
throughout the political system, with all state positions from the bureaucracy to the police force 
distributed in proportion to the size of ethnic groups within the wider population; a minority veto 
to be constitutionally entrenched to provide smaller ethnic groups with the power to block the 
implementation of policies that they find unacceptable; and a form of federalism in which 
communities would be given a degree of self-government over issues that affect only them.874   
This model is not without problems but may help to achieve some semblance of stability and be 
perceived to be more equitable from the point of view of losing factions, than a ‘winner-takes-all’ 
model. This model may not work but clearly some experimentation is required as existing 
arrangements are perceived to be problematic. Federalism and power-sharing have been tried 
                                                 
873 N. Cheeseman, (2017). Democratic breakthroughs in Africa: time to celebrate but worries still linger. The 
Conversation, University of Birmingham, 14 September 2017. 
874 The Zimbabwe Constitution (2013) section 264 (1) on devolution of governmental powers and responsibilities has 
this aspect lucidly entrenched but a centralist approach remained in practice, giving rise to grievances in Matabeleland. 
See Ndakaripa, M. (2014). Ethnicity, narrative, and the 1980s violence in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces 
of Zimbabwe. Oral History Forum d’histoire orale, 34 Special Issue on Human Rights and Oral History 
http://www.oralhistoryforum.ca/index.php/ohf/article/viewFile/546/624 Accessed 20 June 2018. 
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elsewhere in Africa (for example, in Nigeria and Kenya respectively) and lessons can be drawn 
from them in the endeavour to increase prospects for political stability in the Zimbabwean case. 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Somali, Sudan, Rwanda, and other African countries have all experimented 
with political models and it is imperative that “African lessons” be drawn rather than just attempt 
to impose western models. No one-size-fits-all model can be applied in African political systems 
because of their varied colonial experiences, and the unique circumstances of Zimbabwe must be 
factored in, when devising an institutional political design for the country.  The researcher concurs 
with Cheeseman’s view that African political systems [Zimbabwe included], should be less 
majoritarian and suggests that they can do well by protecting the rights and interests of minorities 
so that the true benefits of democratic government are realised.875 
The figure of the leader and his or her personal qualities are also crucial. If the leader enjoys the 
support and trust of the masses, can reach out to his opponents, is a visionary and can see the bigger 
picture beyond him or herself, and is a unifying symbol, it can make a difference. Leaders like 
Nelson Mandela of South Africa and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, in the African context, come to 
mind. The development, political and economic trajectories of these states may have been under 
different leadership at the outset, as these leaders were very focused on nation-building. This is 
not to say that leaders can make a major difference in every context since the geography and history 
differ, but leadership does make a difference. In the African context, unfortunately, divisive leaders 
continue to attempt to change the constitution to extend their stay in power. Examples here include 
Sam Nujoma in Namibia, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, Paul Biya of Cameroon, Obiang-Nguema of 
Equatorial Guinea, José Eduardo Do Santos of Angola, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, DRC 
President Joseph Kabila, and Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi. This extension of rule often derives 
from wanting to cling on to power, which brings with it the ability to continue to gain access to 
state resources, wealth, patronage, and the ability to loot state coffers. Turning to a continent-wide 
body like the AU has little benefit since its membership includes many presidents who are 
themselves clinging to power and their messages would not carry moral weight. For example, one 
could not take Mugabe seriously when he was chair of the AU that has generally opposed military 
coups but ignored constitutional change, which if implemented, has the capacity to introduce new 
leadership. 
                                                 
875 N. Cheeseman, (2017). Democratic breakthroughs in Africa. 
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This dissertation would also suggest that a free and responsible press is crucial to any democratic 
state. The press, be it newspapers, television, or social media, should serve the public interest. 
However, in a country like Zimbabwe, which is deeply divided by party politics along ethnicity as 
evidenced by the power struggle and subsequent split in MDC-T between the two vice presidents, 
Thokozani Khupe from Matabeleland and Nelson Chamisa from Masvingo, the media should not 
only take its role seriously but also responsibly. The press should be able to expose corruption, 
patronage and illiberal tendencies and also to exercise responsibility when doing its work. No 
democratic process can function effectively unless people can communicate their views to the 
public. The Zimbabwean public is relatively well-educated, and an informed citizenry will 
undoubtedly be better placed to participate responsibly in the democratic process. The tendency of 
authoritarian voices to shut down opposition voices does not do anyone any good in the long term. 
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INTERVIEWS 
Interview with Arkmore Kori, CCJPZ National Coordinator,29 May 2017. 
Interview with Faith Kamutsungira, MDC-T Women’s League member,15 May 2017. 
Interview with Fay King Chung, Deputy Secretary for Administration in the Ministry of 
Education from 1980 to 1988 and Minister of Education from 1988 to 1993, 30 June 2016. 
Interview with Freedom Maziriri, State security agent, 23 May 2017.  
Interview with Gandi Mudzingwa, advisor to MDC-T leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, 7 April 2017. 
Interview with Innocent Madenga, PhD student in Peace Studies,24 March 2017. 
Interview with Janice McLaughlin, Maryknoll Sister of St. Dominic, a congregation of women 
religious missionaries that was founded in the United States in 1912 and President of the 
congregation from 2009-2015, 23 October 2017. 
Interview with Monica Mutsvangwa, Minister of State for Manicaland Province, a ZANLA war 
veteran, 31 May 2017. 
Interview with Morgen Komichi, Deputy National Chairperson for Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC-T, 
Deputy minister of Transport in the Inclusive Government (2008-2013), 25 April 2017. 
Interview with Reuben Mureyani, ZANLA ex-combatant, 4 April 2017. 
Interview with Supa Collin Mandiwanzira, Minister of Information Communication Technology 
and Cyber Security and founder of ZiFM Stereo Radio Station, 31 May 2017. 
Interview with Sydney Chisi, leader of the MDC-T Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe 
and political analyst 7 April 2017. 
Interview with Tapiwa Mashakada, MDC-T Member of Parliament for Hatfield, Harare, and 
GNU Minister of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion, 26 April 2017. 
Interview with Togarepi Zivai Mhetu, ZINASU president, 26 April 2017. 
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Skype interview with David Coltart, Zimbabwean lawyer, founder member of the MDC and its 
founding Secretary for Legal Affairs, Member of Parliament for Bulawayo South in the House of 
Assembly from 2000 to 2008, and Senator since 2008, 11 May 2017. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Demographic information 
Question 
number 
Question Response set Skip 
Pattern 
1 What is your sex? 1.  Male 
2.  Female 
 
2 To which age group do you 
belong? 
1.  Less than 25 
2.  25-40 years 
3.  41-50 years 
4.  51 years and above 
5. Decline to answer 
 
3 What is your current marital status? 1.  Single (never married) 
2.  Married 
3.  Living together, but not married 
4.  Divorced/separated 
5.  Widowed 
5. Decline to answer 
 
4 Can you read and write? 1.  Yes 
2.  No 
3. Don’t Know 
4. Decline to answer 
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5 What is the highest level of 
education you completed? 
1.  Never attended school 
2.  Primary 
3. Forms 1 – 2 
4.  Ordinary level 
5.  Advanced level 
6.  Completed diploma 
7.  Completed degree 
8. Other 
(specify)____________________ 
5. Decline to answer 
 
6 What is your occupation?  
______________________________ 
 
7 What is your monthly personal 
income in US dollars? 
1. No income  
2. Less than $100 
3. $100 - $500 
4. Above $500 
5. Decline to answer 
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Political history 
8 What is your political 
affiliation? 
1.  Non-partisan or Neutral 
2.  ZANU PF 
3.  ZANU Ndonga 
4.  MDC-T 
5.  PDP 
6.  ZANU People First 
7.  Other (specify)_____________________ 
8. Decline to answer 
If non 
partisan or 
neutral, 
skip to Qn 
10 
9 At what age did you join 
active politics? 
1.  Less than 25 
2.  25-40 years 
3.  41-50 years 
4.  51 years and above 
5. Decline to answer 
 
10 Does politics affect you in 
any way? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
5. Decline to answer 
 
11 If answered yes to the 
above question, please 
explain how 
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________ 
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12 Have you experienced any 
problems in belonging to 
any party? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Decline to answer 
 
13 If the answer to (12) is 
yes, explain 
_____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________ 
 
14 Have you ever been 
coerced into voting for a 
party you did not like? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Decline to answer 
 
15 Has the issue of 
sovereignty been clearly 
understood by ordinary 
Zimbabweans? 
1.Yes 
2.No 
3.Not so sure 
 
16 Do you believe in spirit 
mediums? 
Yes 
No 
 
17 If answer to 32 is Yes, did 
they play a role in the 
political history of 
Zimbabwe at all? 
1. To a greater extent 
2. To a limited extent 
3. Not at all 
 
18 Does democracy exist in 
Zimbabwe? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
19 Sanctions on Zimbabwe 
are calculated to effect 
regime change. 
1. Agree 
2. Strongly agree 
3. Disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
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20 Media over the years have 
been used to articulate the 
ideological position of the 
ruling party. 
1. Agree 
2. Disagree 
 
21 How can factionalism in 
the opposition parties be 
explained? 
1. The west has withdrawn its support 
2. The parties have been infiltrated 
3. Parties lack clear political and 
ideological positions 
4. It happens in almost every political 
party 
5. All the above. 
 
 
22 South Africa’s ‘Quiet 
Diplomacy’ on the 
Zimbabwean political 
crisis weakened the 
opposition formations and 
strengthened ZANU-PF. 
1. True 
2. False. (Explain your answer) 
_______________________________
_______________________________
_______________________________ 
_______________________________
_______________________________ 
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. How effective were the objectives, strategies and modus operandi of opposition political 
parties in Zimbabwe in their quest for democracy since independence? 
2. To what extent were opposition parties sponsored by western countries to effect regime 
change and to what extent were they driven by internal factors? 
3. What factors militated against substantive multiparty politics and a smooth political 
transition process in Zimbabwe since 1985? 
4. How significant were ZANU-PF liberation narratives in influencing multiparty voting 
trends since 1985? 
5. Why were opposition political parties unable to provide counter narratives? 
6. What role did media play in the portrayal of opposition parties and the ruling ZANU-PF 
party since independence? 
7. Why was the opposition unable to maintain its upward trajectory after the expiry of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU)? 
 
Each interview will take approximately one hour and will be recorded. 
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